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Abstract
Africa is rapidly urbanizing. With so many African voters now living in cities, understanding African
electoral politics now requires understanding the politics of urban areas. How does urbanization affect the
accountability relationships between voters and politicians? Answering this question means answering a
series of more specific empirical questions: what do urban voters want from the government? Which types
of urban voters participate in politics and which do not? How do urban voters choose which candidates to
support? How do politicians campaign in cities? Which types of urban voters do politicians seek to favor
with state resources?
Electoral politics in African cities received significant attention in the independence era, but little polit-
ical science research has examined these cities in the contemporary democratic period. The small literature
that has is largely supportive of modernization approaches. Modernization theories expect a series of socio-
economic transformations created by urbanization to reduce the political importance of ethnicity and the
prevalence of clientelism and other forms of patronage-based politics. But I argue that urbanization also si-
multaneously creates conditions that reinforce incentives for patronage distribution, clientelism, and ethnic
voting. Scarcity in the provision of basic services in contexts of low state capacity encourages politicians to
continue employing patronage-based appeals. This solidifies many voters’ incentives to support ethnically-
aligned parties and drives the new urban middle class away from active political participation, lowering
pressure on urban politicians to engage in programmatic, policy-based competition.
I explore these incentives through a detailed study of Greater Accra, the largest metropolitan area in
Ghana. I combine original survey data and survey experiments, fine-grained geo-coded census data, and
extensive qualitative evidence to explore voters’ policy preferences, vote choices, and patterns of political
iii
participation, as well as politicians’ strategies in a cross-section of urban neighborhoods. The findings
suggest that rather than pulling political competition in one direction, as modernization theories expect,
urbanization in Africa instead moves political outcomes in multiple directions at once: reinforcing ethnic
competition and clientelism in some neighborhoods, while undermining these forms of political competition
in other neighborhoods within the same city at the same time. Studies of the effects of urbanization must
recognize that these dual realities co-exist within African cities.
In addition to building our understanding of urban politics in Africa, the dissertation contributes to
broader political science debates about the emergence of programmatic competition, determinants of politi-
cal participation, patterns of distributive politics, the importance of neighborhood context, and the causes of
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1 | Elections in an Urbanizing Africa
1.1 The Changes and Challenges of Urban Growth
By the mid-1980s, Accra, the capital city of Ghana, already had over one million residents. But you did
not need to drive far from the city center to find rural life. Seven miles (12km) northwest of downtown,
for example, was Gbawe, a farming community nestled in the sloping hills overlooking the city. The 1984
census counted 837 residents. Almost all were Ga, the indigenous ethnic group of the Accra area. Most
worked on small family farms. A chief’s palace sat at the center of the village, surrounded by traditional
compound houses belonging to the community’s original Ga families (Gough & Yankson 2006). A photo
of Gbawe taken a decade later in 1995, included in Gough & Yankson (2006), shows thatched reed roofs on
the homes surrounding the palace, typical of poor villages in rural Ghana.
But a major change began in the 1990s. As the city grew and Accra became increasingly crowded,
residents sought new land on the city’s outskirts (Ardayfio-Schandorf et al. 2012). Accra rapidly expanded
westward. By 2000, Gbawe’s population mushroomed to 29,000. By 2010, it reached 68,000. Gbawe’s
population density is now over 24,000 people per square mile (9,300 per sq. km), nearly double that of
Boston and greater than every US metropolitan area except New York. Only 25% of the residents were Ga
as of 2010. These original inhabitants had been dwarfed by the Akan, an ethnic group from elsewhere in
Ghana, who now make up 58% of the community.
Visiting Gbawe today, you can see vestiges of the original village. The chief’s palace still sits in the
center of the community. The homes immediately surrounding it still belong to the original Ga families. But
they have been renovated, now looking like other lower class houses throughout the city instead of village
dwellings. The chief retains some power among the Ga who remain in Gbawe.1 But the new residents who
1There have been prominent conflicts within the Ga community in Gbawe and surrounding “villages" over chieftaincy, especially
in Oblogo, a directly neighboring community. The Oblogo chief was murdered in 2012 as part of a dispute between the Gbawe
1
now form the majority in the community have little relationship with him. Walk a few blocks past the palace
in either direction and you find yourself in a diverse lower class neighborhood that looks indistinguishable
from others throughout Greater Accra. Amile north of the chief’s palace, on what was farm land two decades
ago, you come to a quiet suburban neighborhood of single-family homes for Accra’s growing professional
middle class.
The transformation of Gbawe from a small village on the outskirts of a city to a dense urban community
in the middle of a major metropolitan area is indicative of broader changes occurring across sub-Saharan
Africa. Africa’s urban population has increased by a quarter billion people since 1990, with nearly 100 mil-
lion new urbanites in West Africa alone (United Nations 2014). This mirrors the trend across the developing
world, where there are now one billion new urban residents since 1990, excluding the well-documented
urban growth in China (United Nations 2014). Table 1.1 shows urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa and
provides a comparison to other regions of the developing world. Southern Africa has long been relatively
more urbanized than the rest of the continent, due to industrialization in South Africa. But near majorities
of the population in West and Central Africa now live in cities as well, despite significantly less industrial-
ization. This includes Ghana, where more than half of the population now lives in cities for the first time.
Cities represent a smaller proportion of the population in East Africa, but current rates of urbanization are
faster there than in every world region except East Asia.
Urban growth has coincided in the last two decades with the longest period of sustained economic growth
since independence in many African countries (Radelet 2010). Annual GDP growth in Ghana averaged
5.5% since 1985, among the highest rates in the world. The country is now considered “middle income"
by the World Bank. The majority of African countries had growth rates averaging over 3% annually over
the last 30 years.2 The re-introduction of multi-party electoral competition in many African countries has
coincided with this urban growth. As of 2014, the 29 sub-Saharan countries listed in Table 1.1 are either now
democracies or competitive authoritarian regimes that hold regular elections.3 These are countries in which
the study of elections is important for explaining political outcomes, even if not all are fully democratic
royal family and Ga families from elsewhere in Accra over land ownership in that community. These conflicts are indicative of
the continued relevance of chieftaincy to segments of the Ga population. For example, see: Rocklyn Antonio and Linda Tenyah,
“Chief Murdered in Accra," The Daily Guide, 10 April 2012.
2See databank.worldbank.org/data.
3These countries are defined based on Freedom House (2014) scores of “Free" or “Partly Free" and/or Polity IV (2014) scores of 1
or greater.
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Table 1.1: Urban Population in Sub-Saharan Africa in Democratic or Hybrid Regimes
Region / Country: % Urban % Urban % Urban Annual % Change F.H. Polity IV
(1965) (1990) (2015) (2010-2015) (2014) (2014)
West Africa (total) 16.6 30.2 45.1 1.6 – –
Cote d’Ivoire 24.5 39.3 54.2 1.4 Partly Free 4
Ghana 26.1 36.4 54.0 1.3 Free 8
Liberia 22.1 55.4 49.7 0.8 Partly Free 6
Guinea-Bissau 14.3 28.1 49.3 1.7 Not Free 6
Nigeria 16.6 29.7 47.8 1.9 Partly Free 4
Benin 12.5 34.5 44.0 1.0 Free 7
Senegal 26.4 38.9 43.7 0.7 Free 7
Togo 15.0 28.6 40.0 1.3 Partly Free -2
Sierra Leone 20.4 33.3 39.9 0.9 Partly Free 7
Mali 12.6 23.3 39.9 2.1 Partly Free 5
Guinea 13.0 28.0 37.2 1.3 Partly Free 4
Burkina Faso 5.2 13.8 29.9 3.0 Partly Free 0
Niger 6.8 15.4 18.7 1.3 Partly Free 6
Central Africa (total) 19.7 32.2 44.0 1.2 – –
Gabon 23.8 69.1 87.2 0.3 Not Free 3
D.R.C. 23.4 30.6 42.5 1.2 Not Free 5
Southern Africa (total) 42.9 48.8 61.6 0.8 – –
South Africa 47.2 52.0 64.8 0.8 Free 9
Botswana 3.8 41.9 57.4 0.4 Free 8
Namibia 20.0 27.7 46.7 2.3 Free 6
Lesotho 6.4 14.0 27.3 2.0 Free 8
East Africa (total) 8.9 17.9 25.6 1.7 – –
Djibouti 56.1 76.0 77.3 0.1 Not Free 4
Zambia 23.4 39.4 40.9 1.1 Partly Free 7
Madagascar 12.4 23.6 35.1 1.9 Partly Free 6
Zimbabwe 14.6 29.0 32.4 -0.5 Not Free 4
Mozambique 5.8 25.0 32.2 0.8 Partly Free 6
Tanzania 6.0 18.9 31.6 2.3 Partly Free -1
Kenya 8.6 16.7 25.6 1.7 Partly Free 9
Malawi 4.9 11.6 16.3 0.9 Partly Free 6
Uganda 5.5 11.1 16.1 2.1 Partly Free -1
Burundi 2.3 6.3 12.1 2.5 Partly Free 6
Sub-Sah. Africa (total) 20.6 31.3 40.4 1.4 – –
Comparison Regions:
South America (total) 55.8 74.1 83.3 0.3 – –
Central America (total) 50.2 65.1 73.8 0.4 – –
Caribbean (total) 42.5 57.9 70.4 0.8 – –
Mid-East (W. Asia) (total) 40.4 61.1 69.9 0.5 – –
East Asia (total) 25.0 33.9 60.0 2.0 – –
Southeast Asia (total) 19.9 31.6 47.6 1.4 – –
Central Asia (total) 40.8 44.6 40.5 0.0 – –
South Asia (total) 18.4 26.5 34.8 1.2 – –
Population figures and sub-region classifications from United Nations (2014). Sub-region totals include all countries. Individual
countries listed are the subset within regions with either Freedom House (F.H.) ratings of at least “partly free" or Polity IV scores
over 0 (higher scores are more democratic). The table excludes small island nations that the UN classifies as part of sub-Saharan
Africa (e.g., Seychelles, Mauritius).
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(Levitsky & Way 2010). The urban population has grown in all but one of the countries listed in Table 1.1
since 1990. At least one third of the electorate now lives in cities in 19 of these countries.4
With so many African voters living in cities, understanding African electoral politics now requires under-
standing the politics of urban areas. How does urbanization affect the accountability relationships between
voters and politicians in African democracies? Answering this question means answering a series of more
specific questions about how electoral competition in urban settings actually operates: What do urban voters
want from the government? Which types of urban voters participate in politics and which do not? How do
voters choose which candidates to support in urban areas? How do politicians campaign in cities? Which
types of urban voters do politicians seek to favor with state resources? These are the core empirical questions
examined in the dissertation.
Urbanization has brought major socio-economic changes to African cities that affect the answers to
these questions. These include the emergence of large urban middle classes in many countries, alongside
the simultaneous expansion of impoverished slums (Kessides 2006, UN-Habitat 2010, African Development
Bank 2011). Traditional social institutions, such as chieftaincy, have adapted to new urban conditions. The
composition of urban populations has also changed with rural-urban migration, with many cities becoming
highly ethnically diverse, bringing different groups into greater social contact and interaction than in rural
areas.
Parallel to these societal changes, urban growth is also producing challenges for Africa’s governments.
We can only understand the political effects of the socio-economic changes associated with urbanization
– the emergence of an urban middle class, the declining importance of traditional elites, and rising ethnic
diversity – if we examine how these interact with the incentives created by new urban governance challenges.
Fundamentally, these challenges are rooted in scarcity. Population growth creates massive demands for basic
public services and infrastructure. Entire urban neighborhoods have emerged as if out of nothing in short
periods of time, with what had been rural villages rapidly transforming into the urban periphery. These
new areas often urbanize despite lacking basic infrastructure – paved roads, running water, sewers, trash
collection, and public schools. Population growth is also overwhelming pre-existing infrastructure in older
urban neighborhoods. City centers suffer from traffic jams, blackouts, dry water taps, flooding sewers,
4Worldwide, over 80% of the urban growth in the developing world outside of China has come in countries that now hold multi-
party elections. This is calculated from United Nations (2014) population data, classifying non-OECD countries (excluding China)
based on 2014 Polity IV scores of 1 or greater.
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and over-capacity schools and hospitals.5 Moreover, even as the middle class and formal sectors grow, the
majority of urban residents remain in the informal sector economy (Kessides 2006). These workers are often
separated from village-level institutions that provide social insurance and shut out from formal sources of
capital (Nichter and Goldmark 2009, Grimm et al. 2012). This leads residents in the informal sector to
place significant demands on politicians for access to stable jobs and financing for businesses. In addition,
politicians must address rising tensions in many cities over access to land and housing.
Elected governments have been failing to respond to many of these challenges, hampered by low state
capacity and significant resource constraints. In the words of one media account, cities in Africa are “out-
stripping the ability of weak and plodding central governments to manage... them."6 Most urban growth
is unplanned and unregulated, occurring in spite of whatever national government policies are in place to
control it (UN-Habitat 2014). Demand for new infrastructure and services is now simply far greater than
what most governments can provide. But precisely because politicians lack the capacity to address all of
these challenges, urbanization creates new opportunities for them as they seek election. These politicians
control many of the most valuable resources in the urban economy – the ability to decide who gets goods like
new roads, running water, or public sector employment, and, importantly, who does not. Their distributive
decisions rest at the heart of urban electoral politics.
Many recent discussions of urban politics in Africa suggest that the socio-economic changes associ-
ated with urbanization should all pull political competition toward more programmatic and policy-based
elections, and away from ethnic competition and patronage-based politics. These studies often argue that
electoral competition in urban Africa is somehow inherently different from that in rural areas, where eth-
nic competition and patronage distribution are commonly assumed to prevail (e.g., Lindberg 2010, Harding
2010, Koter 2013b, Resnick 2014). Ethnicity is thought to lose its central importance in elections as social
identities change in urban melting pots (e.g., Conroy-Krutz 2009, Green 2014, Resnick 2014). The rise of
the urban middle class and the decline of traditional elites is thought to change voters’ preferences and free
them from the constraints of patron-client relationships (e.g., Wahman and Boone 2015), reducing politi-
cians’ reliance on patronage-based strategies (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Koter 2013b, Stokes et
5Wealthy urban residents privately provide some services to themselves, at great cost. Elsewhere, some communities organize on
their own to build basic local public goods. But these are imperfect solutions. Most urban residents still place significant demands
on elected leaders for infrastructure and services.
6Howard W. French, “How Africa’s New Urban Centers are Shifting Its Old Colonial Boundaries," The Atlantic, 1 July 2013.
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al. 2013). Taken together, these studies mirror the predictions of “modernization" theories from the mid-20th
century (e.g., Lerner 1958, Lipset 1960), either explicitly or implicitly.
But these studies often exhibit two shortcomings. First, studies focusing on the effects of the social
transformations of urbanization give only half of the story, missing the countervailing incentives created by
the governance challenges outlined above. Even as wealth rises and cities “modernize," scarcity in access
to basic state resources created by urbanization allows politicians to persist with patronage distribution.
Distribution of state resources to favored ethnic groups then continues to polarize politics along ethnic
lines in many urban neighborhoods, even as the social importance placed on ethnicity in daily social life
in cities declines. And entrenched patronage practices lead middle class voters to withdraw from political
participation rather than place electoral pressure on politicians to forego clientelistic appeals.
Second, existing studies often implicitly view cities as homogeneous entities, taking insights that may
only apply in parts of a city and applying them to all of urban politics in general. This misses key intra-urban
variation. I argue that variation in the local wealth and ethnic diversity of urban neighborhoods, as well as in
the social importance of traditional elites, creates incentives for politicians and voters to engage with each
other in different ways in different neighborhoods. I show that there are neighborhoods where ethnicity does
not influence vote choice and little patronage is distributed. But elsewhere in the same city, sometimes just
a few blocks away, ethnic voting and clientelism can remain extensive.7
These latter neighborhoods are not anachronistic holdouts. They are not places still in the process of
transitioning, or in which the social transformations of urbanization and modernization have not yet had
the time to take hold. Instead, a core insight of the dissertation is that the neighborhoods in which ethnic
political competition and clientelism persist are just as representative of modern urban politics and the
political effects of urbanization as the neighborhoods where ethnic voting and clientelism are rare. Rather
than pulling political competition in one direction, as modernization theories expect, urbanization instead
7The use of terms such as “clientelism" is inconsistent in the literature. I use clientelism to refer specifically to contingent exchanges
between politicians and voters in which particularistic goods (private or club goods) are given in expectation that voters comply
with support (Hicken 2011). This involves repeated interactions over time between politicians and voters, with politicians attempt-
ing to monitor recipients so that future benefits can be withheld if they do not comply. Particularistic goods (private or club goods)
can also be distributed selectively based on political criteria, but given in a single-shot exchange in which the politician does not
expect all recipients to follow through with support or seriously attempt to monitor them. I refer to this latter type of distribution
more generally as “patronage distribution." Some of what others label clientelism or vote buying in Africa (and elsewhere) is
actually in this second category, not the first (Kramon 2011, Guardado & Wantchekon 2014). “Programmatic" or “universalistic"
distribution occurs when similar benefits are distributed based on universally applicable criteria (e.g., need) and not targeted based
on political variables. See Stokes et al. (2013) and Golden and Min (2013) for related discussions of these distinctions, albeit with
slightly different terminology.
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moves political outcomes in multiple directions at once. Urbanization creates more diverse, middle and
upper class neighborhoods, where I find the connection between ethnicity and vote choice is fraying and
clientelism is rare. But urbanization also means the rapid expansion of slums (UN-Habitat 2010), where
I show incentives for ethnic voting are being reinforced and clientelism remains common. I show that
ethnic voting also remains common in ethnically segregated neighborhoods, even when they are wealthy.
We cannot point to the wealthy, diverse neighborhoods within cities alone and claim that modernization
theory’s predictions are being borne out, while ignoring the effects of urbanization in the remainder of these
cities. Instead, studies of the effects of urbanization must recognize that these dual realities can co-exist
within the same city.
Electoral politics in urban Africa received significant scholarly attention in the independence era (1950s-
1970s). But little political science research has examined African cities in the contemporary democratic
period; much of our recent theory about contemporary elections in Africa comes instead from studies of
predominately rural data. I change course and engage in a detailed study of elections and political behavior
in the Greater Accra metropolitan area, the largest urban area in Ghana and the ninth largest in sub-Saharan
Africa. I attempt to offer a fuller picture of electoral politics in African cities than existing literature by
examining voters’ preferences, vote choices, and patterns of political participation, as well as politicians’
strategies for building support in a representative cross-section of neighborhoods in this city.
The dissertation also contributes to political science debates beyond the study of urbanization or African
politics. As outlined below, I expand upon theories about the emergence of programmatic politics, the
determinants of turnout, patterns of distributive politics, the importance of local ethnic geography, and the
underlying causes of ethnic political competition in new democracies.
1.2 Theories of the Political Effects of Urbanization in Africa
1.2.1 Modernization and Post-Independence Africa
Prominent early predictions about the political effects of urbanization were rooted in modernization theory.
Classical modernization theory predicts that as societies urbanize and develop, the social and political impor-
tance of ethnicity and traditional kin-based ties should decline. Class-based political movements and social
identities should emerge in their place, mobilizing an increasing share of the populace into active political
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participation around parties articulating class-based policy platforms similar to those in Western democra-
cies (e.g., Lerner 1958, Lipset 1960, Deutsch 1961). Central to this transformation is the emergence of an
educated urban middle class, with high levels of participation in cross-cutting forms of associational life
(e.g., unions) instead of traditional ethnic-based institutions (Lipset 1960, Inkeles 1966). This urban mid-
dle class then becomes the backbone of the modern democratic electorate, better able to hold politicians
accountable for performance than impoverished voters bound to leaders by primordial kin-based ties. As
politicians compete for votes of the educated urban middle class, the quality of governance improves, rais-
ing prospects for future economic growth in the process. A self-reinforcing cycle emerges in which growth
begets better government and democracy, which then begets more growth (Lipset 1960).
But these types of predictions did not find empirical support in the first generation of scholarship on
urbanization and growth in Africa. A large literature studied the political effects of urbanization in Africa
in the late colonial and early post-independence periods (1950s-1970s), when the first electoral competition
occurred in Africa. A central contribution of this literature was its rebuttal of modernization hypotheses
about urbanization and political change.
Ethnicity instead became more politically important as cities and economies grew in newly independent
African states, not less. Rather than losing their connections to rural village life, urban residents were often
described as “absentee villagers" working in the urban economy, but remitting income back to home villages
where their families remained (Gugler & Flanagan 1978).8 New forms of associational life did emerge in
urban areas and become the basis for political organizations, as modernization theorists expected. But these
associations were often explicitly ethnic in nature (Epstein 1958, Little 1964, Wallerstein 1964). Rather than
providing cross-cutting social ties, ethnic youth associations and similar groups helped rural-urban migrants
sharing a common rural region of origin find their place in the urban economy and lobby for access to
government benefits. Independence-era ethnic associations in urban areas were often more powerful than
labor unions, and served as support bases for the first political parties.
While political parties that grew from independence movements were often initially multi-ethnic (Coleman
1954), ethnic-based electoral competition was central to post-independence urban politics.9 Studies of ur-
8Ekeh (1975) describes political implications of the social pressures rural families placed on urban dwellers to send back wealth
gained in the city.
9In Ghana, however, salient ethnic political cleavages emerged before independence with Ashanti and Akyem opposition to Kwame
Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party (CPP) (Allman 1993, Rathbone 2000). A similar ethnic cleavage remains salient in
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ban Nigeria, for example, document significant ethnic political competition in Lagos and Port Harcourt
immediately upon independence (Baker 1974, Wolpe 1974). Melson (1971) shows that urban workers in
Nigeria supported parties aligned with their ethnic groups rather than socialist parties offering policy plat-
forms that favored their class-based interests. Summarizing a large body of literature, Bates (1983) describes
politics in this era as a competition among ethnic groups to capture wealth in the modern urban economy
and redistribute it back to rural homelands. Rather than fading away, new ethnic identities emerged in cities,
aggregating previously distinct sub-groups into unified political blocs. These identities were sometimes con-
scious constructions of urban political elites seeking to mobilize larger coalitions of voters (Bates 1983).10
This then carried over into rural politics, with ethnic bloc voting in rural areas fueled by ethnic favoritism
by governments that disproportionately targeted state resources to aligned regions.
Early political parties also did not take on the characteristics expected by modernization theories. Con-
sistent with Lipset (1960), Deutsch (1961), and others, these parties did mobilize voters to a significantly
greater degree in urban than rural areas (Zolberg 1966). Many of these parties had lofty official platforms
steeped in socialist language that made explicit class-based appeals. But Zolberg (1966) demonstrates that
this ideological content often bore little relation to how the first generation of African parties governed
once in office. Instead, most ruling parties either became clientelistic political machines or institutions of
authoritarian control (Zolberg 1966, Scott 1969, Lemarchand 1972).
But even though modernization theories found little empirical support in post-independence literature
on urban African politics, contemporary scholars have reasons to reconsider these predictions. Most impor-
tantly, it may simply have been too early in Africa’s development for the changes envisioned by moderniza-
tion theorists to have occurred. Middle and upper classes were minuscule in the 1950s-70s, both in absolute
terms and by comparison to contemporary cities. Studies from this period also examined politics before
sustained democratization. Many countries became single party states almost immediately after indepen-
dence. The democratic period was brief even where elections were initially more competitive, with military
coups dispatching elected governments. Patterns of electoral competitive may be significantly different once
Ghanaian politics into the present (see Chapters 2 and 5).
10This built on the solidification of new ethnic identities during the late colonial period. Epstein (1958) and Posner (2005) describe
the creation of new ethnic identities in urban Zambia during colonialism. Schildkrout (1976) describes a similar process among
migrants in Kumasi, Ghana. Cohen (1969), Baker (1974), and Wolpe (1974) do the same for several cities in Nigeria. Vail (1989)
documents this process throughout Southern Africa.
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democracy becomes institutionalized.
Moreover, key features of the post-independence era that prevented modernization theory’s predictions
from occurring may no longer be relevant. Early literature on urban Africa placed a central focus on rural-
urban migration. Urban growth in these decades was mainly due to migration from rural areas (Gugler &
Flanagan 1978). But recent growth in African cities is due more to higher rates of natural increase in urban
than rural areas than to migration (Kessides 2006). The majority of current urban residents in Ghana, for
example, have lived in cities for their entire lives (Ghana Statistical Service 2008). They are more often the
children and grandchildren of rural-urban migrants than migrants themselves. Ethnic youth associations,
which used to play a central role in integrating rural-urban migrants into urban life, are now much less
active.11 Theories about first-generation migrants are ill-suited to explain the behavior of much of the
current urban electorate. In particular, the high salience of ethnicity discussed in the earlier literature could
be unique to the migrant experience. For example, Severino & Ray (2011) argues that, similar to American
history, first generation urban residents may rely on ethnic ties to establish a foothold in the urban economy,
but longer-term forces of assimilation may ultimately reduce the importance of ethnicity for subsequent
generations. Because of these differences in context, more recent studies of urban politics in Africa (see
below) have either returned to arguments similar to modernization theory or otherwise now suggest that
ethnicity and patronage are less important in urban areas – both in comparison to contemporary rural areas
and to urban areas in the earlier historical period.
1.2.2 Urban-Rural Differences in Contemporary African Politics
A much smaller literature examines urban politics in the contemporary period, after multi-party elections
became routine in many countries. The central focus in this newer literature has been on differences between
urban and rural areas. Several studies explain these urban-rural differences using modernization theory.
Focusing on the individual-level importance of ethnic identity, Robinson (2014) finds that Afrobarom-
eter respondents in urban areas are more likely than those in rural areas to rank their national identity as
11For example, the survey from Greater Accra analyzed in later chapters finds that less than 5% of residents belong to such an
association. Resnick (2014, p. 125) finds similarly low levels of associational participation among poor voters in Lusaka, Zambia.
In addition, I find in Chapter 5 that urban voters’ ties to ancestral rural homelands no longer have any explanatory power for
voting behavior.
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more important than their ethnic identity.12 Green (2014) also uses Afrobarometer data to show that re-
spondents in Bostwana are less likely to emphasize their ethnic identities as they become integrated into
the urban economy. Green (2014) and Robinson (2014) explain these results by directly referencing clas-
sical modernization theory. These Afrobarometer questions are not measures of political behavior, how-
ever. There may be an important difference between the ways in which people socially define themselves
and the political uses of ethnicity. Existing theories of ethnic voting in African politics – including lit-
erature from the post-independence era – already make this distinction explicit. Instrumental theories of
ethnicity argue that voters do not support co-ethnic candidates and parties out of “expressive" social alle-
giance to identity groups, but because of strategic incentives created by patterns of patronage distribution
(Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Ferree 2006, Ichino & Nathan 2013, Carlson 2015a). Even if social attachments
to ethnic groups change in cities, incentives to support co-ethnic parties and candidates can persist if voters
expect ethnic favoritism in the distribution of state resources.
But looking more directly at political behavior, Conroy-Krutz (2009) also finds less overall self-reported
voting for co-ethnic parties among urban than rural Afrobarometer respondents in a cross-section of African
countries, again linking this finding to a modernization hypothesis. Resnick (2012, 2014) examines voting
behavior of poor informal sector workers in Lusaka, Zambia and Dakar, Senegal. She argues that parties
that are best able to build support with these voters place less emphasis on ethnic appeals than they do in
rural areas and instead campaign on populist policy messages that appeal to class-based rather than ethnic
interests.13 In terms of distributive politics, Koter (2013b) argues that urban voters in Senegal are less
susceptible to clientelism because of the declining importance of traditional elites in urban areas, who are
not available to serve as clientelistic brokers for the ruling party in the same way that they are in rural areas.
Lindberg (2010) argues that MPs in urban areas of Ghana are less able to buy votes than in rural areas
12Wealthier and better educated respondents are also more likely to emphasize national over ethnic identities on these surveys,
consistent with a modernization hypothesis.
13Despite this argument, however, Resnick (2014) still finds that ethnicity predicts vote choice among the urban poor in Zambia
(p. 138). She also notes that the opposition party most successful with these voters, the Patriotic Front (PF), still employed
patronage-based strategies; 77% of respondents in Lusaka reported private goods distribution by opposition parties before the
2008 election (p. 131; also see p. 80). Moreover, while promises to lower taxes and rein in Chinese investment were clearly
programmatic, much of the PF’s campaign rhetoric that Resnick labels programmatic – such as promises to provide jobs, housing,
and various club goods (water, sanitation, etc.; see Resnick 2014, p. 76-79) – is observationally equivalent to the campaign rhetoric
that would be expected from an entirely patronage-based party. Similarly phrased promises are made by both parties in Ghana,
including the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which styles itself as pro-business and would never be labeled “populist." See Chapter
3.
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because urban voters are generally more sophisticated than rural voters and harder to bind in clientelistic
relationships.14
Harding (2010) also finds urban-rural differences in voting behavior in cross-national Afrobarometer
data. He argues that urban voters are more likely to support opposition parties than rural voters, regardless of
their ethnicity. This contrasts with widespread ethnic voting in rural areas. But rather than a modernization
argument, Harding (2010) attributes this to governments engaging in “rural bias" after democratization, with
urban voters differentially opposing ruling parties because more state resources are being directed to rural
communities (Stasavage 2005, Bates & Block 2013). This idea that urban voters are often inherently more
likely to support opposition parties has been echoed by other scholars (e.g., Resnick 2011, Koter 2013b,
Wahman and Boone 2013).15
In addition to these studies on Africa, a variant of modernization theory remains prevalent in contempo-
rary scholarship that examines transitions between patronage-based and policy-based political competition.
In line with the national-level correlation between levels of wealth and the extent of programmatic poli-
tics, there is a general expectation that rising incomes and the emergence of the middle class will lead to
declines in patronage-based competition in favor of policy-based competition, particularly in competitive
electoral environments (Kitschelt 2007, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Hicken 2011, Stokes et al. 2013,
Weitz-Shapiro 2012, 2014).16 There are clear exceptions to this pattern – wealthy countries in which forms
of clientelism have persisted, such as Italy and Japan late into the 20th century. But even in these cases,
patronage-based political competition has usually been most prevalent in less urbanized or less economi-
cally developed regions (Chubb 1982, Scheiner 2006, Scheiner 2007).17
Outside of the academic literature, similar ideas rooted in modernization theory now hold significant
14Unlike Koter (2013b) and Lindberg (2010), however, Paller (2014) provides evidence of significant clientelism in slums in urban
Ghana. The empirical findings in Koter (2013b), Lindberg (2010), and Paller (2014) need not be mutually exclusive if we consider
variation across types of urban neighborhoods – a point I return to below.
15But Harding (2010) finds that rural-urban differences in incumbent support attenuate as the urban proportion of a country’s
population rises and the incentives for rural bias by governments decline. Cities are not especially likely to support opposition
parties in the most urbanized African countries. Moreover, Table 1.3 below shows that very few of the largest cities in African
democracies are strongholds of any specific party.
16Wealth is not the only key variable in literature on the decline of clientelism in advanced democracies. Others have emphasized
the importance of supply-side factors, such as institutional reforms to bureaucracies that prevent favoritism in resource allocation
(e.g., Shefter 1994). See further discussion below, and in Chapter 7.
17Luna (2014) and Weitz-Shapiro (2012, 2014) find similar variation in the presence of patronage distribution across municipalities
with different levels of wealth within Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina.
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weight in popular discussion of African urbanization and growth. As an example from the policy world,
Severino & Ray (2011), of the World Bank and the Agence Francaise de Developpement, predict the “end
of ethnicity" as a relevant political identity as Africa urbanizes. They argue that ethnic identities are losing
political salience among the urban middle class due to forces of modernization and inter-ethnic assimila-
tion, especially through cross-cutting social ties similar to those theorized by Lipset (1960).18 In the recent
press, the growth of the urban middle class is commonly linked to predicted improvements in democratic
accountability and to the declining importance of ethnicity. As one of many such examples, Reuters de-
scribes Africa’s emerging urban middle class as “enlightened voters" and “drivers of democracy," who are
“more likely to vote according to policies and issues rather than automatic or traditional allegiances to any
party or ethnic group."19 Now that they can have “preoccupations beyond where the next meal is coming
from," The Guardian argues that Africa’s new urban middle class is “an agent of change" that will improve
democratic governance.20 Foreign Policy predicts the middle class will be “a massive boom to political
growth," unwilling to “to put up with [political] business as usual."21 Writing in The New York Times, David
Brooks describes Africa’s “main story" as an “impressive surge of growth, urbanization, and moderniza-
tion," defined by a “cosmopolitan trend," including a “greater mixing of tribal groupings" in urban areas,
that is changing social and political attitudes and improving the quality of governance.22
Considered together, the more recent academic literature and the popular discussions of African urban-
ization suggest that electoral politics in contemporary African cities with growing middle classes should
differ significantly from patterns typically assumed to hold in rural areas. In direct contrast to the post-
independence era evidence, these sources suggest that: (a) urban politics should be characterized by reduced
reliance on patronage-based appeals in comparison to rural areas, with greater emphasis instead on policy-
based, programmatic competition, especially along class lines; and (b) ethnicity should be less important for
18In more general terms, Radelet (2010), of the Brookings Institution, describes a series of African countries as now being in
beneficial feedback loops of economic growth, improving democratic accountability, and better policy implementation, with
Ghana foremost among them. The language echoes earlier modernization theories about how economic growth and democracy
should be mutually reinforcing.
19Pascal Fletcher, “Africa’s Emerging Middle Class Drives Growth and Democracy," Reuters, 10 May 2013.
20David Smith and Lucy Lamble, “Africa’s Burgeoning Middle Class Brings Hope to a Continent," The Guardian, 25 December
2011.
21Elizabeth Dickinson, “Middle Class Africa," Foreign Policy: Passport Blog, 6 May 2011.
22David Brooks, “The Real Africa," The New York Times, 8 May 2014.
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vote choice in urban than rural areas.
But in the subsequent chapters I show empirically that neither of these two predictions appear to hold in
much of urban Ghana. I find that patronage distribution remains extensive in many neighborhoods. There
is little evidence of a sustained shift to policy-based competition, even in the wealthiest urban areas. Urban
politicians continue to use ethnicity as a key criterion for deciding how to target their resources, both during
campaigns and once in office. Ethnicity still strongly predicts vote choice for many voters, even among
those who do not list their ethnic identity as salient at an individual level in questions similar to those in
Green (2014) and Robinson (2014). Middle class voters are as likely to support ethnically-affiliated parties
as poor voters. None of these features of electoral politics are inherently different in urban than rural areas.
Why?
1.3 The Argument
Urbanization does affect political competition. But rather than producing changes to political outcomes that
all move in the same direction – towards more policy-based competition and less reliance on ethnicity – the
socio-economic transformations and the governance challenges associated with urbanization often create
mutually conflicting incentives. I explain these mixed effects for the three societal changes discussed above.
These are changes to: (a) the wealth of voters, (b) the power of traditional social institutions, and (c) the
ethnic composition of local neighborhoods.
1.3.1 Wealth and the Urban Middle Class
The first main explanatory variable is the wealth of voters.23 The urban middle class is growing quickly
in many countries, with rising incomes and expanding formal sector employment (Radelet 2010, African
Development Bank 2011).24 At the same time, however, this growth has been uneven and unequal; many
23While increases in wealth are not a direct outcome of urbanization itself, it is appropriate to consider the impact of wealth as part
of the broader process of urbanization. Recent gains in wealth have been concentrated in urban areas, where the overwhelming
majority of the upper and middle classes live. More importantly, the emergence of the urban middle class is a central component
of the existing theories about the effects of urbanization discussed above.
24There is debate about how to define the poverty line, which leads to disagreement about the size of this middle class (e.g.,
Freemantle 2014 vs. African Development Bank 2011; also see Thurlow et al. 2015). But there is consensus that the middle
class is growing significantly, however defined. This is occurring despite little industrialization and is not solely due to oil and
mineral extraction (Kessides 2006, Radelet 2010). I describe how I define the middle class in more detail in Chapter 2, drawing
on definitions proposed by Thurlow et al. (2015).
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other urban residents remain poor, living in slums (UN-Habitat 2014). In other settings, rising incomes have
been argued to account (in part) for transitions to more policy-based, programmatic politics by changing
voters’ preferences. Wealthier and middle class voters are said to be less susceptible to clientelistic and
patronage-based strategies because they do not value the types of patronage goods that politicians can pro-
vide, the marginal cost of buying their votes becomes prohibitively high, or because their time horizons are
longer, allowing them to place greater emphasis in voting decisions on major public policies and long-term
performance over more immediate benefits from patronage (e.g., Kitschelt 2000, Kitschelt and Wilkinson
2007, Hicken 2011, Stokes et al. 2013). Differences in preferences are then expected to change the strate-
gies available to politicians – where fewer voters demand patronage goods, politicians should face electoral
incentives to forgo patronage distribution and clientelism (Weitz-Shapiro 2012, 2014).
But in low capacity states with long histories of corruption, favoritism, and failed policy implementation,
an increase in the proportion of wealthy voters can have different downstream effects. Consistent with
existing literature, I show in Chapter 3 that middle class and wealthier voters in urban Ghana have different
preferences than poorer voters. Middle class and wealthy voters are less likely than poor voters to want
private patronage benefits from politicians, and instead more likely to want reforms to major public policies
or demand the provision of truly public goods. In a setting of low state capacity, however, politicians face
a credibility problem in satisfying these preferences (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007). Past governments have often
failed on promises to implement large-scale public policies. When implemented at all, these policies are
often mired in corruption, rent-seeking, or favoritism.25 I argue in Chapter 3 that unable to commit to
delivering the policies that middle class voters want, politicians avoid costly efforts to build support among
these voters and largely refrain from mobilizing their turnout during campaigns. Voters who want major
public policies instead of patronage goods then differentially abstain from political participation. They are
not being mobilized to turn out and have few options on the ballot that they trust will actually address their
preferences. This allows the electorate and political party organizations to be dominated by poorer voters
who are still susceptible to patronage-based appeals, which only reinforces politicians’ incentives against
making credible policy-based appeals to middle class voters in the first place. A programmatic transition
25There is also often little prior history of policy-based competition in African democracies (van de Walle 2007), especially com-
pared to democracies in Latin America studied in much of the literature cited above. Such a history would help solve the credi-
bility problem by informing voters’ expectations about the probability that programmatic campaign promises will be successfully
implemented.
15
does not occur, even as the urban middle class grows.26
Chapter 3 finds empirical support for this argument using a combination of survey data on turnout in
national elections and participation in party organizations and other local political associations, a survey
experiment on voters’ trust in campaign promises, and interviews with local politicians and middle class
voters from Greater Accra. Chapter 6 extends this argument, finding lower turnout in local district assembly
(city council) elections in neighborhoods where more middle class and wealthy voters live.
This contributes to the general study of transitions to programmatic politics by suggesting that the emer-
gence of “dual" clientelistic and programmatic linkages, common in many other middle income democra-
cies, especially in Latin America (e.g., Levitsky 2003, Luna 2014), cannot be taken for granted in settings
with lower state capacity or where there are class-based differences in political participation.27 This chapter
also expands existing work on the relationship between socio-economic class and turnout in the developing
world (Kasara & Suryanarayan 2014), suggesting new mechanisms for why the middle class and wealthy
often turn out at lower rates than the poor in developing countries, in the opposite pattern of advanced
democracies (e.g., Verba et al. 1995).
Even though there is not a significant transition away from patronage politics, I argue that the use of
individual-level clientelism is not uniform within cities. As noted above, informal slums are also expanding
in African cities, concentrating larger numbers of poor voters into dense, impoverished neighborhoods, even
as the urban middle class grows as well (Paller 2012, UN-Habitat 2014). I argue in Chapter 4 that political
parties concentrate their provision of private goods in these poor slums, where many voters demand the
private benefits that parties can provide. This focus on poor neighborhoods is especially the case for the
distribution of the most valuable private benefits, such as patronage jobs, loans, and money for health and
schooling expenses, that politicians can give to voters as part of longer-term clientelistic relationships. But
building the grassroots patronage networks needed to sustain relationships with large numbers of voters
becomes too costly in middle class and wealthier neighborhoods of the city. Clientelism is rare in wealthier
neighborhoods, even among poor voters who live there. Chapter 4 provides evidence of these differences in
26This should not cycle indefinitely. For example, eventually the middle class may grow so large that politicians have no choice but
to appeal to middle class preferences to win elections. I discuss several ways this cycle may be broken in Chapter 3.
27It is important to note, however, that voting is mandatory (and enforced) in the Latin American cases examined in Levitsky
(2003) and Luna (2014), such that the class-based differences in political participation I discuss in Ghana do not exist. Where
middle class and wealthy citizens must turn out to vote, parties face different incentives to appeal to the preferences of these
constituencies.
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private goods distribution and individual-level clientelism between poorer and wealthier neighborhoods of
Greater Accra using survey data and interview evidence.
Despite these neighborhood-level differences in the distribution of private goods in clientelistic rela-
tionships, Chapter 4 shows that parties continue to use the selective distribution of local public, or “club,"
goods as patronage in both middle class and poor neighborhoods as a means of building political support.28
Because of low existing levels of service provision in cities, both middle class and poor voters often de-
mand club goods from the government.29 These club goods can then be selectively targeted to specific
neighborhoods.
As a result, ethnicity remains an important determinant of vote choice, even for middle class voters.
Among those middle class voters who do turn out to vote, the provision of club goods affects voting behavior.
And because ethnicity affects where voters expect club goods to be targeted by different political parties (see
below), ethnicity remains politically relevant for middle class voters.30 Using survey data on individual vote
choices, I find in Chapter 5 that wealthy and middle class voters are just as likely to vote for co-ethnic
parties as poorer voters, in contrast to predictions that the urban middle class should place less emphasis on
ethnicity.31
28I refer to local public goods, such as roads, schools, health clinics, water mains, sewers, electricity poles, etc., as “club goods."
These are goods that are locally non-excludable, benefitting everyone within their catchment areas but not beyond. Unlike public
goods, club goods can be targeted by politicians as patronage to specific groups of voters. Truly public goods have universalistic
benefits and cannot be targeted as patronage. I use “club goods" instead of “local public goods" to keep this distinction explicit.
Note that some existing literature refers to both types of benefits interchangeably as “public goods."
29Even if wealthier urban residents can privately provide some services to themselves, I show in Chapter 3 that they still want club
goods from the government. Private provision is a costly substitute in lieu of state provision, not a permanent replacement. These
residents would still be better off they had paved roads, running water, and stable electricity from the government rather than
having to pay large sums for imperfect private work-arounds (e.g., generators, water delivery services, etc).
30Similarly, Burbidge (2014) uses extended observation of a small group of voters in Kenya to suggest that middle class voters
there still overwhelmingly support co-ethnic parties and candidates when voting, even as they simultaneously place less emphasis
on ethnicity in their own daily lives and believe personally that reflexive support for co-ethnic politicians is not normatively
justifiable.
31Throughout the dissertation, I define ethnic voting as support for the party affiliated with each voter’s ethnic group (if an affiliation
exists), not only as a direct match between the ethnicity of a candidate and voter. The major parties in Ghana draw support from
stable coalitions of groups, even as presidential candidate ethnicities vary. Unless a single group is large enough to win on its
own, even the most ethnically-based parties in Africa combine support from coalitions of groups (Arriola 2012), with members
of groups in the coalition engaging in bloc voting for the party. This definition is discussed further in Chapter 5.
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1.3.2 Traditional Intermediaries in Rural versus Urban Areas
The second explanatory variable is the power and importance of traditional elites. Forms of social organi-
zation evolve as populations shift from village to city. Chiefs and other traditional village-level elites play
significant roles in rural politics in much of Africa. They serve as intermediaries between citizens and the
state, clientelistic brokers who provide blocs of votes to allied candidates, and decision makers controlling
access to land and other local resources (Baldwin 2013, Acemoglu et al. 2013, Koter 2013a, Boone 2014, de
Kadt and Larreguy 2014). While enclaves with powerful traditional authorities persist in some urban areas,
such as among the Ga ethnic group in Greater Accra (see below), residents in urban Africa are often less
connected to traditional authorities than in rural areas (Gugler & Flanagan 1978).32 Politicians must engage
with urban voters through other channels.
But I argue that rather than simply reducing the amount of patronage that is distributed, the weakness of
traditional leaders instead encourages more direct, individual-level contact between political party organi-
zations and voters in some urban neighborhoods. This is particularly true in poor slum communities, where
many poor voters who demand private goods from politicians are densely concentrated. I argue in Chapter 4
that it is in these communities that political parties build their most extensive patronage networks, with party
agents and activists deeply embedded in the social fabric of poor urban neighborhoods. Informal and formal
leaders of poor neighborhoods in Greater Accra – ranging from district assembly members (city councilors)
to landlords and pastors – are often simultaneously local political party leaders, serving formal roles within
party organizations (Paller 2014).33 These local party leaders use their dual roles to distribute patronage and
engage in long-term clientelistic relationships with residents, binding them to their party.
This is in contrast to both middle class and wealthy neighborhoods of the city, as noted above, and also
to rural areas. In rural areas, it can be more cost effective for political parties to engage with voters indirectly
through village elites rather than maintaining individual relationships with voters across a series of far-flung
villages. Moreover, in rural areas that are strongholds of an opposing party, it can be particularly costly for
a party to build networks capable of targeting voters with clientelistic benefits and monitoring their behavior
32The declining importance of traditional leaders may be related to the declining individual-level importance of ethnic identity in
urban areas observed in Robinson (2014) and Green (2014). But it does not necessarily reduce levels of ethnic voting (see Chapter
5).
33By contrast, it is illegal for traditional chiefs to be openly affiliated with a political party in Ghana. They cannot serve simultane-
ously as local political party leaders. Many chiefs are informally aligned with one of the major political parties, however.
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at an individual level, especially if local elites are aligned with the opposing party and erect barriers to
activities by a new party. Rather than build ties to individual voters, parties can provide club goods that
benefit entire rural villages at once, in return for bloc support from the community organized by village
leaders (Lindberg 2010). Parties can then monitor behavior of recipient villages from aggregate election
results without having to spend the organizational costs of maintaining individual clientelistic relationships
with many voters. In many urban neighborhoods, there simply are not local elites capable of serving as
intermediaries and delivering these blocs of votes.
Survey data and interview evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that direct clientelism between a party and
individual voters can be more extensive in the poorest urban slum neighborhoods in Greater Accra than in
the typical rural village, especially in comparison to villages that are in stronghold regions of an opposing
political party.34 But individual-level clientelism is still less common in wealthier urban neighborhoods than
in most rural areas. These differences in the prevalence of private goods distribution and clientelism then
have carry over effects into voting behavior, examined in Chapter 5 (see below).35
1.3.3 Ethnic Composition of Local Neighborhoods
Third, settlement patterns change as cities grow. Urban neighborhoods can be very diverse. Due to past
decades of rural-urban migration, residents whose families are originally from many different regions of a
country often live together in one neighborhood in urban areas to a significantly greater extent than in most
rural communities.36 At the same time, there are also still homogeneous, segregated neighborhoods within
cities.
Literature on ethnic politics in Africa often assumes a close connection between ethnic groups and geo-
graphic territories. Competition over state resources is described as contestation over where these resources
34Private goods distribution clearly still occurs throughout rural areas in Ghana, especially the non-clientelistic distribution of small
gifts (food, t-shirts, etc.) immediately before elections. The main contrast I make in Chapter 4 is in the overall proportion of
voters engaged in relationships directly with political parties between slums and rural villages.
35Importantly, the Ga are the one ethnic group in Greater Accra for whom traditional elites still play a significant role in life within
the city. In Chapters 5 and 6, I find that the political behavior of the Ga differs significantly from other urban residents and
attribute this to the ability of traditional leaders in the Ga community to mobilize support for specific parties and candidates using
the distribution of private and club goods. For example, I find in Chapter 5 that the strongest predictor of vote choice among Ga
voters in Greater Accra is their degree of interaction with Ga chiefs. But interactions with traditional chiefs have no explanatory
power for voting behavior among all other residents in the urban area.
36There are exceptions – rural regions with very diverse populations, and some relatively homogeneous cities – but in general, urban
areas have significantly higher levels of ethnic fractionalization than rural areas. I demonstrate this using census data for Ghana
in Chapter 2.
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go. Club goods or other types of policies targeted to different rural territories are seen as benefiting distinct
ethnic groups as patronage (e.g., Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Kimenyi 2006, Kasara 2007, Franck and Rainer
2012, Burgess et al. 2015, Ejdemyr et al. 2015). This assumption is at the heart of existing theories of both
ethnic voting and ethnic conflict.37 But this logic breaks down in local areas that are diverse. Club goods
that politicians commonly distribute, such as roads, schools, and health clinics are locally non-excludable.
A club good will benefit voters from the many different ethnic groups living in a diverse neighborhood,
including core supporters of opposing candidates or parties. Politicians cannot engage in favoritism by
strategically target club goods on the basis of ethnicity in diverse areas. But in homogeneous areas, these
goods can be used to target voters from a specific ethnic group.
Chapter 5 considers the effects of the ethnic composition of neighborhoods on voting behavior in urban
areas. Extending an earlier argument originally developed in Ichino & Nathan (2013) to explain vote choice
in rural areas, I model vote choice as a function of voters’ expected benefits from electing a party after the
election. I show that these incentives explain significantly more of the variation in voting behavior than
voters’ individual-level attachments to their ethnic identities or levels of social interaction with other ethnic
groups. When there is ethnic favoritism in the distribution of club goods, voters living in a homogeneous
area surrounded by their own group have clear instrumental incentives to support co-ethnic candidates or
parties. These voters will expect to receive better performance after the election – better access to club goods
controlled by the government – if a co-ethnic wins. But this is not necessarily true in diverse areas. Once
reaching office, politicians may still build club goods in diverse areas to improve their overall reputations
of performance, as I suggest they do in Ghana in Chapter 4. But because they cannot favor specific ethnic
groups with club goods in diverse areas, there is no reason for voters systematically to expect a co-ethnic
party to favor a diverse neighborhood after the election to a greater extent than a non-co-ethnic would.
Voters have less of an incentive to support co-ethnic parties in these areas. Under the same logic, when
voters live as a local ethnic minority surrounded primarily by voters from ethnic groups affiliated with a
different political party, these voters may expect better access to club goods if that other party wins the
election, rather than their own ethnically-affiliated party. This creates incentives for cross-ethnic voting by
local minorities (Ichino & Nathan 2013).
But these incentives are complicated by patterns of private goods distribution – an outcome of the first
37For an example of adaptations of this idea in the conflict literature, see Cederman et al. (2011).
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two explanatory variables discussed above. In poor urban neighborhoods where private goods distribution
and individual-level clientelism is extensive, voters can still expect to receive significant private benefits
from a co-ethnic party should it win the election, even if they do not expect differences in club benefits
they will get from each party. To the extent that voters value private goods over club goods, they still
face incentives to support co-ethnic parties in these poor neighborhoods, regardless of their neighborhood’s
ethnic composition. Controlling for voters’ individual characteristics, I expect significant ethnic voting
in poor urban neighborhoods, as long as ethnically-affiliated parties have developed patronage networks in
these neighborhoods, but little ethnic voting in diverse, middle class or wealthy neighborhoods. I also expect
cross-ethnic voting in middle class and wealthy neighborhoods where a greater share of residents are from
ethnic groups affiliated with another party.
I find empirical support for this argument in Chapter 5, using a combination of survey data on vote
choice and polling station election results. A survey experiment shows that these differences in vote choice
vary with voters’ expectations of the private and club goods they will receive from each major party after
the election in different neighborhoods. Rather than there being uniformly less emphasis placed on ethnicity
in voting decisions in urban areas, there is significant ethnic competition in some urban neighborhoods,
and virtually none in other neighborhoods, even as voters choose among the same candidates in the same
election. This variation in voting behavior is orthogonal to measures of the social importance that voters
place on their ethnic identities.
This extends existing theories of instrumental ethnic voting in Africa to account for patterns of voting
behavior in both rural and urban areas and adds additional empirical support to this approach to studying eth-
nic politics (Bates 1983, Chandra 2004, Posner 2005, Ferree 2006, Ichino & Nathan 2013, Carlson 2015a).
Following this literature, my results suggest that ethnicity is not an innately relevant variable in African
elections, but instead serves as a means to an end for voters. The ethnic affiliation of politicians is a useful
heuristic for a voter that aids in the identification of which politicians are most likely to perform in her best
interest. In areas where this cue does not indicate that a voter will receive more benefits from a co-ethnic
party or candidate, ethnicity stops being a significant determinant of voting behavior. “Expressive" theories
of ethnic politics, which focus instead on the social attachments that voters place on their ethnic identities
(e.g. Horowitz 1985) and are implicit in Green (2014) and other modernization approaches to ethnic politics,
cannot account for this variation. In addition, by focusing on variation in the importance of ethnicity across
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neighborhoods, my argument is among the first to consider the relationship between ethnic context and po-
litical behavior in new democracies.38 The evidence of geographic variation in voting behavior in Chapter
5 suggests that to explain voting behavior in the developing world, we must account for how differences in
local contexts alter voters’ incentives.
Together with Chapter 4, this argument also joins a small recent literature examining how politicians
adopt geographically varied patronage strategies, appealing to voters in areas with different demographic
characteristics with different bundles of particularistic goods (e.g., Magaloni et al. 2007, Diaz-Cayeros et
al. 2015, Ejdemyr et al. 2015). In doing so, I argue for the need to move past recurring debates in politi-
cal economy literature over whether parties in developing countries are more likely to target swing or core
voters with benefits (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986, Dixit and Londregan 1996; see Golden and Min 2013
for a literature review). Similar to several other studies suggesting that this presents a false dichotomy in
the study of distributive politics (Albertus 2013, Faller 2013, Kramon and Posner 2013, Stokes et al. 2013,
Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2015), I suggest instead that parties in urban Ghana simultaneously employ both strate-
gies. They target unaligned voters and diverse neighborhoods with some types of club and private goods in
a non-conditional, non-clientelistic fashion, especially during campaign periods. But they also favor core,
co-ethnic supporters and co-ethnic neighborhoods over time in the distribution of other benefits, includ-
ing through individual-level clientelism. These latter actions sustain incentives for ethnic voting in many
neighborhoods.
1.4 Ghana and Beyond
Empirically, I examine electoral competition in a single major city: the Greater Accra metropolitan area.
As described in Chapter 2, I combine original survey data and fine-grained geo-coded census data, which
is rarely available for African cities, alongside local election results and a series of qualitative data sources.
By choosing this case and using these sources, I attempt to strike a middle ground between two types of
existing studies on urban politics in Africa. Detailed “large-N" comparisons across a representative sample
of neighborhoods within one city allowme to examine the interplay of neighborhood conditions and political
competition much more closely than is possible in cross-national studies, which usually have to average
38Ichino & Nathan (2013) and Kasara (2013) are key exceptions. A much larger literature on American politics has examined how
local ethnic context affects voter attitudes and behavior (e.g., Key 1949, Hopkins 2010, Enos 2014).
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over any intra-urban variation in outcomes.39 I also present a more representative picture of the range of
outcomes within cities than is possible in studies that focus narrowly on a single class of voters or type of
neighborhood, or which lack detailed data on local demographic conditions.40 Nonetheless, there are risks
to external validity when drawing on a single overall case. I discuss key scope conditions here.
1.4.1 The Case
Ghana is as prime a candidate as any country in sub-Saharan Africa to experience the political transitions
predicted by modernization theories. It is at the forefront of each of the trends described at the beginning
of the chapter. It is now officially a “middle income" country and has regular elections, a stable two party
system, a free press, and little political violence. Ghana recently became a majority urban country (see
Table 1.1) and has experienced sustained economic growth, with annual GDP growth over 5% in every year
in the last decade except during the global downtown of 2009. Ghana has now held five competitive national
elections, with two peaceful transitions in power.
Greater Accra, Ghana’s capital and largest metropolitan area, is an ideal case in which to explore the
political effects of urbanization. It is a rapidly growing city that contains significant variation across neigh-
borhoods in the presence of the three main explanatory variables highlighted above.41 The area’s population
has more than doubled its 1990 total, reaching approximately 4 million people.42 Greater Accra has a large,
educated middle class; 22% of adults in the metropolitan area as of the 2010 census had formal sector em-
39Afrobarometer surveys, such as those used in Conroy-Krutz (2009), Harding (2010), Green (2014), and Robinson (2014), provide
overall representative samples at the national level, but do not provide representative samples of specific urban areas within
countries. This precludes making comparisons at the level of specific cities or neighborhoods within cities.
40For example, Resnick’s (2012, 2014) main results come from non-representative survey samples of voters from a subset of a single
socio-economic class in Lusaka and Dakar (informal sector poor voters who happen to work in traditional markets). Paller (2012,
2014) observes a single type of neighborhood in Ghana (slums). Paller (2012, 2014) does examine variation across different types
of slums, however.
41There are three other major metropolitan areas in Ghana – Kumasi, Takoradi-Sekondi, and Tamale. I focus on Greater Accra
because these other cities have more limited census data, required to estimate key explanatory variables for the analysis I conduct
in Chapters 3-6. Each of these cities is also more homogenous in terms of wealth and ethnic composition, allowing for fewer
comparisons across local neighborhoods within the same overall setting.
42Population figures for Accra vary across sources because there is no consistent definition of the city’s boundaries. The city is
far larger than its official boundaries, known as the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA). The AMA has actually shrunk in
area over time, with two new districts carved out as independent municipalities. But the city now stretches as an uninterrupted
urban agglomeration from Kasoa at the border of Ghana’s Central Region, 15 miles west of central Accra, to Kpone, on the
outskirts of Tema, 20 miles east of central Accra. This encompasses 11 other district governments in addition to the AMA and
28 parliamentary constituencies in total. United Nations (2014), used for the other cities in Table 1.3 below, excludes Tema and
several of the other outlaying districts from its definition of Accra, resulting in a population of 2.3 million instead of 4 million.
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ployment, some secondary education, and were literate in English.43 Approximately half of the population
lives in slums, while the other half does not. The city suffers from a long list of infrastructural deficits, in
both poor and wealthier neighborhoods. The city is very diverse, but contains segregated enclaves domi-
nated by specific ethnic groups. Finally, Greater Accra is politically competitive, containing strongholds for
both parties alongside competitive neighborhoods. These features are typical of many other large African
cities, including many of those listed in Table 1.3 below.
1.4.2 External Validity Across Countries
There are several scope conditions at both the national and city level that should affect how the argument
extends to other cases. I consider the national-level conditions first. To provide a comparison to other new
democracies in Africa, Table 1.2 again lists the 29 countries in sub-Saharan African from Table 1.1 that are
either democracies or hybrid regimes with multi-party elections. Each column of Table 1.2 corresponds to a
scope condition.
First, I argue that Ghana’s low state capacity and lack of a history of competition between programmatic
political parties present key constraints on the ability of politicians to make credible policy-based electoral
appeals (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007). With politicians unable to commit to delivering the policies that middle
class and wealthy voters want, I describe a cycle in which these voters abstain from political participation
and allow politicians to continue winning with patronage-based strategies in urban areas. The first column
of Table 1.2 roughly approximates state capacity using the “Bureaucratic Quality" index from Political Risk
Services Group (2014).44 While Ghana’s capacity is lower than that of many Latin American countries such
as Argentina and Chile, key cases of “dual linkage" politics examined in Levitsky (2003) and Luna (2014),
Ghana has among the highest levels of state capacity in sub-Saharan Africa. This suggests that the credi-
bility problems I see in Ghana may be more extreme elsewhere.45 Ghana’s history of little programmatic
43Accurate income-based measures of socio-economic class are not available. This likely provides a lower bound for size of the
middle class, as discussed in Chapter 2.
44This index is also used in Kasara & Suryanarayan (2014) to measure a similar concept. It runs from 0 to 4, with 4 being the
highest capacity states (e.g., Germany, Sweden).
45In some cases, local state capacity within municipal governments could differ from national state capacity. For the most part,
local governments in Africa often have limited budgets and lack bureaucratic independence, however (Olowu & Wunsch 2004).
An exception is Lagos State, in Nigiera, where recent widely documented improvements in tax collection may indicate higher
levels of state capacity locally than in Nigeria as a whole. But Lagos’ success has received so much attention specifically because










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































competition is also similar to most other African countries (van de Walle 2007), as indicated by the lack of
programmatic parties in most countries in the second column.46
Second, I emphasize the role of local political party organizations in distributing patronage and mobi-
lizing voters. Ghana’s parties are among the most institutionalized and organized in Africa (Riedl 2014).
The third column in Table 1.2 codes countries based on party system institutionalization as measured by
Riedl (2014).47 In settings with less institutionalized parties, party organization may be less extensive in
poor urban neighborhoods, reducing the amount of clientelism. Under the argument in Chapter 5, this may
reduce incentives for ethnic voting in poor, ethnically diverse neighborhoods within cities.48 But while the
results for ethnic voting may differ somewhat in these weaker party systems, weak parties should be even
less able to make credible policy-based appeals. This may exacerbate the class-based differences in par-
ticipation described in Chapter 3, further dis-incentivizing transitions to more policy-based competition in
cities despite the growth of the urban middle class.
Third, unlike in Ghana, there are some African countries where there has never been significant ethnic
political competition. This distinction is indicated by the column for “Politicized Ethnic Cleavages" in Table
1.2. This is defined based on the “PREG" variable from Posner (2004), which measures ethnic fractionaliza-
tion across “politically relevant ethnic groups" in each country. Ghana is near the middle of the distribution.
But my arguments about ethnicity are less relevant in countries like Senegal and Mali, which have always
had less ethnic competition and have little history of ethnic voting (Posner 2004, Koter 2013a). My other ar-
guments about class-based differences in preferences and political participation, and about variation across
urban neighborhoods in patterns of clientelism, can still apply in these cases, however.
46One exception on each front could be South Africa. Although the dataset in Table 1.2 rates South Africa as having lower state
capacity than Ghana, others have argued that South Africa has significantly higher capacity state than other African countries,
even higher than other middle income countries outside the region (Lieberman 2003). South Africa also has several parties that
consistently campaign on ideologically distinct policy platforms. In South African cities, the class-based differences in political
participation that I discuss in Chapter 3 may not exist, as middle class voters have alternatives on the ballot that can promise to
address their preferences more credibly than any party in Ghana.
47Riedl (2014, p. 41) codes party system institutionalization on a 6 point scale, with higher scores indicating greater institution-
alization. For simplicity, I round these scores to the nearest whole number. Riedl (2014) does not include all countries in Table
1.2.
48Moreover, Ghana’s parties have developed clear affiliations with different ethnic groups that inform voters’ expectations about
the likely beneficiaries if a party wins. There could be concern that these expectations will be less defined in settings where
new emerge in each subsequent election, resulting in less ethnic voting. But overall rates of ethnic voting, along with voters’
expectations of ethnic favoritism, appear to remain very high in countries like Kenya and Zambia, even though they have unstable
parties. For example, Arriola (2012) describes how endorsements made by ethnic elites still clearly signal to voters which newly
formed party is most likely to act in their interest after the election.
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On the other end of the spectrum, the cross-ethnic voting that I find in diverse, middle class neighbor-
hoods in Greater Accra (and Ichino & Nathan (2013) finds in rural areas) may be less likely in settings where
ethnic cleavages have become so hardened by histories of violence that voting for a party affiliated with an
opposing group is unthinkable. Some other countries have much more significant experiences with violence
than Ghana, indicated by the “Recent Political Violence" column in Table 1.2.49 But there are reasons to
doubt whether past violence is enough to override instrumental incentives to vote across ethnic lines. This
is exemplified by Kenya. One election after serious violence, Kalenjin voters overwhelmingly supported a
Kikuyu candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta, who was simultaneously on trial for instigating mass killings of Kalen-
jins. The prospective patronage benefits of empowering the Kalenjin leaders, such as William Ruto, who
had joined Kenyatta’s coalition, appear to have outweighed Kalenjin voters’ concerns about past violence.
Finally, some countries have experienced less significant economic growth than Ghana and likely have
much smaller urban middle classes. Data is not available with which to directly estimate and compare the
size of the middle class across countries. As a rough proxy, the final column of Table 1.2 provides the
average annual GDP growth rate in each country over the last three decades. In countries growing less
quickly, such as Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo, smaller proportions of the urban population
will live in middle or upper class neighborhoods compared to Ghana. Other countries, such as Burkina Faso
or Mali, are growing as rapidly as Ghana, but started from lower baselines. Cities in these countries also
likely have smaller middle classes. Where the middle class is smaller, there should be less variation within
cities in voters’ policy preferences and the presence of clientelism than I observe in Ghana.
1.4.3 External Validity Across Cities
There are also differences in characteristics of cities that should affect the applicability of the argument.
First, I argue that scarcity in access to basic public services leads voters to place significant demands on
politicians which can be addressed through patronage distribution. In cities that have experienced less
rapid population growth, voter demands for basic services may be less acute. Table 1.3 lists the 25 largest
metropolitan areas in the democracies or hybrid regimes in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. But comparing growth rates
between 1985 and 2015 to these other larger cities, Greater Accra is at the middle of the distribution, not an
49This column is coded using data from ACLED (2014), with a country marked as having significant recent political violence if
there are at least two incidents of violence involving the state or competing political forces in the dataset from 2001-2014 with
more than 20 reported fatalities per incident.
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outlier. Existing infrastructure and service delivery has likely been overwhelmed to an even greater extent
in cities experiencing more extreme population growth, such as Abuja, Lagos, Dar es Salaam, and Kumasi.
Voters in these cities may place even greater pressure on politicians for access to scarce club and private
goods.
Table 1.3: Twenty-Five Largest Urban Areas in Countries with Elections
Metro Area Metro Area % Change Locally
City, Country: Pop. (1985) Pop. (2015) (1985-2015) Competitive?
Lagos, Nigeria 3,500,000 13,123,000 275% Yes
Kinshasa, DRC 2,812,000 11,587,000 312% –
Johannesburg, S. Africa 3,446,000 9,399,000 173% Yes
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 1,137,000 5,116,000 350% Yes
Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire 1,716,000 4,860,000 183% Yes
Greater Accra, Ghana 1,431,000a 4,010,000a 180% Yes
Nairobi, Kenya 1,090,000 3,915,000 259% Yes
Cape Town, S. Africa 1,925,000 3,660,000 90% Yes
Kano, Nigeria 1,861,000 3,587,000 93% Yes
Dakar, Senegal 1,162,000 3,520,000 203% Yes
Ibadan, Nigeria 1,436,000 3,160,000 120% Yes
Durban, S. Africa 1,446,000 2,901,000 101% No
Ouagadougou, Burk. Faso 424,000 2,741,000 546% No
Antananarivo, Madag. 742,000 2,610,000 252% Yes
Kumasi, Ghana 532,000 2,599,000 389% No
Bamako, Mali 608,000 2,515,000 314% –
Abuja, Nigeria 204,000 2,440,000 1096% Yes
Lusaka, Zambia 636,000 2,179,000 242% Yes
Pretoria, S. Africa 763,000 2,059,000 170% Yes
Lubumbashi, DRC 588,000 2,015,000 243% –
Mbuji-Mayi, DRC 509,000 2,007,000 294% –
Conakry, Guinea 766,000 1,936,000 153% Yes
Kampala, Uganda 595,000 1,936,000 225% Yes
Harare, Zimbabwe 778,000 1,501,000 93% Yes
Benin City, Nigeria 480,000 1,496,000 212% Yes
Population figures from United Nations (2014) for “urban agglomerations" around each city. a: Pop-
ulation for Greater Accra is adjusted using 2010 census data to include Tema and other surrounding
urban districts, as discussed in the text. The UN figures underreport Accra’s population by excluding
these districts. Local political competitiveness calculated using data sources described in the Ap-
pendix for the most recent election for which results are available. Local results were not available for
the D.R.C. and Mali.
Second, some cities are either significantly poorer than Greater Accra, with very small middle classes,
or significantly less diverse, dominated by a single ethnic group. Smaller middle classes should largely be
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an outcome of differences in national-level economic conditions, as discussed above. Homogeneity on both
of these dimensions (wealth and diversity) should also be more likely in smaller cities, especially those that
are not national capitals, which have served as particularly significant magnets for rural-urban migration
(Gugler & Flanagan 1978, Ades & Glaeser 1995). For example, ethnic fractionalization in Kumasi, Ghana’s
second largest metropolitan area, is half of that of Greater Accra, with most neighborhoods of Kumasi
predominately inhabited by indigenous Ashanti (Akan) residents. Even if the underlying argument above is
correct, the full range of outcomes predicted above should be less visible in cities that have less variation on
the explanatory variables.
Finally, Greater Accra is highly politically competitive, with a significant local presence from each major
political party in Ghana. Both parties have grassroots organizations that can reach voters throughout the city,
especially in poorer neighborhoods. Other cities may not be so competitive. If a single party dominates local
political competition, other parties may not have strong local organizations, even if they are well organized
elsewhere in the country. Under the argument I make in Chapter 5, voters from ethnic groups affiliated
with the locally weaker party in these cities should be less likely to receive private goods from their own
co-ethnic party, even in poorer neighborhoods. They may then have stronger incentives to vote across ethnic
lines when living in a poor neighborhood surrounded by the other party’s affiliated ethnic groups, consistent
with the argument in Ichino & Nathan (2013). But most of the largest African cities are fairly competitive, as
shown by the final column in Table 1.3. Even if urban voters in some countries are marginally more likely to
support opposition parties than rural voters (Harding 2010), few cities are clear opposition strongholds. This
column codes whether one party won more than 65% of the vote in the city in the last election for which
results are publicly available.50 In all but 3 of these 25 cities, no party reached this threshold.51 Where
the losing party still manages to win 35% or 40% of the vote, or the urban vote is split many ways across
numerous parties, multiple parties likely have a local presence in the city and are capable of engaging with
individual supporters who live there, similar to Greater Accra.
50A list of election results used for each city is the Appendix.
51Moreover, in two of three cases where a single party dominates in the city, it is the ruling party, not the opposition party. The
exception is Kumasi, Ghana, where the NPP won 70% of the vote in the last presidential election. This is not an arbitrary outcome
of the cutoff used. If the threshold is lowered to 60% of the vote, only two additional cities would be coded as strongholds of
a particular party: Anatananarivo, Madagascar and Lusaka, Zambia. The ruling party won in Lusaka; the opposition party in
Anatananarivo.
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1.5 Taking Modernization Back Out, Keeping Institutions In
Following in the footsteps of modernization theorists, recent discussions of politics in urban Africa often
assume a model of political development in which all good things seem to go together. Urbanization inter-
acts with economic growth and democratization in a virtuous cycle, reducing the importance of ethnicity
and clientelism. Class-based political movements are thought to emerge in their place, with politicians, es-
pecially those associated with opposition parties, winning support based on the policy proposals that best
address the needs of urban voters, rather than the distribution of patronage. I find little support for this
argument. Instead, I join older post-independence literature on urban Africa in pushing back against mod-
ernization theories of urbanization.
Processes of socio-economic change in Africa’s urban areas are just as likely to create perverse incen-
tives that perpetuate sub-optimal governance outcomes as they are to lead to more accountable forms of
political competition. Pre-existing patterns of patronage distribution and ethnic politics will persist in many
parts of African cities despite the societal changes created by urban growth as long as the majority of voters
continue to rely on the state for scarce basic goods and services, politicians remain able to distribute these
services based on political criteria, and voters have reason to doubt the capacity of governments to carry out
broader programmatic promises. At the same time, there are some urban neighborhoods where clientelistic
relationships are rare and voters do not have strong incentives to line up behind co-ethnic candidates. Ac-
cepting that both good and bad outcomes co-exist as part of the same urban political experience is necessary
for identifying policy approaches that can best address the challenges presented by urban growth in a way
that aligns with political realities on the ground.
African cities mirror some aspects of the historical American experience. As waves of immigrants
poured into American cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, urban governments became bastions of
clientelism and ethnic politics. This persisted in some citiese for decades, despite the emergence over time
of large middle classes as well as significant inter-ethnic social interaction and assimilation. This “machine
era" ended as much because of institutional constraints imposed to restrict the ability of urban politicians
to distribute patronage (e.g., civil service reforms that professionalized bureaucracies) as because of any
socio-economic transformations (Erie 1988, Shefter 1994, Trounstine 2008).
The potential for negative effects of urbanization in the absence of these types of institutional changes
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is shown in Chapter 6, which combines arguments from the previous chapters to examine local municipal
elections. Rather than sparking a transition to better urban governance, I show that wealthy and middle class
voters have almost entirely withdrawn from participation in local elections in Greater Accra. Candidates for
local offices need only compete for the support of the poor, and local elections become heavily clientelistic,
with significant ethnic voting. A minority ethnic group (the Ga) that is better organized at turning out
its members and distributing clientelistic inducements is then able to capture disproportionate power in
municipal governments, and uses this power to redistribute local government resources to itself. This further
hampers the municipal government’s ability to address needs for goods and services in the city at large and
only reinforces the dissatisfaction of most voters with the local government.
Reforms similar to those in the US that limit politicians’ opportunities for patronage distribution may
ultimately prove more important for transforming patterns of electoral competition in African cities than
rising wealth, the declining importance of traditional leaders, or increasing ethnic diversity. Such reforms
can reduce poor voters’ dependence on politicians for access to government benefits. In addition, mandatory
turnout laws, similar to those in Argentina and Chile, could also force middle class and wealthy voters to
participate and place more demands on politicians for policy-based campaigns. More substantive decentral-
ization that empowers local governments could increase trust among middle class voters that policy-based
electoral appeals are credible and create buy-in with the local government system. I discuss this potential of
institutional reform to transform urban politics in Chapter 7.
1.6 Roadmap
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the Ghanaian case and Greater
Accra, as well as my main data sources. The subsequent empirical chapters are then organized by dependent
variable, examining the interplay of the three explanatory variables highlighted above for a series of related
outcomes. Chapter 3 examines the relationships between voters’ policy preferences – the demands they
place on politicians for goods and services – and patterns of political participation. The chapter explores
how differences in participation based on variation in preferences among socio-economic classes affect
politicians’ incentives to engage in patronage-based campaigns. Chapter 4 explores distributive politics
in urban areas from the perspective of political parties, examining patterns of clientelism and patronage
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distribution across different neighborhoods of the city. It also compares these patterns to rural areas. Chapter
5 studies voter behavior in national elections, showing significant variation across urban neighborhoods in
the importance of ethnicity for vote choice. Chapter 6 combines insights from the previous chapters in a case
study of local government elections in the Greater Accra metropolitan area. Chapter 7 addresses alternative
arguments about the political effects of modernization and considers how patronage-based appeals and the
political importance of ethnicity could be reduced through institutional forms that change the incentives
underlying political competition in urban areas.
32
2 | The Case and Data: Urbanization in Greater Accra
2.1 Introduction
The previous chapter describes urban growth in Gbawe, a small farming village that rapidly became a dense
urban community in the 1990s and early 2000s. Gbawe’s transformation is indicative of broader changes
that have been occurring across urban Ghana in recent decades. It speaks to the emergence of Ghana’s
urban middle class, with parts of the village now settled by middle class, formal sector workers. Gbawe
represents variation in the importance of traditional social institutions within urban Ghana, with chiefs from
the indigenous Ga ethnic group retaining importance, while other residents are disconnected from rural
traditional authorities. Gbawe is also now substantially more diverse than ever before, due to in-migration
from other areas of the city and country. In this chapter, I describe these three socio-economic changes in
the Greater Accra metropolitan area, introduce the larger political setting in which they have been occurring,
and lay out the primary data sources used to examine their political effects in the remaining chapters.
2.2 Ghana’s Political System
Ghana reintroduced multi-party democracy in 1992, ending over two decades of near-continuous military
government. The country has now held five consecutive competitive national elections, beginning in 1996.1
There have been two peaceful transitions in power between political parties, after the 2000 and 2008 elec-
tions. Presidential elections use a majoritarian run-off system: all votes count equally in a single national
constituency; the top two finishers compete in a second round if no candidate initially wins 50%. Mem-
1The 1992 elections were marred by claims of fraud in the presidential election and an opposition boycott of the parliamentary
elections.
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bers of Parliament (MPs) are concurrently elected in 275 single-member districts, called “constituencies."2
Ghana’s parliament remains weak relative to the presidency. MPs do not introduce independent legislation
or engage in significant executive oversight. Party line voting is near absolute and legislation from the pres-
ident’s party essentially always passes (Lindberg & Zhou 2009, Lindberg 2010).3 Real power is vested in
the President and his cabinet. While MPs control a small discretionary constituency development fund, con-
trol over the clear majority of state resources depends on the presidential election, typical of many African
countries (van de Walle 2003).4 The powerful MPs are those chosen to serve in the cabinet; constitutionally,
at least one half of national ministers are sitting MPs.
Presidential elections also determine control over every local government in the country. Ghana is di-
vided into 10 regions and 216 administrative districts.5 Districts serve as the main tier of local government.
The president appoints a local ruling party leader as District Chief Executive (DCE), akin to a mayor, to
lead each district.6 There is a local legislative body equivalent to a city council called the District Assembly
serving below the DCE. In each district, 30% of the assembly members are appointed by the national pres-
ident and remainder are elected from single-member wards called Electoral Areas. Assembly members are
elected to four year terms, off cycle from the presidential and parliamentary elections. Presidential appoint-
ment of 30% of assembly members gives the ruling party a majority on almost every District Assembly.
Combined with the appointment of the DCE, this means that the party that wins the presidential election
gains direct control over local spending decisions, even in opposition stronghold districts.7 As discussed in
Chapters 4-6, this allows for favoritism by the ruling party in state spending within each district, not only
across broader regions of the country. District governments have little independent policy-making authority
2The number of MPs has expanded before each recent election, from 200 in 2000 to 275 by 2012.
3Divided government is constitutionally possible, but has never occurred.
4Despite their weak position at the national level, MPs are key local political actors in Ghana. As the most powerful local political
patron in most communities, MPs often gain de facto control over the local party organization in their constituencies, resulting
in strong lobbying influence over local government appointments and the allocation of district resources if their party wins the
presidential election (and takes control over the district government, see below).
5The number of districts has also expanded significantly in recent decades from 110 in 2000 to 216 before the 2012 election. The
275 constituencies nest within the 216 districts, with a one-to-one match in rural areas and a many-to-one correspondence in larger
districts, especially the cities.
6District Chief Executives are instead called Municipal or Metropolitan Chief Executives (MCE) in larger districts, but these terms
are used interchangeably in common practice.
7The local government system and separation of powers between assembly members and the DCE is explored in more detail in
Chapter 6.
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and often struggle to raise independent tax revenues. Instead, their primary task is making local distributive
decisions about budget allocations they receive from the national government.8 These include the District
Assemblies Common Fund, an annual formula-based allocation guaranteeing a minimum budget for each
district (Banful 2008).
Two political parties dominate Ghanaian politics: the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), in
power 1992-2000 and 2009-present, and the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP), in power 2001-2008.
Recent presidential elections have had razor thin margins between these parties, with the 2008 election
decided by less than a percentage point. The NDC is a successor to the previous PNDC (Provisional National
Defense Council) military government, and was formed by PNDC leader Jerry Rawlings as he transitioned
from military dictator to elected president in 1992. The party styles itself as socialist, building in part on
the legacy of Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) from the independence era. The NPP
was formed before the 1992 election, but grew from a series of earlier political parties active in Ghana’s
brief prior democratic periods in the 1950s to 1970s.9 The NPP describes itself as a more conservative
pro-business party, dating to opposition to Nkrumah by earlier incarnations of the party. These self-assigned
ideological labels bear little relation to how these parties now govern, however, as shown in Chapter 3.
Both parties are among the most institutionalized in Africa (Riedl 2014). They have official membership
rolls and permanent committees of local activists at the polling station, constituency, and regional levels
who create a permanent roster of party agents who campaign on their behalf. Local party members vote
in competitive primary elections to select both parliamentary and presidential candidates (Ichino & Nathan
2012). These parties remain active even when in opposition; both have access to private sector financing to
continue party activities and some patronage distribution to supporters.
The NDC and NPP both have stable roots in society, drawing on distinct ethnic bases. Because no
single ethnic group in Ghana is large enough to form a national majority, both parties have built coalitions
of groups, similar to the other African cases explored in Arriola (2012). Members of these groups can
engage in significant ethnic bloc voting for their party (see Chapter 5), even if the presidential candidate
8Many national government programs are also administered separately by district, with district-level ruling party leaders choosing
local beneficiaries based on a fixed amount of benefits allocated to each district by the national government.
9These are primarily the United Party (UP) of the late 1950s and 60s, which itself grew from the Ashanti-based National Liberation
Movement (NLM) of the early 1950s, which opposed Nkrumah and the CPP during the independence period.
35
is not always from their own ethnic group.10 The NPP’s strongest support comes from the cocoa farming
belt in the center of the country, particularly the Ashanti and Eastern Regions. These areas are home to the
Akan, Ghana’s largest ethno-linguistic group, which forms the majority across much of southern and central
Ghana. The NPPs strongest base is the Ashanti (Ashanti Region), Akyem (Eastern Region), and Akuapem
(Eastern Region) sub-groups within the Akan, as well as multiple smaller Akan sub-groups.11 The ruling
NDC draws strong support from the Ewe from Ghana’s Volta Region, the ethnic group of its founder, Jerry
Rawlings, and many predominantly Muslim groups from Ghana’s three northern regions, especially now
that the current NDC president is from Northern Region. The connection with the NDC does not hold
for every northern ethnic group, but dates to extensive patronage from the NDC to northern Ghana under
Jerry Rawlings in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as strong ties between the Rawlings regime and Northern
migrants in southern Ghana (Kobo 2010).12 The NDC historically has also drawn most votes of the Ga, the
indigenous ethnic group of the capital, Accra.13 Existing research shows an overall pattern of ethnic voting
among each of these groups, while also indicating that some voters cross between the parties (Weghorst &
Lindberg 2013, Ichino & Nathan 2013). A series of smaller ethnic groups, such as the Guan and Konkomba,
are not closely affiliated with either party.
10Or in the case of John Evans Atta Mills of the NDC in 2000, 2004, and 2008, is from a group outside the core coalition of the
party all together. Mills was a Fanti (an Akan sub-group), but still received overwhelming support from Ewes and other core
ethnic groups of the NDC.
11This partisan alignment dates back to Akan opposition to Nkurmah in the independence era, as discussed above.
12Many northern groups are politically split in the north along sub-group, or clan lines, due to internal chieftaincy disputes. As
discussed below, chiefs own most of the land in Ghana, so control over chieftaincy positions is valuable in rural areas. The most
prominent example of this is the Dagomba, the largest ethnic group in northern Ghana (and the largest group within the Mole-
Dagbon census category). The majority (approximately 80%) are from the Andani “gate" (or clan), which is strongly aligned
with the NDC, with very high rates of ethnic bloc voting for the party. But a smaller rival gate within the Dagomba, the Abudu,
has become closely tied to the NPP because the NPP government supported the Abudu in their pursuit of the violently contested
Dagomba chieftaincy in an apparent attempt to win back some Dagomba votes (MacGaffey 2006). Despite these intra-ethnic
disputes within the rural north, northern migrants who live in southern Ghana are largely viewed as affiliated with the NDC. The
overwhelming majority of Dagombas in Accra are Andanis, for example. These migrants in the south often live in segregated,
Muslim neighborhoods known as “zongos" (a Hausa term for foreigners’ quarters), which are popularly seen as major NDC
strongholds. In the interviews described below, local politicians and party leaders in Greater Accra consistently discuss “zongos"
and other Northern-migrant communities in Greater Accra as strong bastions of NDC support, such that is appropriate to treat
these groups as generally aligned with the NDC in the analysis of voting behavior within Greater Accra.
13The NPP is affiliated, however, with a few clans among the Ga because the previous NPP government backed their claims for
disputed chieftaincies. This is similar to the NPP’s strategy in northern Ghana.
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2.3 Urbanization in Greater Accra
Less than a quarter of Ghana’s population lived in cities at independence in 1957. Today, 54% of Ghana’s
25 million people live in urban areas (United Nations 2014, World Bank 2015). Ghana has four large
metropolitan areas, Greater Accra (combining Accra, Tema, and surrounding districts), Kumasi, Tamale,
and Takoradi-Sekondi. Figure 2.1 shows these four metropolitan areas on a map of Ghana. Two of them,
Greater Accra and Kumasi, now count among the 25 largest cities in sub-Saharan Africa. Smaller cities in
Ghana have been expanding even faster than the major metropolitan areas in recent decades (World Bank
2015). But Greater Accra, as the national capital, retains a dominant position in the national economy. It
has attracted the most rural-urban migrants and contains the most internal economic and ethnic diversity
compared to Ghana’s other major cities.
The Accra area was first home to a series of small fishing communities inhabited by the Ga ethnic group.
These villages were originally at the far periphery of the pre-colonial economy; West Africa’s powerful pre-
colonial kingdoms in medieval times were located far to the interior. But beginning in the second half of the
15th century, Ghana’s Atlantic Coast became home to a series of European forts and trading installations,
which became central export points for gold and the Atlantic slave trade. Several European forts built along
the Accra coast in the 17th century remain important landmarks in the contemporary city.14 The arrival of
European trade gradually transformed Accra into a commercial hub linking the powerful Ashanti kingdom
in central Ghana to European markets. The city grew further after becoming the capital of the British Gold
Coast colony in the late-1870s, and especially after the British built a railway in the early 1920s linking
Accra to the gold and cocoa producing regions of central Ghana. The basic street layout of Accra’s central
business district dates to this period. Accra received rural-urban migrants throughout the colonial era, but
the Ga ethnic group remained the majority and dominated both colonial-era and independence-era politics
in the city (Parker 2000).
After independence, Accra and surrounding communities grew rapidly due to rural-urban migration.
With Accra serving as the seat of government and hub of the national economy, every major ethnic group
in Ghana developed a significant foothold in the city. The Ga gradually became a minority in their own
14These are Ussher Fort, by the Dutch in 1649, Christiansborg (Osu) Castle by the Danish in the 1660s, which became Ghana’s seat
of government from 1957 until 2013, and James Fort, built by the British in 1673.
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Figure 2.1: Map of Ghana: The 10 administrative regions are labeled, along with the 4 major metropolitan
areas (highlighted in black). The 5 parliamentary constituencies included in the rural comparison survey
(described below and in Chapter 4) are shaded in gray.
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homeland. By the mid-1990s, the Akan (Twi) language had replaced Ga as the primary lingua franca of
the city, alongside English (Kropp Dakubu 1997). In recent decades, however, continued growth of the
city has been driven more by higher rates of natural increase in urban than rural areas than migration from
rural areas (Ghana Statistical Service 2008, World Bank 2015). By the beginning of the 21st century, Accra
had spilled far past its official city boundaries to consume surrounding districts within the Greater Accra
Region and become fully contiguous with the nearby city of Tema. Figure 2.2 shows the 12 current urban
administrative districts that now make up the Greater Accra metropolitan area, of which the official city of
Accra – the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) – is only one.15 The metropolitan area’s population is
now approximately 4 million, up from 2.8 million in 2000 and 1.4 million in 1984.
Much of this growth has been unplanned. In the late-1950s, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah,
drew up a plan for the city that led to the construction of several well laid out residential neighborhoods
ringing the central business district. In the mid-1960s, Nkrumah also oversaw construction of an industrial
port city at Tema, east of Accra. Tema still retains its neatly arranged street grid from this period. But after
these early efforts, major urban planning in Accra became rare. Similar to other cities across the developing
world, many neighborhoods have emerged over the past decades in a haphazard, uneven fashion, lacking
basic infrastructure. This growth has been most extensive in peri-urban communities on the outskirts of
the original city, which have exploded with urban sprawl. An example is Ga South (Weija) District on the
western edge of Accra, home of Gbawe, the village described in Chapter 1. The district was almost entirely
rural two decades ago, but grew in population by nearly 300% between the 2000 and 2010 censuses. It is
now home to 485,000 people, even though some neighborhoods in the district have lower levels of service
provision per capita – fewer paved roads and public schools, less running water – than many rural towns.
Over time, Greater Accra has become very politically competitive. The city is a key contested region
in presidential elections. In 2012, the NDC won 50.6% of the presidential vote in the metropolitan area’s
28 urban constituencies, compared to 48.8% for the NPP. This was similar to the 50.3% and 47.8% won by
each party, respectively, in 2008. Panel (a) of Figure 2.3 shades the 238 Electoral Areas (ELAs), or wards,
within the metropolitan area by 2008 presidential election results.16 The ruling NDC has strongholds in pre-
15As noted in Chapter 1, “Greater Accra" refers here to all urban districts within the Greater Accra Region. This excludes six rural
parliamentary constituencies in the official administrative region: Ada, Ningo-Prampram, Shai Osudoku, Sege, Domeabra-Obom,
and Amasaman. The current population of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) is now approximately 1.9 million.
16Because of missing data at this level of aggregation for the 2012 results (see Chapter 5), I used 2008 data for the visualization
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Figure 2.2: Greater Accra Metropolitan Area: The 12 district governments that comprise the Greater Accra
metropolitan area are labeled here. These districts cover 28 parliamentary constituencies. Two districts
– Ga South and Ga West – include rural and urban parliamentary constituencies. The rural portions of
these districts are shaded in gray (Domeabra-Obom and Amasaman). The official city of Accra – the Accra
Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) – is labeled in bold. The points are the GPS locations of the 48 clusters of
respondents in the main urban survey. The triangles are the locations of the focus groups discussions with
voters.
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dominately Northern slums such as Mamobi-Nima and Ashaiman, as well as in the original Ga communities
along the Atlantic coast and in the peri-urban areas where Gas remain most numerous. The opposition NPP
dominates in the majority Akan neighborhoods that line the northwestern rim of the city, as well as in parts
of Tema.17 Other areas of the city are very competitive, however.
2.4 Major Changes Due to Urbanization
Greater Accra is representative of the series of developments common to major African cities presented in
the previous chapter. The city faces significant shortcomings in service delivery, which sustains demands
in the electorate for goods that politicians can target as patronage. The city has an emerging middle class,
even as there are also growing slum communities. There is variation within the city in the importance
of traditional elites. Finally, the city has very diverse neighborhoods alongside more segregated ethnic
enclaves.
2.4.1 Challenges in Service Delivery
Growth has strained public infrastructure and service provision, in newly urbanized areas and older neigh-
borhoods alike. As will be shown in Chapter 3, these shortcomings affect voters’ preferences over what
they want from the government, which then affect the forms of electoral political competition within the
city. The neighborhoods of central Accra (inside the AMA), as well as in central Tema and other areas that
were created as part of the early city plans in the late 1950s and early 1960s, still have better infrastructural
endowments and access to basic services than much of the rest of the city, but still suffer from overuse and
years of delayed maintenance. As a result, both the center city and outlaying areas have significant needs
for improvements to infrastructure and services.
In outlaying districts such as Adenta, Ga East, and Ga South, most roads other than the major thor-
oughfares are unpaved. In the center city, most are paved, even within some of the slums. But both paved
and unpaved roads can incur serious damage during each rainy season due to flooding exacerbated by in-
here. Results are highly correlated between these elections in the areas for which data is available in both years.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































adequate drainage and trash collection.18 Where they exist, the city’s sewers and storm drains are almost
all open air, continually collecting trash and debris. Some neighborhoods organize volunteer community
labor campaigns to clear them, but these efforts are not systematic. Many drains are never regularly cleared.
Annual flooding ensues. Recent floods in central Accra have caused hundreds of deaths, including through
a fuel station explosion in 2015 that attracted international media attention, as well as recurring cholera
outbreaks.19 Regular flooding on the outskirts of the city washes out numerous roads every year. District
governments lack the funds to repair all that are damaged, let alone expand roads in all neighborhoods that
still lack them.
The electricity grid covers the entire metropolitan area, with connections available to all who can afford
them. But generating capacity cannot meet demand. There have been extended rolling blackouts in recent
years. Consistent electricity is only available to those who can purchase diesel generators. Running water
availability is also problematic. The center city has a pipe network, but in sizable portions of Adenta,
Madina, Ga South, Ga East, and Ga West districts there are still no pipes in the ground.20 Even in areas
where the pipe network exists, water flows irregularly. Many neighborhoods only receive pipe-borne water
once a week. Elsewhere it is even less frequent. Rather than rely on public pipes, many residents purchase
water privately. Wealthier residents either get regular tanker truck deliveries to their homes or dig boreholes
with electric pumps on their property. Poor residents often buy water from local business that stockpile
water in tanks and sell it to surrounding residents at a markup.
Overcrowding in public primary schools in central Accra forced education officials to adopt a shift
system with students only attending for half of each school day. This continues in parts of the city as
of early 2015, despite a major school construction push by the NDC government, funded by international
donors, and a public declaration of the end of the practice by Accra’s mayor in 2011.21 In newly urbanized
communities on the outskirts of the city, some neighborhoods still have no public schools at all. Public
18Local governments throughout the metropolitan area have significantly expanded curbside trash collection in recent years. But
many neighborhoods across the city still must dump trash at a central location.
19For example, see: “Accra Floods: More than 100 Feared Dead After Explosion," The Daily Guide, 4 June 2015; Severious Kale
Dery, “Cholera Outbreak Worsening in Gt. Accra; Over 6000 cases recorded," The Daily Graphic, 26 August 2014.
20The NDC government significantly expanded the pipe network in Adenta and Madina in late 2014, however, using development
assistance from the Chinese government. This was after all data collection for the dissertation. For example, see: “Confirmed:
Water Starts Flowing at Adenta," Peace FM Online, 24 December 2014.
21For example, see: “Shift system still exists in Accra schools," Ghana Web, 13 February 2013; Charles Ando, “New School Block
Inaugurated at Darkuman-Kokompe," The Daily Graphic, 30 April 2014.
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primary education is free, but families living in these areas have to pay to send children to private schools.
Those who cannot afford private school tuition often seek assistance with tuition payments from politicians,
as shown in Chapters 3 and 4, opening avenues for clientelism. Public hospitals in the center city suffer
from similar overcrowding. Budget shortfalls and delays in government payments of health care providers
salaries have also led to recurring strikes by public sector doctors and nurses, denying services to those who
cannot afford care at private clinics.22
The city also has a housing shortage. This applies in all of urban Ghana, which is estimated to be
approaching a 2 million unit housing deficit (World Bank 2015). There has been significant recent construc-
tion of high end housing by private developers around Accra (Grant 2009), but these homes rent at rates
comparable to some US cities, far beyond the budget of the majority of the city’s residents. Construction
of non-luxury housing has not kept pace and the government abandoned efforts at providing public housing
decades ago as part of donor-backed “structural adjustment" reforms (Arku 2009). Lower class residents
are instead often forced into informal slums by high rents. With supply constrained, landlords now charge
renters two years cash advances on most rentals (Arku et al. 2012). This violates rent control laws, but they
are rarely enforced. Housing shortages and upfront rent payments severely constrain the ability of residents
to sort across neighborhoods in search of better access to local public services, as discussed further in Chap-
ter 5. The World Bank argues that “the inability of the existing housing... supply to meet effective demand
results in a situation where many urbanite[s]... are forced to live in slums or areas of poor housing conditions
characterized by overcrowding and low-quality or absent basic services" (World Bank 2015, 22).
2.4.2 Emergence of the Middle Class
Despite these service delivery challenges, urbanization in Ghana has come hand-in-hand with major eco-
nomic progress. Ghana’s economy hit rock bottom in the early 1980s, but in the three decades since the
country has had annual average GDP growth over 5%, among the fastest rates in the world (World Bank
2015). GDP growth reached as high as 14% in 2011, and has remained over 4% annually throughout the
last decade. Importantly, most of this sustained growth is not due to oil and mineral extraction; large-scale
22For example, see: “Doctors in Ghana continue to strike over salary dispute," BBC News, 12 April 2013; “Junior Doctors On Strike
Over Unpaid Salaries," The Daily Guide, 3 June 2015; “35,000 Nurses, Midwives Declare Strike," Peace FM Online, 2 July 2014.
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oil production only began in 2011.23 Similar to other African cities (Kessides 2006), the economy in urban
Ghana is increasingly dominated by the service and commercial sectors, especially in Greater Accra.24 Al-
though this economic growth has created considerable inequality, there have also been substantial reductions
in poverty (World Bank 2015).
Growth has produced a large urban middle class, similar to many other African countries in recent
decades (Resnick 2015). The middle class in Africa is not consistently defined or measured in existing
literature. Some sources use income based cutoffs. These include African Development Bank (2011), the
most widely cited recent report estimating the size of the African middle class, which defines middle class as
those with incomes over US$4 per day. But incomes in Ghana and other developing countries are difficult
to measure accurately using self-reports on surveys, and can be highly variable over time, especially for
those employed in the informal sector economy.25 In a comprehensive effort to define the African middle
class consistently across countries, Thurlow et al. (2015) instead proposes identifying the middle class by
more concrete indicators for the probability that someone has escaped poverty and has the necessary skill
set to compete in the modern economy. They highlight secondary education and formal sector employment
as the two strongest indicators of middle class status across Africa, alongside housing quality. Following
this approach, I measure membership in the middle class in the subsequent chapters through measures of
formal sector employment and education (see below and Chapter 3). Both of these factors are likely highly
correlated with the higher incomes available in the city’s modern, professional economy.26
Using individual-level 2010 census data (which does not attempt to measure income), 22% of working-
age adults in Greater Accra are now employed in the formal sector (private or public), are literate in English
23Ghana’s economy has suffered a recent downturn in 2014 and 2015, but it is not yet clear whether this is a temporary slowdown
or a long-term departure from the growth previous trends.
24Combined with the new oil money entering the country, Accra is also increasingly the home of the regional (Africa or West Africa)
headquarters of major multinational corporations, as well as many international organizations and NGOs. This has stimulated
further investment in the high end service economy in the city. Growth has also been fueled by reinvestment of wealth from
the Ghanaian diaspora, beginning in the mid-1990s. Upper class Ghanaians who had emigrated to the US and Europe during
the 1980s have now returned in large numbers and repatriated wealth (Grant 2009). This foreign investment has not produced
significant industrialization, however. Industrial employment is actually falling in urban Ghana as the rest of the economy expands
(World Bank 2015).
25Moreover, income-based cutoffs do not account for the cost of living, which can fluctuate significantly against the US dollar
within short periods of time in economies that suffer from unstable exchange rates, such as Ghana.
26To the extent that some in the informal sector economy may also have high incomes, this likely provides a lower bound on the
true size of the city’s middle class. I discuss the implications of using a conservative definition for middle class status in Chapter
3.
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(the language of official business), and have some secondary or tertiary education.27 Using this definition,
the middle class has clearly been growing. Employment in the formal sector in the city rose from 24% of
working-age adults in the 2000 census to 30% in 2010. This represents roughly 350,000 additional formal
sector workers in a ten year period. Adults with at least some secondary education rose from 32% to 43%
of the city over the same period.
Contrary to cities elsewhere in the developing world, especially in Latin America (e.g., see Luna 2014),
Greater Accra’s middle and upper class is not overwhelmingly concentrated into certain districts of the
city. Instead, many middle class and poorer residents often live intermixed within the same administra-
tive districts and parliamentary constituencies. This mixing has long been typical of West African cities
(Gugler & Flanagan 1978). While more gated upper class housing developments are now being constructed
(Grant 2009), there still are not majority middle class districts within the city. Residents with formal sec-
tor employment, literacy, and secondary education make up the majority of adults on the 2010 census in
only one of the 28 urban parliamentary constituencies in Greater Accra, with 53% in Ayawaso West, a
constituency within the AMA that houses the main national university and the wealthiest neighborhood in
the country (East Legon). The median urban constituency is 23% middle class. On the other end of the
spectrum, concentrated slums with significant poverty have developed in Greater Accra. But other poor
residents live mixed in among middle and upper class residential neighborhoods, often as squatters or in
other informal, temporary housing arrangements.
Panel (b) of Figure 2.3 shades Electoral Areas (wards) in the metropolitan area by the proportion of
adults on the 2010 census with formal sector employment, some secondary education, and English literacy,
which I use as a proxy for the presence of the middle or upper class. The presence of large slums is
visible in the areas surrounding Ga Mashie (Jamestown), at the heart of central Accra, and other traditional
Ga communities along the Atlantic Coast, such as Teshie and Nungua. In addition, concentrated poverty
in majority Northern slums such as Sabon Zongo, Agbogbloshie, and Mamobi-Nima within the AMA is
visible.28 Upper class areas are visible at Legon and around the airport in the Ayawaso West constituency
of the AMA, as well as along the Spintex Road in Ledzokuku-Krowor District, where construction of new
27Public education is only free through middle school (“Junior Secondary") in Ghana. There is a large discontinuity between middle
school and secondary school (“Senior Secondary") attendance due to socio-economic class.
28Geo-coded census data is missing for Tema and Ashaiman districts. The Ashaiman and Tema New Town slums are thus not
visualized in Panel (b) of Figure 2.3. Wealthy neighborhoods in Tema West constituency are also not shown.
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upper class housing developments has been most extensive. But across most wards in the city, Panel (b)
shows that wealthier and poorer residents are more mixed.
2.4.3 Traditional Accra: The Ga Ethnic Group
Greater Accra also has significant internal variation in the importance of traditional ethnic institutions. Tra-
ditional chiefs retain their importance among the indigenous Ga ethnic group, but serve little role in daily
life for others in the city. Despite being the original inhabitants of the region, the Ga are now a minority
in their own city. As of 2010, the Greater Accra Region had become 40% Akan, 27% Ga, and 20% Ewe,
with the remaining 13% comprised mostly of Northern ethnic groups.29 The city still has segregated Ga
neighborhoods, however, in the locations of many of the original Ga villages. These include parts of Ga
Mashie (Jamestown), Bawaleshie, La, Osu, Teshie, Nungua, Kpone, and Bortianor. Many of these original
Ga communities have become economically marginalized over time (Ardayfio-Schandorf et al. 2012), with
some of the most concentrated poverty in the city (Weeks et al. 2006).30
These Ga communities are distinctive from other parts of the city, with prominent chief’s palaces, such
as the one described in Gbawe at the beginning of Chapter 1, and traditional family houses, which serve as
central meeting points for the extended Ga families, or clans, originating from each neighborhood. Ga resi-
dents who live elsewhere in Greater Accra often return to these family houses for social events and weekly
or monthly family meetings, maintaing strong ethnic social networks within the community. Traditional
Ga festivals celebrated in these original communities remain major events in the city. For example, an an-
nual ban on “noise making" decreed by Ga chiefs closes bars and nightclubs, silences mosque minarets,
and subdues church services for a month each year throughout the city. The ban is enforced by the district
governments.
Traditional chiefs in Ghana are constitutionally granted ownership of most land in the country. In rural
areas, land ownership can give chiefs significant social power, with the ability to reallocate lands among
families, charge tribute or taxes to outsiders who have settled in an area, and lease community lands to
investors or business interests (Goldstein & Udry 2008, Onoma 2010). As the indigenous ethnic group of
Greater Accra, Ga chiefs formally own most land in the city. Their property rights are irregular enforced,
29The city of Accra (AMA) was only 23% Ga in the 2010 census.
30This can be seen visually by comparing the Ga majority areas in panel (c) of Figure 2.3 with panel (b).
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however (Firmin-Sellers 1996, Onoma 2010). Large tracts of land in the city have been seized by the
government and leased to other users, cutting Ga chiefs out of opportunities for rent extraction. This is
a source of significant discontent within the Ga community, many members of which see themselves as
unfairly compensated for the use of their land by outsiders (Yeboah 2008); this irregular enforcement of
Ga property rights is used to politically mobilize Ga voters around a perception that they are losing status,
threatened by newcomers to the city (Paller 2015). Accra’s courts are the site of numerous land cases in
which Ga chiefs or families sue current users (or the government) to reestablish property rights. Adding
to the complexity are disputes within the Ga community over which Ga families are the rightful holders of
some of the chieftaincies in Greater Accra. This has lead to legal battles within the Ga community, as well
as some intra-ethnic violence.
Some of these internal disputes have become politicized, with the NDC and NPP aligning themselves
with rival families in search of Ga votes. Ga elites, including chiefs, have become closely tied to the
political party leadership in Greater Accra, especially to the NDC, which has historically drawn the most Ga
votes.31 This gives Ga an outsized, favored position in politics within the city. Constituency-level leaders
and parliamentary candidates are drawn heavily from the Ga community, particularly for the NDC. Gas won
half of the 28 urban parliamentary seats in 2012, despite comprising only a quarter of the electorate. Almost
all DCEs (or mayors) appointed by the NDC to lead the city’s district governments are Ga, as discussed in
Chapter 6. Party agents describe campaigning in Ga communities as a central part of voter mobilization in
Greater Accra, using chiefs and family heads as intermediaries to reach Ga voters in a way that they cannot
with other ethnic groups in the city.32 Local politicians from both major parties describe approaching Ga
chiefs to pay their respects and ask for permission to begin any projects, such as building new local public
goods.33 Ga chiefs can mount legal challenges and mobilize local residents against a project, tying it up for
years. This power allows Ga chiefs to extract concessions and spending from local governments in return
31Chiefs are formally barred from political activity, but in reality, chiefs across the country are sometimes intimately involved in
local politics, and encourage residents in their communities to support specific electoral candidates.
32Interview with NPP party agents, Krowor constituency, 15 February 2014; interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon
constituency, 27 February 2014; interview with NPP party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 18 February 2014; interview
with NPP party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 5 March 2014; interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon con-
stituency, 26 March 2014.
33Interview with district assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 25 February 2014; interview with district
assembly member, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 14 February 2014; interview with district assembly member and NDC ex-
ecutive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 27 February 2014; interview with district assembly member, Ablekuma North
constituency (AMA), 11 March 2014.
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for their support.
Other residents lack similarly powerful traditional leaders in Greater Accra. Instead, consistent with
what modernization theories expected to occur as a result of rural-urban migration (see Chapter 1), many of
the remaining residents of the city are increasingly disconnected from traditional authorities. The Akan, the
largest ethnic group now living in Accra, have chiefs who play important roles in village life in Akan regions
of the country and in the city of Kumasi, capital of the Ashanti kingdom and the Asantehene, the most
powerful traditional authority in Ghana. But their authority does not extend to Accra. Some Northern ethnic
groups have posted sub-chiefs to live within the city’s “zongo" communities (Northern migrant settlements),
but because these chiefs do not own land, they have significantly less local power than they would in a rural
area in the north. Imams and other religious leaders often play a more important leadership role among the
Northern community in Accra than chiefs. To the extent that ethnic social networks remain important among
these other ethnic groups, they tie residents of Greater Accra back to their ethnic home regions elsewhere in
Ghana, rather than creating dense social ties within the city that can be used for local political mobilization.
Ultimately, the ability of the parties, especially the NDC, to campaign in Ga communities by enlisting the
assistance of Ga elites and working through locally dense Ga social networks means that Ga voters are easier
to target with patronage than other residents of the city. This is explored further in Chapter 5.
2.4.4 Ethnic Diversity
Finally, similar to other major African cities, Greater Accra has become very ethnically diverse. Panel (c) of
Figure 2.3 displays the majority ethnic group in each Electoral Area of the metropolitan area. As discussed
above, there are still homogeneous Ga enclaves along the cost, as well as segregated Akan communities,
especially on the northwestern rim of the city. There also slum areas populated primarily by groups from
northern Ghana. But most wards in Figure 2.3 have no majority ethnic group.
By contrast, most rural villages in Ghana are the homeland of a single ethnic group or a small set
of related groups. While most rural communities have some outsiders living there as local minorities,
indigenous groups usually make up the clear majority. Almost all rural territories in Ghana are viewed
as belonging to a locally dominant ethnic group, with government spending directed to these areas seen as a
transfer in favor of that specific group. There are some exceptions to this pattern. Ghana also has a history
of rural-rural labor migration, especially around the cocoa farming industry, which is the largest source of
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rural employment across southern Ghana. Seasonal migrants from the three northern regions have long
travelled down to work on cocoa farms in central Ghana. Akans from the Ashanti and Eastern Regions have
also gradually migrated into Ghana’s Western and Brong Ahafo Regions in search of more productive land
(Hill 1963). But this has not produced ethnic diversity at the local level on anything near the scale of urban
areas like Greater Accra.
These differences can be seen clearly in Figure 2.4. The top panel is a density plot of the distribution
of the standard Herfindahl index of ethnic fractionalization in each enumeration area, or census tract, in
all rural areas of the country on the 2010 census.34 Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability that
two randomly selected people from a enumeration area are from the same ethnic group. The median rural
enumeration area has ethnic fractionalization of 0.17. The distribution of ethnic fractionalization by enu-
meration area in the Greater Accra metropolitan area is in the second panel. Here, the median enumeration
area has ethnic fractionalization of 0.60. Figure 2.4 shows that there are still some homogeneous local areas
within Greater Accra, but much of the city is diverse. The final two panels give similar distributions for
all major metropolitan areas in Ghana (adding Kumasi, Tamale, and Takoradi-Sekondi) and for all cities,
adding several smaller cities such as Sunyani, Cape Coast, and Ho. In each panel, ethnic fractionalization
within these cities is clearly much higher than in rural areas.35
2.5 The Data
I examine the political effects of urbanization using a mixed-methods approach. The main inferences are
drawn from analysis of original survey data on voter attitudes and behavior, combined with local election
results and fine-grained census data. This census data allows for significantly more detailed measurement of
urban neighborhood characteristics than has been possible in past studies of urban Africa. Together, these
data sources are used for “large-N" comparisons of political outcomes across a representative cross-section
of neighborhoods within the city. This analysis is complemented by a series of qualitative sources that aid
in understanding the underlying motivations behind these outcomes: interviews with local politicians and
34Each of the country’s 37,000 enumeration areas contains several hundred people.
35But there is relatively less ethnic diversity in the smaller cities than in Greater Accra because they have attracted less rural-urban
migration over time.
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Figure 2.4: Ethnic Diversity by Enumeration Area: Density distributions of ethnic fractionalization for
each 2010 census enumeration area (tract) for: (a) all rural areas of Ghana; (b) Greater Accra metropolitan
area; (c) the four major metropolitan areas (Greater Accra, Kumasi, Tamale, Takoradi-Sekondi); and (d) all
Ghanaian cities (the four metro areas, all regional capitals, Obuasi, Ejisu, Techiman, Bawku).
political party leaders, as well as focus groups with ordinary urban residents conducted during intensive field
research between 2012 and 2014. In this section, I introduce basic features of these data sources, including
several key variables from the survey and census data that will reappear throughout the subsequent analysis.
2.5.1 Survey and Census Data
The main survey analyzed throughout the text interviewed a representative, random sample of 1008 residents
of Greater Accra in November-December 2013. The survey interviewed 21 respondents at their households
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in 48 small sampling clusters, or neighborhoods, in 10 parliamentary constituencies within the city.36 The
sample was selected after stratifying all parliamentary constituencies in the metropolitan area by wealth,
ethnic diversity, and 2012 NDC vote share, and then selecting random start points within constituencies
after stratifying on wealth and ethnic diversity using geo-coded census data.37 Interviews were conducted
in four languages (English, Akan/Twi, Ga, or Ewe) by local enumerators using smartphones. From each of
the 48 start points, respondents were selected via a standard random walk procedure.38 The points in Figure
2.2 above display the centroids of the 48 clusters of respondents in the survey.
At an individual level, the survey measures a series of demographic characteristics of each respon-
dent. These include age, ethnicity, religion, wealth, types of living arrangements, and socio-economic class.
Wealth and socio-economic class are measured using indices based on a series of questions on basic assets,
education, and types of employment. The first, referred to as the education/employment index, is the first
dimension of a factor analysis of indicators for: having more than a middle school education, English liter-
acy, and formal sector employment. This is meant to match the definition of middle class status discussed
above. In the absence of reliable data on income, I rely on this index as the primary measure of class, as
discussed above. A separate index measures basic household assets of each respondent and is based on the
first dimension of a factor analysis of indicators for owning a car, a television, a computer, having running
water, a flush toilet, electricity, and a home security gate.39 These variables were chosen so as to avoid
incorporating access to local public services into the measure of assets.40 An additional series of demo-
graphic questions measures respondents’ residential histories, which are used in Chapter 5 to examine how
long respondents have lived in each neighborhood and how they sorted into living there. Other questions
measure respondents’ social attitudes about their ethnic groups.
3613 interviews are dropped in all analyses due to enumerator errors, leaving N = 995. The parliamentary constituencies are
Ayawaso East, Ayawaso North, Ablekuma North, Ablekuma Central, and Okaikwei Central, within the city of Accra (AMA), and
Weija-Gbawe, Bortianor-Ngleshie Amanfro, La Dade Kotopon, Ledzokuku, and Krowor, in the surrounding area.
37See the Appendix for more detail on the sampling procedures.
3840% of interviews were on weekends and holidays so employed and wealthy respondents were more likely to be available.
Interviews alternated by gender.
39Both of these indices are scaled in standard deviations from mean values of 0. I also make a count variable of each indicator of
education and employment, ranging from 0 to 3, and repeat all analyses with this variable, finding substantively identical results
(not shown).
40In particular, even though running water and electricity can be provided publicly, middle class and wealthy residents in Greater
Accra often privately provide these services to themselves, as discussed above, such that access is more a measure of wealth than
public service provision.
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In addition to these basic demographic questions, the survey asks respondents a series of questions about
political preferences and political behavior, examined and explained in the subsequent chapters, as well as
about their ties to chiefs and other local community leaders. Randomized survey experiments measuring
voters’ perceptions of the credibility of campaign promises and their expectations about where patronage
will be targeted by the major parties are also included. These survey experiments are analyzed in Chapters
3 and 5.
Separately, two main explanatory variables at the neighborhood level – neighborhood wealth and eth-
nic composition – are measured using geo-coded enumeration area (tract) level census data, using a 10%
individual-level random sample of Ghana’s 2010 census.41 Calculating these variables requires a defini-
tion of “neighborhoods." Neighborhood boundaries in any city are nebulous social concepts. People living
in the same place often disagree about the boundaries of their neighborhood (Wong et al. 2012). Univer-
sally agreed-upon definitions of neighborhood boundaries do not exist in Greater Accra, except for in a few
geographically distinctive communities. Moreover, census enumeration area boundaries provide an inap-
propriate means of defining neighborhoods; as elsewhere, (Wong et al. 2012) enumeration areas in Ghana
are politically and socially irrelevant creations of the census bureau. Taking enumeration areas as the unit
of observation may also suffer from the “modifiable areal unit problem" (Openshaw 1983), in which arbi-
trary choices over how to impose discrete boundaries on continuous geographic data can significantly bias
a study’s results.
I attempt to mitigate the risk of bias by defining local neighborhood characteristics as weighted averages
of census characteristics from all census tracts around each individual survey respondent, with information
closer to the respondent weighted higher, and all data outside a given radius weighted as 0. This smooths the
census data over the enumeration areas rather than imposing discrete, arbitrary neighborhood boundaries and
follows a well-established approach used in the Sociology literature to measure ethnic segregation (Reardon
and O’Sullivan 2004, Lee et al. 2008), and also mirrors Ichino & Nathan (2013). Because of the small scale
at which urban club goods benefit voters in Greater Accra, the city’s very high population density,42 and the
fact that it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate local pockets of ethnic homogeneity within the city
from more heterogeneous surroundings at larger distances, the main radius for these weighted averages used
41This is a 10% sample of individual-level census returns within each enumeration area, selected by the Ghana Statistical Service.
42Population density reaches over 90,000 / sq. km in the city.
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is 500 meters around each respondent.43 This means that each neighborhood in the analysis is measured
relative to each respondent’s own location. This approach also accounts for population density, with the
weights a function of both distance and population density around the respondent. See the Appendix for
detail on the specific weighting function used.44
Using this spatially-weighted census data, the wealth of each respondent’s neighborhood is calculated
as the first dimension in a factor analysis of census data on assets, education, and employment, mirroring
the individual-level indices that measure assets and socio-economic class in the survey.45 The neighborhood
wealth index is scaled in standard deviations from the city-wide mean of 0 and is calculated over all enu-
meration areas in urban Greater Accra. In the survey sample, the variable ranges from -1.4 to 3, with a mean
of -0.10. Higher values indicate greater local wealth in the radius around each respondent. In addition, the
ethnic composition of the area around each respondent is measured using the weighted average of the ethnic
group population shares within the same radius. Local ethnic diversity is measured as a standard Herfindahl
fractionalization index calculated using these population shares for the nine census categories for ethnicity:
Akan, Ga-Dangbe, Ewe, Mole-Dagbon, Guan, Gurma, Grusi, Mande, and Other.46 Population density is
measured as the population of the enumeration areas covered by each sampling cluster, divided by the area
(in sq. km). Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the core variables from the survey and geo-coded
census data that appear repeatedly throughout the analysis in text. Other variables from the survey and cen-
sus data measuring specific outcomes are introduced in the later chapters as needed, with separate summary
statistics provided.
In addition to the survey on urban areas, a companion survey was conducted in five rural constituen-
cies of Ghana to allow for comparisons to outcomes in rural areas (see Chapter 4). This rural survey was
conducted in five parliamentary constituencies, randomly selected from all rural constituencies in five re-
43Because these weights decay with distance, the results using this approach are robust to small changes in the maximum distance
used for this radius, such as using 600 or 700 meters instead.
44The median census enumeration area is 0.03 sq. km in area, smaller than the 0.79 sq. km of each radius around respondents.
45Variables that only measure service provision, not wealth, are excluded. The index includes: % in the radius around each
respondent with running water (privately provided by wealthier residents via tanker or borehole); % with a flush toilet, % with
electricity (available to all who can afford it), % in a single-family home (excluding informal structures); % with a computer; %
adults with more than a middle school education; and % adults employed in the formal or public sectors.
46Because a subset of the latter 6 categories are northern groups, more Northerners in an area will be correlated with fractionaliza-
tion. I also calculate an alternative index that collapses to 5 categories: Akan, Ga-Dangbe, Ewe, Northern, and Other. This is
highly correlated with the 9 category measure (r = 0.92). Results for ethnic fractionalization are robust to using either.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for the Urban Survey
mean min. max. sd N
NDC Vote in 2012 presidential elec. (0,1) 0.53 0.00 1.00 0.50 804
NPP Vote in 2012 presidential elec. (0,1) 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.50 804
Self-Reported Turnout in 2012 (0,1) 0.84 0.00 1.00 0.36 995
Co-Ethnic Party Vote (0,1) 0.76 0.00 1.00 0.43 797
Neighborhood Wealth Index (500m) -0.10 -1.40 3.02 0.80 995
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m) 0.69 0.39 0.86 0.11 995
Ga % (500m) 0.25 0.05 0.76 0.19 995
Akan % (500m) 0.37 0.13 0.67 0.15 995
Ewe % (500m) 0.16 0.05 0.35 0.07 995
Northern % (500m) 0.12 0.01 0.53 0.13 995
Population Density per sq. km (by cluster) 28710 1650 95120 27050 48
Party member (0,1) 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.37 995
Education/employment index 0.00 -1.04 1.74 1.00 995
More than middle school education (0,1) 0.51 0.00 1.00 0.50 995
Formal sector employment (0,1) 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.36 995
Fluent in English (0,1) 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.50 995
Assets/wealth index 0.00 -1.10 2.30 1.00 995
Ethnicity most “salient" social identity (0,1) 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.50 995
Moved for Family / Ethnicity (0,1) 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.44 995
Age 35.54 18.00 93.00 13.07 995
Muslim (0,1) 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.40 995
Male (0,1) 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 995
Akan (0,1) 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.49 995
Ewe (0,1) 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.38 995
Northerner (0,1) 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.38 995
Ga-Dangme (0,1) 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.46 995
Years in neighborhood (0,1) 15.34 0.00 80.00 14.28 995
Percent life in Greater Accra 0.69 0.00 1.00 0.33 995
Met chief in last year (0,1) 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.35 995
Ethnic categories do not add to 1 because some respondents are from multiple groups. Chapter 5 dis-
cusses how this is addressed when measuring support for co-ethnic parties.
gions of southern Ghana (excluding Greater Accra Region).47 The selected constituencies are indicated
by the light gray shading in the map of Ghana above (Figure 2.1). The sample contains two very homo-
geneous, stronghold constituencies (Kpando, Volta Region, 89% NDC in the 2012 presidential election;
Manso Nkwanta, Ashanti Region, 82% NPP), two less homogenous constituencies that leaned to each party
(Lower Manya Krobo, Eastern Region, 67% NDC; Offinso South, Ashanti Region, 65% NPP), and a highly
47The sampling frame for this comparison survey of rural areas was limited to southern Ghana, excluding Greater Accra Region
itself, because of the logistical complications of conducting the survey in northern regions with Accra-based enumerators.
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diverse, competitive constituency (Offinso North, Ashanti Region, 50% NPP, 47% NDC).48 Enumerators
interviewed 21 randomly selected respondents in five villages or towns within each constituency, for a total
of 105 respondents per constituency. The sampling procedure for respondents within villages was identical
to the urban survey, with random start points for enumerators selected through a similar process. The survey
questionnaires were the same.
Finally, in addition to the survey and census data, I also draw on localized polling station-level election
results from the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections and Electoral Area level, or ward (clusters of polling
stations), results from Ghana’s 2010 local government elections. These results are paired with the census
data to estimate demographic characteristics around polling stations and within Electoral Areas, based on
a random sample of geo-coded polling station locations collected by a team of enumerators. These data
sources are described in more detail as they are analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6. In the process of creating
this dataset on polling station and Electoral Area locations, enumerators also conducted a separate, smaller
survey on club goods delivery by the local government in a representative, random sample of locations
throughout the Greater Accra metropolitan area. This additional survey is discussed in Chapter 6.
2.5.2 Interviews and Voter Focus Groups
I also rely on a series of interviews with politicians and ordinary voters to develop theory and interpret pat-
terns in the quantitative data. This includes 47 semi-structured interviews, listed in the Appendix, conducted
with Members of Parliament, constituency-level political party executives, local party agents, and District
Assembly members (city councilors), representing both the NDC and NPP.49 The specific questions varied
based on the type of politician interviewed, but generally focused on the ways in which they interact with
voters during campaigns and once in government, how they explain voters’ political behavior, and how they
believe urbanization has affected political competition within the city.
These interviews were conducted in two main waves. In the first wave, in 2012 and 2013 before the sur-
vey was fielded, subjects and locations were selected non-randomly to cover a cross-section of parliamentary
constituencies and types of neighborhoods throughout the metropolitan area, as well as a range of different
48This is in line with the actual distribution in southern Ghana, where there are relatively fewer diverse or politically competitive
constituencies in comparison to urban areas, as shown above.
49Several of these 47 interviews involved more than one politician, such that the total number of politicians interviewed is somewhat
larger.
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types of politicians. In addition, a separate wave of interviews conducted in 2014 focused more intensively
on four randomly selected parliamentary constituencies, with the goal of getting detailed insight into local
politics in these specific areas of the city. The constituencies were selected after stratifying on political
competitiveness, to insure interviewers were conducted in an NDC stronghold (La Dade Kotopon), and NPP
stronghold (Ablekuma North), and two competitive constituencies (Krowor, Okaikwei Central). Within
constituencies, I randomly selected one wealthier neighborhood and one poorer neighborhood to focus on,
after dividing all Electoral Areas, or wards, based on the median value of the neighborhood wealth index de-
scribed above. Snowball sampling was used for interview subjects, with interviews with constituency-level
party leaders followed by asking for contacts to local party agents in the selected neighborhoods.
Finally, in addition to these interviews, I draw on 13 focus group discussions conducted with small
groups of ordinary urban residents. These are used to provide greater context with which to interpret the
survey results. Locations were selected to provide a representative cross-section of poorer and wealthier
areas in the metropolitan area, as well as reach residents both within the city of Accra (AMA) and in
outlaying areas. At each location, participants were recruited using a random walk sampling method, similar
to the survey, and were offered a small amount of compensation to assemble later for a group discussion.
Each group composed 4 to 8 people, all mixed by age and gender. The conversations were semi-structured,
with open-ended questions about political preferences and voting behavior, as well as about typical campaign
tactics the participants had witnessed in their communities.
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3 | Policy Preferences and Political Participation
3.1 Introduction
Poverty is believed to sustain the distribution of particularistic benefits by politicians in return for sup-
port. Economic development, urbanization, and the growth of the middle class have all been argued to
spur transitions to more policy-based competition (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Hicken 2011, Stokes et
al. 2013). While many Ghanaians are poor, Greater Accra contains a burgeoning middle class, as described
in the previous chapter. One quarter of adults in this city of 4 million have at least some secondary educa-
tion, English literacy, and employment in the formal sector. Nearly 80% earn over US$4 per day (Ghana
Statistical Service 2014).1 Unlike cases of clientelistic persistence in the face of economic growth else-
where (e.g., Kitschelt 2007), Ghana has a liberalized economy and is highly politically competitive. But
despite the rise of the urban middle class, politics remains predominantly particularistic and patronage-
based (Lindberg 2010, Whitfield 2011), centered around the distribution of localized public services and
patronage goods, rather than a contest over public policies. This has been shown even in cities like Accra
(Paller 2014).
I provide an explanation for the persistence of particularistic linkages between parties and voters in
the face of urbanization and economic growth by examining the interaction of voters’ preferences with
politicians’ incentives to supply different types of goods to voters. I focus on urban areas, where growth of
the middle class has been concentrated and existing literature suggests that programmatic competition should
be most likely to emerge first. Urban middle class voters are more likely than poor voters to want major
universalistic policies from politicians than narrow particularistic benefits that can be targeted as patronage.
But these preferences do not translate into significant policy-based electoral competition. Politicians are
1This is the benchmark often used to define the African middle class (e.g., African Development Bank 2011; also see Thurlow et
al. 2015). Calculated at the November 2013 exchange rate.
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unable to commit to delivering on campaign promises to voters who want these policies (Keefer & Vlaicu
2007). This creates short-term incentives to ignore voters’ universalistic preferences – even as they become
more common – and to avoid wasting campaign effort on middle class voters. As a result, voters who
want universalistic policies are more likely to abstain from participation, both because they are not being
mobilized to turn out and because they do not trust that their preferences will be addressed. Electoral
participation remains dominated by poorer voters who are more susceptible to patronage appeals. This
could then stall the emergence of policy-based competition despite demographic changes in the electorate
that should be encouraging it.2
Using the data sources from Greater Accra described in the previous chapter, I show in this chapter that
middle class voters, defined by their education and participation in the formal sector economy,3 are more
likely than poorer voters to want universalistic policies that cannot be targeted as patronage. But voters
who want these policies are also less likely to turn out to vote and more likely to refrain from other forms
of participation. Through interviews and a survey experiment, I suggest that these voters abstain for two
reasons: they are unlikely to be mobilized to turn out by parties that do not believe they can credibly convince
middle class voters to support them, and because voters who want universalistic policies are especially
unlikely to believe politicians’ campaign promises. Patronage-based appeals then persist in Greater Accra,
sustaining incentives for the ethnic political competition documented in subsequent chapters.
This chapter offers a new explanation for the persistence of patronage-based appeals even in contexts of
high intra-party competition and low state intervention in the economy, counter to theories in Kitschelt &
Wilkinson (2007) and Kitschelt (2007). My argument suggests that the dual programmatic-clientelistic link-
ages seen in many Latin American countries (e.g., Levitsky 2003, Luna 2014), with parties simultaneously
competing for middle class votes based on policy proposals and support from the poor based on clientelism,
may not emerge if there are class-based differences in participation.4 Instead, these findings reinforce that
demand-side changes in voters’ preferences are not enough to spur transitions to policy-based competition
2I focus on the poor and middle class, not the wealthy elite. Wealthy elites may demand patronage, as those most directly engaged
in business with the state, and may also participate at high rates, as the ruling political class. They may also fund campaigns in
return for contracts and access. But because they are such a small portion of the electorate (and are also unlikely to consent to
survey interviews) the wealthy are not well represented in the data below and are not a focus of any analysis here.
3See Chapter 2 and Thurlow et al. (2015) for further discussion of this definition.
4Unlike most new democracies, voting is compulsory (and enforced) in the main Latin American cases in which “dual linkages"
have been observed (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Chile), reducing the possibility of class differences in participation. The impor-
tance of compulsory turnout is discussed further in Chapter 7.
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without institutional changes that also alter politicians’ strategic incentives to supply patronage (e.g., Shefter
1994, Hagopian et al. 2009, Hicken 2011). In addition, the chapter extends research on class-based turnout
differences in Kasara & Suryanarayan (2014) to explore additional reasons why middle class voters may
participate less than the poor in many developing countries.
3.2 Class and Political Competition
There is a general expectation that as the middle class emerges and economies develop, political competition
will become less particularistic. Demand for patronage may decline in the electorate, through processes
of modernization, or the supply of patronage may be constrained by bureaucratic reforms or economic
liberalization (e.g., Erie 1988, Shefter 1994, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Hagopian et al. 2009, Hicken
2011, Stokes et al. 2013). This correlation is imperfect; clientelism remained prevalent deep into the 20th
century in countries like Japan and Italy. But existing literature argues that this is explained by hegemonic
parties with significant control over economic resources (Chubb 1982, Scheiner 2006, Kitschelt &Wilkinson
2007, Kitschelt 2007).5
Demand-side explanations for the presence of patronage-based appeals are based on poorer voters gain-
ing greater marginal utility from patronage benefits that politicians can provide (Hicken 2011, Stokes et
al. 2013). Because poor voters more acutely need private goods like food, housing, or jobs, as well as local
public, or club, goods, such as running water and paved roads, they are more susceptible to appeals that
strategically target or withhold these goods. Poorer voters may also be more risk averse, preferring upfront,
targeted benefits over promises of broad future policy changes (Kitschelt 2000). By contrast, wealthier
voters may judge patronage distribution as normatively unacceptable, punishing politicians engaging in it
(Weitz-Shapiro 2012).
In middle income democracies, clientelism often co-exists with policy-based appeals (Kitschelt &Wilkinson
2007). Many Latin American parties woo poor voters with selective transfers, while engaging middle class
voters with policy (Luna 2014).6 Luna (2014) argues that dual appeals are most likely when the poor are
5Within these countries, clientelism has been most prevalent in rural or poor regions and built on traditional social institutions, still
consistent with a modernization hypothesis (e.g. Chubb 1982, Putnam 1993, Scheiner 2007).
6Luna (2014) documents this in Chile and Uruguay and Levitsky (2003) in Argentina. Weitz-Shapiro (2012) shows differential
use of clientelism across Argentine municipalities with different levels of wealth. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2015) document similar
“portfolio diversification" in Mexico. Sometimes one party specializes in patronage distribution while others avoid it (Calvo &
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segregated from the middle class and rich into separate electoral or administrative districts. This allows
local politicians to specialize in either a particularistic or policy-based appeal without bringing the two into
conflict.7 In addition, these studies make an implicit assumption that there is high enough state capacity
that politicians can credibly commit to implementing policy platforms. But this is not the case in settings
with little previous history of policy-based parties successfully implementing distinct programs (Keefer &
Vlaicu 2007), as in much of Africa.
A separate literature documents class-based differences in political participation. In advanced democra-
cies, the wealthy and middle class are more likely to vote than the poor, and also to participate in a range
of other political activities (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Verba et al. 1995; but see Ansolabehere and
Hersh 2012). The preferences of the rich are then better represented (Gilens 2012). Kasara & Suryanarayan
(2014) demonstrates that this reverses in many developing countries, however. In developing countries with
low capacity to tax and little ideological polarization between parties, the poor vote more than the wealthy.8
They argue that when the rich are not threatened by taxation, they do not need to participate to prevent
redistribution.
But while costs of abstention are lower when wealthier voters are not threatened by taxation, the benefits
to participation are also lower where politics is patronage-based. Turnout buying may inflate the turnout of
the poor through distribution of inducements that the rich do not value (Nichter 2008). And clientelism likely
affects participation in other areas beyond voting. For example, where parties are engines for patronage
distribution, members join in pursuit of rents rather than ideology, as Ichino & Nathan (2012) describe for
Ghana.9 The reward structure to participation in such an organization is unlikely to be aligned with the
goals of middle class voters seeking to advance specific ideologies or policies. But if middle class residents
do not participate, the demand-side pressure that the literature above expects politicians face for making
Murillo 2004). Counter to the argument below, however, turnout is compulsory in these countries (though not enforced in Mexico).
7This segregation is much less the case in African cities, especially in West Africa (Gugler & Flanagan 1978). Where poor and
wealthier voters are intermixed, these strategies can directly conflict: patronage distribution can be punished by wealthier voters
(Weitz-Shapiro 2012), but foregoing the targeting of services constrains opportunities to commit the support of poorer voters
through clientelism.
8Relatedly, Croke et al. (2014) argues that more educated voters are less likely to participate in competitive authoritarian regimes
because they do not want to legitimate authoritarian rulers, using evidence from Zimbabwe. But as I argue below, educated middle
class voters may find participation futile even in a significantly more democratic context.
9Similarly, Hite-Rubin (2015) shows that party membership declines rapidly in the Philippines when voters no longer depend
financially on the patronage benefits they get from joining a party.
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policy-based electoral appeals above may not occur, even as the middle class grows.
3.3 Patronage Politics and Participation as Reinforcing
In a country transitioning to democracy where the major parties are not initially ideologically differentiated,
most voters are poor, and ethnicity is salient, the politicians who are at first most successful will be those
who can best target patronage benefits to key constituencies and ethnic bases, not those with strong policy
commitments.10 But what happens when economic growth and urbanization subsequently reduce aggregate
preferences for patronage in the electorate? Even in highly competitive political systems, politicians may
still face incentives to use predominantly particularistic appeals.
I extend existing work on programmatic transitions (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) to make clearer
an implicit distinction between voters’ preferences for two classes of resources: particularistic goods or uni-
versalistic policies. Particularistic goods encompass both private goods, targetable to individuals (e.g., cash
payments, jobs), and local public, or club, goods that can be targeted as patronage to specific communities
(e.g., local roads, schools). Universalistic policies instead necessarily affect many other people and cannot
be targeted as patronage to specific voters or communities.11 The extent of particularistic preferences in the
electorate provides an upper bound on the proportion of voters who can be won over with patronage-based
appeals. Particularistic preferences could be satisfied via universal distribution based on rational-technical
criteria. But if many people want particularistic benefits from the government, patronage-based appeals re-
main a viable option for politicians, who can build support by selectively distributing benefits. By contrast,
where a large number of voters have universalistic preferences, patronage-based appeals are no longer a vi-
able strategy; voters’ preferences cannot be satisfied by patronage.12 Instead, space opens for programmatic
competition between ideologically-differentiated parties.
Particularistic preferences should be explained by individual and local needs (Stokes et al. 2013). People
10The initial party organizations that emerge and determine which politicians subsequently gain opportunities for political contes-
tation will similarly emphasize patronage over program.
11Universalistic policies include those concerning overall economic management, foreign investment and trade, natural resources,
major infrastructure, and corruption, as well as tax rates, education policies, subsidies to industries or agriculture, utility prices,
price controls, labor and immigration laws, etc.
12That voters have preferences for particularistic goods does not mean that politicians will always engage in clientelism. But if
most voters instead make universalistic demands, politicians cannot compete by distributing patronage.
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who are poor and lack employment and education should be more likely to demand jobs, loans to starts
businesses, and assistance with basic expenses from politicians. In contrast, those in the middle class should
be less likely to rely on politicians, instead having more universalistic preferences. Local needs for public
services should also affect preferences. If paved roads and running water, for example, are not available in
a neighborhood, middle class residents may still want particularistic goods from the government.
If middle class voters have greater overall preferences for universalistic goods, politicians’ electoral
pressures should change as the middle class grows. Politicians who have already specialized in patronage-
based appeals can respond in two ways: they can diversify their approach and make real policy promises
to middle class voters, or they can “stay the course" with patronage appeals, making only cursory efforts
to address universalistic preferences. Each entails costs: the first, the transaction cost of making policy-
based appeals credible and restricting the supply of patronage by committing to distribute some benefits
universally; the second, the opportunity cost of foregoing votes from those wanting universalistic policies.
In urban African settings, the second choice – “staying the course" – may often be less costly than the first.
It is essentially costless for politicians to include rhetoric about large-scale policy proposals in platforms
and manifestos, but the existence of this rhetoric does not mean that voters will believe it. Where the state
has a long history of failing to deliver on policy promises amid budget crises, corruption, and ethnic or
partisan favoritism, voters will initially discount the credibility of these promises (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007).13
Even if specific leaders become committed to a universalistic agenda, the bureaucracies and other politicians
charged with implementing it will often fail to deliver; a rich literature documents persistent corruption
and favoritism in policy implementation across Africa (e.g., van de Walle 2001, Reinikka and Svensson
2004, Franck and Rainer 2012). Moreover, making policy-based appeals will be difficult for parties that
have already invested instead in providing patronage. Implementation of universalistic policies often means
foregoing existing opportunities to deliver patronage and extract rents. Even if politicians in middle class
districts support universalistic policies, they confront a costly collective action problem: in many policy
areas, they cannot act on their own – they need the cooperation of others in the political system (bureaucrats,
legislators, branches of government) who may not face the same incentives.14 For example, rural legislators
13In contrast to most of Africa, in key cases of “dual linkage" politics in Latin America, such as Chile and Argentina, there have
been long histories of competition between ideologically-differentiated, policy-motivated parties, sometimes even predating the
large-scale use of clientelism (Levitsky 2003). In these contexts, parties will have less difficultly signaling policy credibility.
14Cruz & Keefer (2015) and Persson et al. (2012) describe these constraints in policy implementation in depth.
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or party leaders may block policies preferred by those in middle class districts unless it does not constrain
their own distribution of patronage.15
Building credibility requires long-term investments in successful implementation of policy proposals,
taking more time than a politician with a short time horizon has. But this credibility is crucial for policy-
based appeals to work. Any politician can buy support through particularistic goods because these can be
delivered upfront, before the election. But voters must trust politicians to follow through later for policies
that require longer-term implementation (Kitschelt 2000).16 Importantly, the better-educated, middle class
voters who actually want these universalistic policies may be those most aware of past policy failures and
most dissatisfied with the status quo policy environment. These voters may be most skeptical and least
likely to believe universalistic campaign promises. This leads to two theoretical expectations. First, in
settings of low state capacity, few voters will see campaign promises as credible. Second, voters who prefer
universalistic policies will be especially unlikely to see politicians’ promises as credible.
Remaining focused on particularistic appeals can instead be less costly to politicians. As long as changes
in preferences are gradual, politicians can still win in the short term only by delivering the patronage to poor
voters that they have already specialized in providing, foregoing the costs of building policy credibly. A party
can employ surface-level rhetoric about universalistic issues, but they need not focus significant mobilization
efforts on the middle class, as there is no reason to waste effort on voters that a party does not believe it
can convince to support it. This only becomes costly if another party does make credible policy-based
appeals and corners the votes of the middle class. But any opposing party also faces the same credibility
and coordination problems. Moreover, because some middle class voters do still want particularistic club
goods because of shortcomings in service delivery, as discussed above, a party can still secure at least some
middle class votes by selectively targeting club goods to neighborhoods with poor service provision. As a
result, beyond costless rhetoric, politicians will largely avoid mobilizing middle class voters that it believes
are not susceptible to particularistic appeals.
But a particularly important reason parties can afford to “stay the course" despite the growth of the
middle class may be a lack of participation from voters who want universalistic policies. These voters will
15Barkan (2008) discusses similar coordination problems in African legislatures.
16Moreover, performance in the delivery of particularistic goods is far more observable, allowing voters to more immediately verify
the trustworthiness of particularistic promises.
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have few options to chose from that they credibly believe will give them what they want. With no palatable
choice on the ballot, they may become disillusioned and stop turning out.17 And if party organizations
and other politically-active associtionas are built around the distribution of patronage, voters who do not
value patronage benefits may avoid them. In addition, a large literature shows that an important determinant
of turnout is whether voters, or those in a voter’s surrounding neighborhood, are mobilized to turn out by
parties (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Gerber and Green 2000, Fedderson 2004, Nichter 2008, Cho and
Rudolph 2008, Abrams et al. 2010). While parties may devote significant patronage resources to mobilizing
participation of the poor through turnout buying (e.g., Nichter 2008), if parties ignore middle class voters in
their campaigns, these voters may not vote simply because they are not being mobilized. Combining these
factors, I thus expect that voters who want universalistic policies should be less likely to vote or participate
in electoral politics in other ways. Moreover, voters who want universalistic policies should be particularly
unlikely to participate when they are not being mobilized.
This may create a feedback loop. If voters who want universalistic policies withdraw, the median voter
shifts towards those preferring particularistic benefits. Party organizations remain dominated by those seek-
ing patronage and the main barriers to entry for politicians continue to select for politicians best able to
deliver patronage, not policy. In turn, politicians avoid the middle class audience costs of clientelism theo-
rized byWeitz-Shapiro (2012) and can forego costly investments in making universalistic appeals credible.18
But this may only encourage more of those who want universalistic policies to stay away. This will not cy-
cle indefinitely – a shock, such as an economic crisis, could spark greater turnout, or the middle class may
eventually grow so large that parties have no choice but to include wealthier voters in electoral coalitions.
But in the medium term, even if economic growth reduces aggregate preferences for particularistic goods in
the population, patronage politics can be “sticky," with the form of political competition lagging well behind
voters’ preferences.
17Research on Latin America shows that voters who are disillusioned with systemic corruption and believe they cannot create real
change through voting are less likely to turn out (McCann and Dominguez 1998, Davis et al. 2004, Chong et al. 2014).
18It is possible that voters with universalistic preferences remain active in other ways, for example through civil society. Research on
India suggests, for example, that while the urban middle class is less likely to turn out to vote or participate in party organizations
than the poor, the middle class remain active in civil society groups (Chatterjee 2004, Harriss 2006). But even if this allows
for indirect lobbying into government decision-making, these voters will not affect politicians’ behavior through channels of
electoral accountability – patronage-based appeals remain a more viable path to elected office and the predictions here should still
hold. Moreover, while growing in importance, the influence of civil society is often argued to be weaker in African democracies
compared to new democracies elsewhere (e.g., Gyimah-Boadi 2004).
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Why do disaffected voters not organize a new party or reform an existing one to offer themselves uni-
versalistic policies? Staying home is the lowest cost response in the face of large collective action problems,
particularly if these voters are dispersed across neighborhoods, not already embedded in unions or other or-
ganizations that provide a framework for collective organization, and cross-cut the main ethnic cleavages in
society.19 An outside entrepreneur with a policy-based appeal could emerge, but this is unlikely in the near
future in more institutionalized party systems, such as Ghana, where the barriers to an outside campaign are
significant (Riedl 2014).20 Moreover, an outsider faces the same constraints and collective action problems
to making credible policy appeals. Ultimately, to the extent that such a credible outside option does emerge,
the predicted differences in participation should decline.
3.4 Data Sources
I examine the theory by combining data on voters’ preferences and participation with interview evidence.
Voter-level data is from from the main survey of residents of Greater Accra conducted in a random sam-
ple of 48 sampling clusters (or neighborhoods), as described in Chapter 2. Preferences were measured by
adapting an Afrobarometer question, similar to that in Lieberman & McClendon (2013), which asks re-
spondents to list up to three issues that they want the government to address.21 Enumerators recorded up
to three sentence-long responses instead of coding pre-defined categories. Responses were subsequently
blind-coded as indicating preferences for private goods, defined as preferences that could be addressed by
targeting specific people, club goods, defined as preferences that could be addressed by targeting a spe-
cific neighborhood, or public/universalistic goods, defined as preferences that could only be addressed by
a public policy affecting many people.22 The coding rules are intentionally conservative, counting all pref-
19There is also not necessarily ideological consensus in what policies they want, hampering their ability to coalesce around a
coherent platform.
20The closest examples of insurgent policy-based campaigns in Africa are the populists documented by Resnick (2014), such as
Michael Sata in Zambia, a former regime insider who emerged in a significantly less institutionalized party system. Fusing policy
appeals and clientelism, Sata targeted his message to the urban poor, not the middle class, and would not have ended the turnout
disparities predicted here.
21“In your opinion, what are the most important issues or problems that you think the government should address?" This was asked
before other questions about politics, to avoid priming. Enumerators indicated that these could either be national or local – “this
is either in Ghana generally or in your area here" – if asked for clarification. A level of government was never specified to allow
unprompted responses.
22See the Appendix for coding rules.
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erences that could be satisfied through a targeted transfer as particularistic (private or club), to produce a
lower bound estimate of universalistic preferences and an upper bound on the voters potentially suscepti-
ble to patronage-based appeals. Because respondents gave up to three responses, these categories are not
mutually exclusive; I operationalize universalistic preferences both as an indicator for whether a respondent
named any universalistic good among their three responses or as the percentage of total responses that were
universalistic.
Turnout is measured by asking if respondents voted in the December 2012 parliamentary and presiden-
tial elections. 84% reported turning out, compared to an official rate of 76% in the same parliamentary
constituencies. While desirability bias likely leads to some over-reporting, wealthier and better educated
respondents are thought to be most likely to over-report voting (Karp & Brockington 2005, Ansolabehere &
Hersh 2012, Kasara & Suryanarayan 2014). This would bias against my results if those preferring univer-
salistic policies, who are wealthier and better educated, overreport turnout relative to poorer, less educated
voters who want particularistic goods.
As described in Chapter 2, I rely on an index of questions on education, literacy, and employment as the
primary measure of socio-economic class. I also include an index of basic assets.23 These are continuous
measures; I do not discretely define respondents as middle class or poor, but only refer to those with more of
these characteristics as more likely to be middle class. Controlling for differences in basic assets, education,
literacy, and formal sector employment are all likely to be highly correlated with socio-economic status.
This follows Thurlow et al. (2015), which argues that rather than income-based definitions, which are often
very unreliably measured in Africa, the African middle class is best defined as those who have achieved
“security from economic vulnerability" and have skills necessary for “social mobility" (1). They argue that
secondary education and formal sector employment are among the strongest indicators that a person has
permanently escaped poverty in most African countries.24
23The education/employment index includes: having more than a middle school education, English literacy, and formal sector
employment. The assets index includes: owning a car, television, and computer, having running water, a flush toilet, electricity,
and a security gate. As discussed in Chapter 2, these indices are the first dimension of factor analyses of each set of variables,
scaled in standard deviations from mean values of 0. I also make a count variable of each indicator of education and employment,
ranging from 0 to 3, and repeat all analyses below with this variable, finding substantively identical results (not shown).
24Measuring class from education and employment status is intentionally conservative. Some respondents may be wealthy, but
working in the informal sector. Others may themselves be uneducated, or in the informal sector, but be in a clearly middle class
family. In either case, classifying these respondents as poor biases against the main hypotheses here, making it less likely to find
differences in behavior between poor and middle class respondents.
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Neighborhood characteristics and service provision around each respondent are measured using geo-
coded enumeration area census data in the manner detailed in Chapter 2. I also overlay geo-coded 2010
census enumeration area data on top of similar geo-coded data from the 2000 census to measure changes
over the 10 year period in total population in each 500 meter radius around respondents. This provides
a proxy for need for local infrastructure by measuring the population pressure on existing roads, water
systems, public schools, etc. In addition, survey questions measure the availability of running water and
enumerators recorded the quality of roads, gutters, and other public infrastructure in each respondent’s
neighborhood.
3.5 Empirical Analysis
I find that middle class respondents are more likely to prefer universalistic policies than poorer voters and
that those who want universalistic policies are less likely to participate in politics. I then show that this
connection between preferences and participation may exist for two reasons: because of little campaign
mobilization of middle class voters and because the low credibility of campaign promises.
3.5.1 Preferences and Participation
Overall, 55% of respondents named at least one universalistic policy among the three issues they wanted the
government to address. Over one third (36%) named two or three universalistic policies. The most common
preferences are presented in Table 3.1. Being in the middle class is a strong predictor of universalistic
preferences. Neighborhood-level needs also predict these preferences. I estimate a series of multi-level
models following the form:
yi = ↵j +  1EducEmployi +  2Assetsi +Xi  + ✏i
yi = ↵j +  1EducEmployi +  2Assetsi +  3Pop10Y rsi +  4NeighWealthi
+  5Waterj +  6Roadj +  7Densityj +Xi  + ✏i
where yi is either an indicator for respondent i naming any universalistic policy among her responses, or
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the 48 sampling clusters j, to account for clustering in the sample (Gelman & Hill 2007).25 EducEmployi
is the idex of survey questions on literacy, education, and formal sector employment, which I use to define
middle class, and Assetsi is the index of assets. Xi is a matrix of individual controls: age, gender, mem-
bership in each major ethnic category, an indicator for being Muslim, a measure of the percentage of each
respondent’s life lived in the urban area, an indicator for whether the respondent prefers state spending be
targeted to a home region instead of her current neighborhood,26 and an indicator for moving to the current
neighborhood to satisfy preferences for club goods.27 28
The second model adds neighborhood-level predictors: Pop10Y rsi is the percentage change in popula-
tion around respondent i between 2000 and 2010, to measure strain on local infrastructure; NeighWealthi
is a factor analysis of census variables measuring neighborhood wealth around respondents (see Appendix);
Waterj is the percentage of respondents in sampling cluster j who report that running water is regu-
larly available; Roadj is an indicator for whether the largest road in sampling cluster j was paved;29 and
Densityj is population density in the census enumeration areas covered by sampling cluster j.30
Results are in Table 3.2. From column 3, I estimate that a respondent with secondary education, English
literacy, and formal sector employment is 10.7 percentage points (95% CI: 0.7, 20.6) more likely to list at
least one universalistic policy among her preferences than than a respondent without these characteristics.31
In particular, poorer respondents are especially more likely to demand private goods than middle class
25The main results are robust to instead using clustered standard errors by sampling cluster (not shown). The model is a logistic
regression when the outcome is binary and OLS otherwise. I also replace the percentage measure with a count of universalistic
preferences per respondent (from 0 to 3) and replicate Table 3.2 using an ordered logistic regression, finding identical results (not
shown).
26Together with the measure of the percentage of the respondent’s life lived in the urban area, this controls for whether respondents’
preferences are made with respect to a rural home region instead of their current urban neighborhood. This would weaken any
relationship between preferences and service provision in current neighborhoods.
27Respondents able to sort to meet needs may have fewer particularistic preferences because they have already been satisfied.
28Two additional indicators control for interview quality and measurement error in all models: whether enumerators made logistical
errors during the interview (12% of interviews), and whether enumerators noted respondents were cooperative (90%).
29Questions about water were only asked to a random subset of respondents in each cluster, so this data is aggregated to the sampling
cluster level (j).
30Population density can also proxy for need for club goods. The densest parts of the city are in the original downtown, where
existing endowments of infrastructure are overwhelmingly concentrated. Less dense neighborhoods on the periphery of the city
have significantly less basic infrastructure.
31There could be concern that the measure of middle class status includes whether a respondent is employed in the formal sector,
while demands for employment are a common particularistic preference (see Table 1), putting employment on both sides of the
regression. In the Appendix, I re-estimate Table 3.2 both after re-defining middle class status based only on education and literacy,
as well as after dropping all respondents who reported demands for employment. Results are identical (see Appendix).
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Table 3.2: Universalistic Preferences, by Socio-Economic Status and Local Need
1 2 3 4
Outcome: Binary Percentage Binary Percentage
Educ/Emply. Index 0.176⇤ 0.041⇤⇤⇤ 0.177⇤ 0.041⇤⇤⇤
(0.084) (0.012) (0.083) (0.012)
Assets Index  0.114  0.013  0.117  0.015
(0.085) (0.012) (0.087) (0.013)
Pop. Change 10 Years (500m)  0.012  0.003
(0.026) (0.004)
Neighborhood Wealth (500m) 0.275 0.043
(0.177) (0.027)
Running Water (by cluster) 0.708⇤ 0.119⇤
(0.341) (0.052)
Paved Road (by cluster) 0.462† 0.071†
(0.255) (0.039)
Pop. Density (by cluster) 0.017⇤⇤ 0.002⇤
(0.006) (0.001)
Individual-level Controls Y Y Y Y
N 987 987 987 987
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Columns 1 and 3 are logistic regres-
sion coefficients, columns 2 and 4 are OLS. Intercepts are partially pooled by sampling
cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007). The outcome is either a binary indicator
for listing at least one universalistic policy (column 1 and 3) or the percentage of to-
tal preferences that were universalistic (columns 2 and 4). For readability, population
density is scaled as 1000s / sq. km.
respondents.32 In columns 3-4 of Table 3.2, I find that all respondents are more likely to want universalistic
goods when in neighborhoods with better existing service provision, while still preferring particularistic
goods in areas without running water and paved roads.33
But respondents who want universalistic policies are less likely to turn out to vote than those only
wanting particularistic goods. In Table 3.3, I estimate similar multi-level logistic regressions in which the
outcome is turnout in the 2012 election. The main explanatory variable is either the binary or percentage
measure of universalistic preferences.34 I include the same controls as above, as well as several additional
32Middle class respondents are 15.2 percentage points (95% CI: 4.4, 25.3) less likely to mention at least one private good than poor
respondents. Middle and lower class respondents are equally likely to want club goods (water, roads, etc.), however, consistent
with some middle class voters still wanting these goods because of poor service provision in their neighborhoods, as discussed
above (see Appendix).
33All first differences are conducted as in Hanmer & Kalkan (2013).
34Because preferences and turnout must be measured in the same survey, preferences are observed after the decision to vote, yet are
being used as an explanatory variable. A series of robustness tests in the Appendix address concerns that preferences reported on
the survey could have been influenced by factors arising after the voting decision. But if the classification of preferences has been
muddled, with some respondents mis-assigned to the wrong category (universalistic vs. particularistic), the measurement error
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predictors that may affect the campaign strategies that voters are exposed to: competitiveness in each respon-
dent’s electoral ward,35 ethnic fractionalization around each respondent, the neighborhood wealth index, and
population density.36 Simulating from columns 2 and 4, I find that respondents who list at least one univer-
salistic preference are 7.1 percentage points (95% CI: 2.6, 11.6) less likely to vote, and respondents who list
exclusively universalistic preferences are 7.8 percentage points (95% CI: 0.7, 15.7) less likely to vote, than
respondents with only particularistic preferences.37
I also identify respondents who have withdrawn from politics in general. I make an indicator for whether
a respondent has done none, or only one, of the following five forms of participation: voted in the 2012
election, is an active member of a party, knows an agent or leader from any party, knows or has met with
her district assembly member (city councilor), and/or participates in a non-party association (such as a
church group, union, civil society, or neighborhood group) that discusses political issues at least “some of
the time."38 Over a third (36%) of respondents are what I label “minimum participators," people who have
done zero or only one of these activities.39 I use this binary indicator as the outcome variable in columns
5-6 of Table 3.3. Respondents who want at least one universalistic policy are 8.5 percentage points (95%
CI: 2.4, 14.2) more likely to refrain collectively from these forms of participation than those who only want
particularistic goods. In addition, middle class respondents are more likely to abstain from these activities
in general. Simulating from column 5, respondents with English literacy, at least some secondary education,
and formal sector employment are 10.5 percentage points (95% CI: 0.8, 20.2) more likely to abstain than
those without those characteristics. In addition, middle class respondents are an estimated 7.1 percentage
would bias against seeing different behavior between the two groups.
35This is the absolute value of the difference in two party vote between the NDC and NPP in the 2008 presidential election.
36I also include parliamentary constituency fixed effects. Constituency-level party leaders decide on local campaign strategies
in Ghana. Features of local parliamentary races could also affect turnout because parliamentary and presidential elections are
concurrent.
37In Table 3.3, however, it is not the case that middle class respondents in general are less likely to vote – instead, only those middle
class respondents with universalistic preferences are less likely to vote. This is consistent with the theory above: middle class
respondents who still want many particularistic goods (better services for their neighborhood) may still believe their preferences
can be addressed by politicians.
38Importantly, these latter two indicators – meeting with local government representatives and, especially, participation in associa-
tional life – measure some of the primary ways voters who do not vote or participate in parties could still remain politically active.
Including these variables thus partly accounts for concerns that voters with universalistic preferences may still be participating in
politics through other informal means even if they refrain from direct engagement with the electoral process.
3974% of these only vote, but have done none of the other activities. 18% of respondents are “maximum participators" who have









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































points (95% -0.5, 14.2, p = 0.07) less likely to be party members than poor respondents. Local party
members are the most immediate people to whom politicians in Ghana are accountable, serving as the
primary voters who select local and national candidates.
3.5.2 Mobilization
There are two reasons these voters are less likely to participate. First, voters with universalistic preferences
are less likely to be mobilized to vote. Ghanaian politicians are well aware of the correlation between class
and preferences in Table 3.2. In interviews, parliamentary candidates and party agents from both parties
described how they use class as a heuristic for which voters are convincible, avoiding middle class voters
because these politicians do not believe they can effectively engage with them. Instead, politicians describe
campaigns as focused on mobilizing poorer voters through selective distribution of private and club goods.
For example, an NPP parliamentary candidate argued when asked about his approach with middle class
voters, “People are more aware of what they really want than before. Before you could use money to change
their minds, but... your money can’t buy most of them now like it used to." As a result, “you don’t convince
them [middle class voters] much at all. They know what is going on." But he argued, “the poor people...
somebody brings them a big bag of sugar, tomorrow rice – what they eat is what they are thinking about,"
and went on to describe efforts to engage with poor voters by distributing particularistic goods.40 A local
NPP executive made a similar argument about the difficulty of engaging middle class voters: “I would say
they are politically awakened, so they can discern now more than before. Formerly, people could fool them.
But now you cannot fool them... They know exactly what is happening when you come to them, whether
you are deceiving them or not... You must be very careful if you are dealing with them."41 Another NPP
candidate argued: “When people have a certain level education, they are able to clearly understand the issues.
I don’t mind whether they support me or they support the NDC, but they have some logical arguments to
make their choices. So I really don’t worry about that. My focus is on those... who are susceptible to the
deceits of politics... I am focusing my effort in the informal communities."42 An NPP executive similarly
40Interview with NPP candidate, Madina constituency, Greater Accra, 6 June 2012.
41Interview with NPP executive, Dome-Kwabenya constituency, Greater Accra, 26 June 2012.
42“Informal" communities refers to those in informal housing amidst the wealthier homes in the constituency. This candidate was
campaigning in the wealthiest constituency in the city, with the greatest ability to focus on middle class voters of any candidate,
yet focused on poorer voters. Interview with NPP candidate, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 16 July 2012.
74
acknowledged that his party focused on poor voters more dependent on politicians for access to benefits:
“Yes, we have them [wealthier voters]... But we don’t normally follow them so much... Most of the people
want to see their MP assisting their wards, for example, getting school admissions, getting employment and
other things" – typical benefits delivered in clientelistic exchanges in Ghana.43
NDC politicians described similar difficulties campaigning among middle class voters. A constituency
executive said, “There are areas any time you go house to house, there’s somebody there. But my area
[a wealthier neighborhood], you spend one hour at somebody’s gate ringing the bell, they will not come
out." Instead, he described his focus on poorer voters, characterizing his patronage relationships with them
in familial terms: “We become their father and their mother, we become their parents... I build these
relationships with the people for a very long time."44 An NDC activist made a similar point discussing
differences in campaigning between middle class and poor areas: “Somewhere like the Zongo and other
places where poverty is high, everybody is trying to reach out for [benefits]. They do understand you when
you talk. But the residential [neighborhood], when we go there they don’t listen to you... Before you go in
they tell you we have made up our mind, we know what we’re doing."45
Some middle class voters may be unreceptive because parties canvass with a message that does not ad-
dress their preferences for major policy changes. An NDC executive noted that the party did not emphasize
policy messages when going door-to-door, instead focusing on promises of small-scale club goods for spe-
cific neighborhoods: “You target your message... It depends on the area you go. You look at the need of the
area and target it... Their drainage is very bad, or there is flooding in this area. That is what you tell them
you are going to fix."46
I systematically examine mobilization before the 2012 election by asking respondents about campaign
activities in their neighborhoods.47 I find less effort from the parties to mobilize turnout among middle class
43Interview with NPP executives, Okaikwei North constituency, Greater Accra, 6 August 2013.
44Interview with NDC executive, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 23 July 2012.
45A “Zongo" is a Muslim slum. Interview with NDC ward executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 1 March 2014.
46Interview with NDC executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 27 February 2014.
47The questions are: “Think back to before the elections last year. Did any political parties come door-to-door in this neighborhood
to meet with voters in their homes?" and “Think back to before the elections last year. Do you remember if any of the political
parties gave out any gifts, such as t-shirts, food, or money to some people in this neighborhood?" While previous studies suggest
that there is under-reporting in self-reports of vote buying (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012), the wording here explicitly does not
ask respondents if they themselves accepted gifts, only whether they knew about them. Overall, 49% of respondents reported that
gifts were distributed and 67% reported door-to-door campaigning.
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Table 3.4: Campaign Mobilization, by Local Wealth and Socio-Economic Status
1 2 3 4
Outcome: Door to Door Door to Door Private Gifts Private Gifts
Educ/Emply. Index  0.004  0.008  0.117†  0.186⇤
(0.090) (0.091) (0.092) (0.093)
Assets Index  0.219⇤  0.216⇤ 0.029 0.053
(0.090) (0.090) (0.092) (0.093)
Universalistic Preferences (binary)  0.199 0.190
(0.157) (0.162)
Neighborhood Wealth (500m)  0.486⇤⇤  0.513⇤⇤  0.096  0.150
(0.161) (0.164) (0.173) (0.177)
2008 Competitiveness (by ward)  2.558⇤  2.980⇤⇤  1.426  1.501
(1.098) (1.119) (1.262) (0.170)
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)  0.337  0.601  1.935  1.561
(1.267) (1.283) (1.503) (1.471)
Pop. Density (by cluster) 0.001 0.001 0.020⇤ 0.018⇤
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Individual-level Controls Y Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y
N 930 923 930 923
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The outcome is knowledge of door
to door campaigning in columns 1 and 2 and gift distribution in columns 3 and 4. Logistic
regression coefficients with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman
and Hill (2007). For readability, population density is scaled as 1000s / sq. km. Additional
observations are missing because some respondents refused to answer these two questions.
Note that competitiveness is higher when the competitiveness variable is smaller (absolute
difference in vote shares between NPP and NDC), such that there is more mobilization in
places that were more competitive in the last election.
voters, consistent with the interviews. In columns 1-2 of Table 3.4, the outcome is an indicator for whether
a respondent reports that she saw party agents going door-to-door in her neighborhood before the election.48
In columns 3-4 of Table 3.4, the outcome is an indicator for reporting that she either saw or “heard about" a
party distributing private gifts before the election. The models are multi-level logistic regressions with the
same predictors as in Table 3.3.
Respondents are less likely to report door-to-door mobilization efforts in wealthier neighborhoods. From
column 1, respondents are 10.1 percentage points (95% CI: 3.4, 17.1) less likely to report door to door mobi-
48Door-to-door canvassing remains the main tactic used by both parties in Ghana to get voters out to the polls. There are not
well-developed separate means for the parties to mobilize the middle class. For example, while the use of TV advertising is
a major means of engaging the middle class in Latin America, this is still in its infancy in Ghana. None of the interviewed
politicians mentioned broadcast or online media at all when asked to describe campaign activities. Moreover, because Ghanaian
campaigns are decentralized, with constituency-level party organizations conducting local mobilization for the party’s presidential
and parliamentary candidates, the efforts described in the interviews above represent the main mobilization that all voters are
exposed to.
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lization after increasing local neighborhood wealth by 1 standard deviation. Middle class respondents were
significantly less likely to be exposed to gift giving before the last election. From column 3, respondents
who are fluent in English, have some secondary education, and are employed in the formal sector are 8.8
percentage points (95% CI: -1.1, 19.2, p = 0.07) less likely to report gift distribution than respondents with
none of these characteristics. While the parties cannot easily observe individual-level preferences when
deciding who to approach, they can observe socio-economic class – they are unlikely to go door to door in
middle or upper class neighborhoods in the first place and unlikely to offer gifts when they do interact with
middle class voters.
In the results above, however, I find that those with universalistic preferences, not the middle class in
general, are less likely to turn out. But there is a connection between mobilization and these results – voters
with universalistic preferences are especially unlikely to turn out to vote when they live in an area that is not
subject to campaign mobilization. In an additional model similar to Table 3.3, column 4 above, I interact
universalistic preferences with the percentage of respondents in each sampling cluster reporting door to
door mobilization before the election (see Appendix for corresponding table).49 In sampling clusters with
the minimum canvassing (17% of respondents aware of it), respondents who want universalistic policies
are dramatically less likely to turn out to vote than those preferring exclusively particularistic goods (28.4
percentage points less likely, 95% CI: 1.5, 56.9). But in areas with the maximum reported mobilization
(95% of respondents reporting it), those with universalistic preferences are not significantly less likely to
turn out than other voters (95% CI: -8.7, 13.9).50
3.5.3 Credibility of Promises: Survey Experiment
Voters with universalistic preferences are also those least likely to see campaign promises as credible. In the
absence of some external pressure pushing them to the polls, these voters may see participation as unlikely
to result in desired changes to policy, become disillusioned, and stay home.
49Because existing literature suggests that mobilization in a voter’s local context or neighborhood can affect turnout, I use aggregate
reported mobilization by sampling cluster (Fedderson 2004, Cho and Rudolph 2008, Abrams et al. 2010). This also reduces the
odds that any interaction is only the result of desirability bias, with respondents who deny voting also being those most likely to
deny knowledge of campaign activities. Models for the individual-level interactions are similar (not shown).
50Even if door to door appeals are unlikely to work as effectively on those with universalistic preferences, as described in the
interviews, there may be higher turnout by voters with universalistic preferences who do live in neighborhoods with significant
mobilization because everyone else around them is also participating at higher rates, creating pressure to participate (Cho and
Rudolph 2008, Abrams et al. 2010).
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On the surface, the NDC and NPP both employ some universalistic rhetoric in their campaigns (although
the NPP has recently gone further in this direction). Elischer (2013) describes these parties as somewhat
programmatic and ideologically-differentiated based on an analysis of their manifestos.51 But characterizing
these parties as programmatic is problematic. There are strong reasons for voters to doubt these promises
and the importance of this rhetoric for vote choice is dubious. As discussed above, including universal-
istic proposals in manifestos is essentially costless; following through and implementing them is crucial
for whether voters believe in them. Many of the most prominent universalistic promises from each party
have been marked by failures of implementation. Even if formally universalistic as described in manifestos,
policies based on each party’s most recent major campaign promises have often actually been clientelistic
in how benefits were distributed, been mired in corruption, never happened, or only been partially imple-
mented after significant delay.52 Voters are well aware of these implementation failures, which are covered
extensively in the popular press.
In addition, the opposition NPP claims that their party is center-right, and the party maintains a following
among the wealthiest business elite. NDC leaders sometimes describe their party in socialist terms, in line
with the “revolutionary" rhetoric of their founder, Jerry Rawlings. But the actual records of NDC and
NPP governments belie their self-proclaimed ideologies. Voters are unlikely to have clear expectations that
these parties will govern in line with distinct policy orientations. The NDC oversaw neoliberal structural
adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s, with widespread privatization of the economy. The NPP created much
of Ghana’s (still nascent) welfare state, focusing on pro-poor policies such as a national health insurance
system, and centered its 2012 manifesto on a pledge to make secondary school free. The current NDC
government has further liberalized the economy, reducing subsidies for fuel, water, and electricity, and is
negotiating a new loan agreement with the IMF that will restrict any socialist agenda. Both parties also have
51Importantly, Elischer (2013) notes that this was more the case in Ghana’s initial elections in the 1990s than in recent years – even
though the middle class is now much larger than in the 1990s.
52Prominent recent examples include: national youth employment programs, widely said to be used as patronage and embroiled
in a major corruption scandal which revealed dramatically fewer beneficiaries than claimed; rural electrification and school
construction programs distributed as patronage (Briggs 2012, Faller 2013); an NDC pledge to build hundreds of new schools,
of which only a small minority were constructed; a national health insurance system created by the NPP that repeatedly denies
guaranteed services to policyholders due to funding difficulties and in which membership is distributed by local politicians as
patronage; a major NDC 2008 campaign pledge to construct affordable housing, for which no houses were ever constructed;
delays in payments to contractors building national highways, resulting in a large section of the main national highway remaining
unpaved for over 5 years; failures to implement public wage reforms championed by the NPP, resulting in repeated delays in
payments to civil servants and prominent strikes, including by the doctors and nurses in public hospitals.
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a history of adopting each other’s proposals; in 2014, the NDC government announced it would attempt to
implement the free secondary education policy championed by the NPP. The current NDC government also
embraced other programs originally established by the NPP, such as youth employment and loan programs
that the NDC had criticized when in opposition.
Participants in 13 focus groups were skeptical of campaign promises in the 2012 election. Multiple par-
ticipants pointed to their lack of trust as their reason for staying home on election day, expecting corruption
and clientelism in the implementation of promised universalistic policies, if they were ever carried out at
all.53 For example, one participant in a middle class neighborhood said of the NPP’s main 2012 national
campaign promise to make secondary school free, they “will ‘chop’ [steal] the thing, and the benefits will
not be extended to the poor. So its not going to be free at all."54 A woman in another middle class area
similarly argued “you can say you will bring free education, but when you win, you will not do it."55 An
accountant in the Odorkor neighborhood argued, “When they promise, they [MPs] will do some small work
within the period that the election is coming on and they will come and clear the gutters and everything...
Then after that, you vote, and they are gone. We don’t believe in anything they are telling us."56 A hair-
dresser in Adenta explained that “this [MP candidate] will say this today and then tomorrow he does another
thing. The other one too... he says this and then he will not even do anything... The person will go and enjoy
it with his or her family... So there is no need for me to vote."57 Instead of trusting these promises, middle
class participants emphasized their self-reliance. A statement from a nurse in Dzorwulu is typical: “We
struggle for ourselves. They [politicians] think about themselves, we also think about ourselves."58 Another
middle class participant in Odorkor tied his disillusionment to the fact that he does not want particularistic
goods: “I’m not looking at the MP to do something for me. I can help myself. But that’s what they’ve [MPs]
53The 2012 presidential contest was decided by 3% of the vote and many of the parliamentary races in Greater Accra were similarly
competitive. Respondents did not stay home due to a lack of competition.
54The participant’s prediction was accurate. In September 2015, two years after the focus group interview, the NDC government
(now seeking to implement the NPP’s campaign proposal, see above) announced the “free" senior high school policy it would
implement for the coming school year would not actually be free – parents would still need to pay several hundred dollars per
year in administrative fees. See William Yaw Owusu, “NDC Free SHS Costs GHc380" Daily Guide, 18 September 2015. The
quote is from: focus group, Dzorwulu, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 21 June 2013.
55Focus group, Adenta, Adenta constituency, Greater Accra, 7 August 2013.
56Focus group, Odorkor “Official Town", Ablekuma North constituency, Greater Accra, 1 October 2013.
57Focus group, Adenta, Adenta constituency, Greater Accra, 7 August 2013.
58Focus group, Dzorwulu, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 21 June 2013.
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been doing to get the illiterate people."59
Interviewed politicians recognized this lack of trust. An NDC parliamentary candidate describing his
reception while campaigning said, “I think there is a collapse of trust in politicians generally... The complaint
we usually get is that we’ve voted for this party for 16 years, nothing has come out of it. What are the
guarantees that you will be different from the rest?"60 An NPP constituency executive noted this distrust and
tied it to turnout: “People were peeved, because they didn’t get what they expected from us [when NPP was
in power]... Some of them didn’t vote at all. A lot of people didn’t vote because they were not happy."61
Others acknowledged that voters did not see policy messages in their platforms as credible. Local exec-
utives from both parties complained about how they performed poorly despite having the “better message,"
accusing the other side of winning by buying votes.62 As one NPP activist said after describing his party’s
promise about free secondary education: “I don’t want to be misleading... The fact is Ghanaians don’t vote
on issues. That’s what every politician, that’s what the NDC knows." Along with many other local activists,
he believes that vote choice is instead explained by particularistic preferences, not policy promises. Voters
are “influenced by petty, petty things," he argued. “The money problem comes first. They see that your
partner [the NDC] has given them money and if you aren’t giving your money they are shouting on you...
So they are not voting on issues."63 This sentiment was widely shared in the interviews.
An embedded vignette experiment on the survey allows me to test which voter characteristics explain
beliefs about the credibility of campaign promises. Each respondent was read two sets of paired vignettes
about hypothetical parliamentary candidates. The candidates in the vignettes randomly varied along three
dimensions: their ethnicity, cued via names;64 their professional background;65 and policies they promised
59Focus group, Odorkor “Official Town", Ablekuma North constituency, Greater Accra, 1 October 2013.
60Interview with NDC parliamentary candidate, Ablekuma North constituency, Greater Accra, 20 June 2012.
61Interview with NPP party executive, Weija/Gbawe constituency, Greater Accra, 29 July 2013.
62E.g., interview with NDC executive, Ablekuma North constituency, Greater Accra, 25 March 2014; interview with NPP executive,
La Dade Kotopon constituency, Greater Accra, 4 March 2014; interview with NPP executives, Okaikwei North constituency,
Greater Accra, 6 August 2013.
63Interview with NPP party agents, Ledzokuku constituency, Greater Accra, 1 August 2013.
64Names unambiguously cue membership in one of the four major ethnic categories: as an Akan, Ga, Ewe, or Muslim northerner.
Two names were used per ethnicity to average over idiosyncratic features cued by specific names. Full texts of the vignettes are
in the Appendix, with balance statistics.
65These were doctor, lawyer, businessman, or university lecturer; all are common backgrounds for MPs.
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to deliver after the election, selected from two examples each of universalistic, club, or private goods.66 67
After being asked to vote in a mock election between the two candidates in each pair, respondents were
asked about one randomly selected candidate per pair: “Do you think a politician like [NAME] will actually
deliver on a promise like [PROMISE]?". This provides a measure of beliefs about the credibility of promises
to deliver the cued policies.
Overall, few respondents saw these promises as credible – only 28.4% of respondents answered “yes,"
with the lowest rates for the universalistic (27.2%) and private (27.8%) goods, and highest for club goods
(30.4%). In Table A.11, I analyze responses using similar multi-level models to those above, while also
including indicators for each treatment condition as controls, as well as an indicator for whether the promise
was made by a co-ethnic to the respondent. I estimate results separately for each type of promise (univer-
salistic, club, and private).68
Consistent with the argument above, respondents who want universalistic policies are the least likely
to believe that politicians’ promises are credible. Simulating from column 1, respondents who only want
particularistic goods are 6.4 percentage points (95% CI: -0.9, 13.4, p = 0.07) more likely to believe the
promise to deliver a universalistic policy than respondents who actually want at least one universalistic
policy. Although those with universalistic preferences are similarly skeptical about promises to deliver
particularistic (club, private) as well as universalistic goods, this skepticism creates a particularly important
hurdle for politicians seeking to reach these voters through policy-based appeals. As discussed above,
politicians cannot target these policies to voters upfront in the same way that they can with particularistic
goods (Kitschelt 2000); low credibility poses a significantly greater hurdle to policy-based campaigns than
patronage-based campaigns because policy platforms will only build support if voters trust that they will be
implemented over time. But ultimately, the voters with the greatest preferences for universalistic policies
66The example policies were chosen from answers that respondents gave to a pilot of the main survey question on preferences they
want addressed. For universalistic goods, the treatments were “lobby for keeping the price of fuel and utilities low so that everyone
in Ghana can continue to afford fuel and electricity" or “lobby for construction of new water production facilities in Ghana, so
the water flows more regularly around the country." For club goods, “construct and tar more of the roads in the constituency" or
“build new classroom blocks and resource centers at schools in the constituency." For private goods, “find jobs for some of the
youth in the constituency" or “provide scholarships to some families in the constituency to pay school fees."
67There were no similar treatments about presidential candidates. It would be implausible for respondents to believe a cue for a
presidential candidate from all of these ethnicities, or for a presidential candidate to directly promise private goods (which would
be delivered indirectly through a party organization). In addition, the experiment did not cue partisanship. Pilots revealed that
a party cue would overwhelm the other treatments – with reflexively favorable answers about preferred parties creating ceiling
effects.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































– those most likely to support a politician based on her platform – are those least likely to believe in any
politician’s promise to deliver these policies.69
3.6 Conclusion
While existing work has established an overall negative association between wealth and patronage-based
competition at both the national (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007) and sub-national levels (e.g., Weitz-
Shapiro 2012, Luna 2014), much less research has examined the process by which contemporary societies
actually transition from one form of competition to another as wealth increases.70 By examining a new
democracy in flux, where there have been rapid gains in wealth, this chapter zooms in on this process and
see whether the growth of the middle class does translate into new forms of competition.
I find that while the urban middle class wants universalistic public policies from the government, politi-
cians in Greater Accra do not believe that they can credibly convince these voters to support them. I suggest
that this may create a feedback loop in which politicians continue winning elections based almost entirely
on particularistic appeals despite increases in wealth and education that existing literature suggests should
instead lead to the at least partial emergence of programmatic, policy-based competition. While wealth and
programmatic competition are correlated cross-nationally, the findings in this chapter emphasize that the
connection between these variables can be very indirect.
In the next chapter, I expand the analysis on campaign mobilization above to consider how particularistic
competition in Greater Accra actually operates, examining which types of voters and neighborhoods are
targeted with particularistic benefits as the parties compete for support.
69Separately, columns 1-4 in Table A.11 also show that there is a co-ethnicity treatment effect in the experiment, with respondents
significantly less likely to trust promises about universalistic goods from non-co-ethnic politicians compared to co-ethnics. In
line with the literature on ethnic favoritism and ethnic voting (e.g., Posner 2005), respondents may not believe that universalistic
policies promised by rival ethnic groups will actually be universalistic, but instead only favor that other group. This creates an
additional hurdle for the credibility of policy-based appeals.
70Comparatively more attention has focused on historical transitions from clientelism in the US and Europe (e.g., Erie 1988,
Shefter 1994, Stokes et al. 2013, Kuo 2014). Kitschelt & Kselman (2013) emphasize the need for greater focus on whether wealth
actually leads to less patronage-based competition outside of these advanced democracies; after excluding the world’s wealthiest
democracies, they find little remaining national-level correlation between wealth and clientelism. I discuss the implications of
their findings further in Chapter 7.
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4 | Distributive Politics in Urban Areas
4.1 Introduction
Ghana’s two major parties put out glossy platforms each election year that contain some universalistic policy
proposals, such as the NPP’s 2012 pledge to make public secondary school free. But Chapter 3 suggests that
most urban voters discount the credibility of these promises and that the parties themselves recognize that
their platforms do not affect many voters’ choices, even among the urban middle class. In addition, Chapter
3 shows that there is little substantive differentiation between proposals that the NDC and NPP make, giving
policy-motivated voters little basis on which to pick one over the other. If Ghana’s major parties are not
winning votes based on policy appeals, how do they build support with the urban electorate?
A key means is the distribution of particularistic goods, often as patronage.1 Urban voters place signifi-
cant demands on the government for access to better economic opportunities and to scarce public infrastruc-
ture and services. The parties are distinguished more by who can expect to benefit from the particularistic
goods they distribute to address these demands than by their specific policies. In this chapter, I examine
distributive politics within urban areas, focusing on how parties distribute particularistic goods during cam-
paigns and once in office.
In campaign periods, parties and candidates widely distribute small-scale private benefits in one-off in-
teractions with voters, passing out gifts during door to door canvassing, as well as after rallies and other
public events, such as church services. The ruling party also makes short-term investments in club goods
before the election – for example, temporarily paving more roads or cleaning out more gutters and sewers.
Much of this activity is targeted at those perceived to be unaligned or swing voters, or occurs in politically
1As I discuss further in Chapter 5, access to particularistic goods is not the only factor affecting vote choice in Greater Accra. Voters’
macro-economic performance evaluations of the major parties are also correlated with vote choice, for example (see Chapter 5).
But expectations about particularistic goods explain significant variation in voting behavior.
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competitive neighborhoods where co-ethnics of both parties live. But none of these actions are clientelism,
as defined by Hicken (2011) and Stokes et al. (2013). Parties cannot monitor or enforce vote buying transac-
tions with the many voters receiving these benefits before the election. These goods are not given as part of
repeated relationships in which voters expect that continued benefits are conditional on their vote choices.
These actions conform more instead to logics of “reputation building" than vote buying, as argued by Kra-
mon (2011) and Guardado & Wantchekon (2014), with particularistic goods handed out unconditionally to
improve perceptions of performance rather than directly commit voters to a party. Longer-term, however, the
parties also engage in sustained clientelistic relationships with co-ethnic voters, distributing private goods,
and also favor co-ethnic neighborhoods with public spending on club goods. This involves the distribution
of many of the more valuable patronage benefits a party gains control over once taking power, such as public
sector employment and government anti-poverty programs, as well as local government spending on public
infrastructure.2
I argue that sustained clientelistic relationships in which these more valuable spoils of office are dis-
tributed are most extensive in poorer areas of the city. But clientelism is rare in middle class and wealthy
neighborhoods, where the costs of maintaining individual-level relationships with voters are too high rela-
tive to the benefits. In the distribution of club goods each party also has incentives to engage in longer-term
favoritism to co-ethnic neighborhoods over areas dominated by groups affiliated with the opposing party.
This is consistent with the broader literature on ethnic favoritism in the distribution of club goods in Africa
(e.g., Bates 1983, Kimenyi 2006, Franck and Rainer 2012, Ejdemyr et al. 2015). Diverse areas where co-
ethnics of each party are mixed, or areas where many unaffiliated voters live, can receive club goods from
both parties before elections, as the parties seek to build performance reputations. But homogeneous areas
are only likely to receive significant investments in club goods from an ethnically-aligned party.
I explore this argument by combining interviews and focus groups with the urban survey data. I focus
most empirical attention on the distribution of private goods.3 I describe how parties conduct unconditional
2Both major parties in Ghana have some funding to engage in the distribution of particularistic goods even when not in power,
especially during the campaign. But their ability to engage in long-term clientelistic relationships with individual voters and to
favor co-ethnic neighborhoods with club goods increases significantly if they win the presidential election and take direct control
over every local district government, as described in Chapter 2.
3Due to measurement limitations described below, it is not possible to test directly all implications of my argument about the
distribution of club goods. Data in Chapter 6, however, provides some evidence of favoritism to ruling party areas, as well as to
co-ethnics of local government leaders, in the distribution of school and road construction within the Greater Accra metropolitan
area. More importantly, the results for voting behavior in Chapter 5 are observationally consistent with the predictions about club
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distribution of small private benefits immediately before elections, while also engaging in longer-term clien-
telistic relationships, primarily with co-ethnic, core supporters. I find that these clientelistic relationships
are most common in poor urban neighborhoods, expanding on the evidence in Chapter 3 that parties dis-
proportionately focus campaign efforts in poorer neighborhoods. Finally, I use data from a similar survey
implemented in five rural parliamentary constituencies to compare goods distribution in urban and rural ar-
eas. I present suggestive evidence that individual-level patronage relationships directly between the parties
and voters are more common in the poorest urban neighborhoods and slums than in the typical rural vil-
lage. Instead, the parties place greater emphasis on distributing club goods in rural villages, targeting entire
communities with benefits rather than specific individual voters.
This chapter shows that two different types of patronage distribution occur alongside each other in
Ghanaian campaigns – one represents clientelism, with sustained exchanges of benefits for support between
patrons and clients, and one does not, with unconditional distribution of patronage goods that is not vote
buying. Existing literature often conceptually lumps these together, taking empirical observation of either as
evidence of clientelism and vote buying.4 But I suggest that these are distinct strategies that address different
goals and respond to different constraints. In doing so, I demonstrate that patronage-based parties engage in
geographically varied strategies, using different types of patronage goods to reach voters in different places
(e.g., Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2015, Albertus 2013, Luna 2014). I suggest that similar dynamics occur in African
cities, where they have rarely been studied.
Moreover, I follow Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2015) and Stokes et al. (2013) in arguing that the trade-off
between targeting core and swing voters emphasized in much of the existing distributive politics litera-
ture has been over-stated (e.g., see summaries in Golden and Min 2013 and Kramon and Posner 2013).
Parties often face incentives to do both.5 In particular, canonical “swing voter" approaches such as Dixit
& Londregan (1996) and Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) provide an inappropriate framework for analyzing
goods presented here. This includes survey experimental results on voters’ perceptions of where club goods are most likely to be
distributed by each party.
4Golden & Min (2013) draw attention to a similar problem, discussing how different patronage strategies that require distinct
theoretical explanations are often discussed in existing literature using the same terminology, creating theoretical confusion. Along
similar lines, Gans-Morse et al. (2014) model how parties choose among a series of distinct patronage strategies depending on
various features of the electoral and party systems.
5The original model from which much of this debate emerged, Cox &McCubbins (1986), is usually cited as arguing that core voter
strategies are more likely. But this model actually suggests that politicians will often play mixed strategies, targeting benefits to
both core and swing voters, even if core voters receive relatively more from risk averse politicians.
86
settings where co-ethnicity defines who is a core voter and an instrumental logic explains ethnic voting
(Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Ferree 2006, Ichino & Nathan 2013, Carlson 2015a). These theories model a
party’s core voters as ideologues who evaluate the utility of electing an ideologically-aligned party along-
side the separate benefits of monetary transfers offered by each party. But where the relationship between
ethnicity and partisanship is instrumental, the core status of a party’s co-ethnics is conditional on their con-
tinued expectations of receiving benefits, or transfers, from that party. Parties cannot bank on the support of
core voters and concentrate their focus on swing voters, as predicted in Dixit & Londregan (1996).6 Parties
must instead continue favoring core co-ethnics in order to maintain their status as core supporters, even as
they also seek to build additional support among other voters with the remainder of their resources to form
a winning coalition.7
Ultimately, the use of these dual strategies of patronage distribution mean that the already limited re-
sources that urban governments control are not allocated in a manner that best addresses the pressing needs
of growing urban areas for public services.8 This only deepens the government’s failure to address the
governance challenges created by urbanization. Urban residents’ demands for private goods, such as jobs
and financing for small businesses, and demands for club goods, such as for new roads and sewers, are
usually only satisfied when it is politically expedient.9 Residents must make do with short-term patches,
rather than sustained commitments to improving service delivery: long-neglected roads are suddenly paved
weeks before an election, only to wash away again in the next rainy season; poor residents get jobs through
government anti-poverty programs, only to have these positions handed over to someone else when a new
6Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2012) and Gottlieb and Larreguy (2015) also develop related theories that endogenize the core status of voters,
contrary to classic models such as Dixit and Londregan (1996).
7I assume that each party’s co-ethnic voters are not enough on their own to form an electoral majority. This is empirically the case
in Ghana, as described in Chapter 2. If core ethnic groups did form a majority, parties would clearly not have incentives to provide
goods to other voters outside these core groups, even in the Dixit and Londregan (1996) model.
8Colloquially, the political provision of patronage is usually discussed in the language of providing or bringing “development" to a
politicians’ community. This language normatively justifies practices that lead to inefficient, ineffective delivery of public services
compared to less politicized allocations.
9Importantly, there are some investments in public goods that benefit the entire urban area. For example, the past NPP government
completed an expressway linking Accra and Tema. The current NDC government has begun creating a series of key highway
interchanges to improve traffic congestion and embarked on a large-scale school construction effort within the AMA (city of
Accra). But these projects are often funded by external donors, representing distributive decisions made outside the regular
budgeting process. The US Millennium Challenge Corporation paid for the new highway (now named for George W. Bush) and
Brazil is funding some of the interchanges. USAID and the Chinese government are funding the school construction effort as part
of a donor-led “Millennium Cities" project. Delivery of more every day government resources – public hiring, choosing recipients
for programs, decisions about which residential streets to pave – can be far more targeted.
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government, with a new set of clients, takes power. Moreover, this patronage distribution sustains incentives
for ethnic political competition, which is examined in Chapter 5.
4.2 Mixed Patronage Strategies in Urban Areas
I argue that the major parties target particularistic goods to individual voters and different neighborhoods us-
ing a combination of two strategies: clientelistic distribution to core supporters over time and unconditional
distribution of benefits to build perceptions of performance, especially among unaligned and swing voters
during campaign periods. Each strategy involves the distribution of private goods, targeted to individuals,
and club goods, targeted to neighborhoods. But more valuable private or club goods, especially those that
involve repeated interactions between the distributor and recipients (e.g., jobs, loans, building a new road),
are more commonly distributed as part of clientelistic relationships, while less valuable goods that can be
given in single-short interactions (e.g., handouts of cash or food, re-paving a pre-existing street) are more
often distributed as part of unconditional reputation building strategies.
Where each of these strategies is most prevalent depends in part on the wealth and ethnic composition
of urban neighborhoods and individual voters. The ethnic composition of neighborhoods and voters helps
determine where clientelism is used versus unconditional reputation building, with individual-level clien-
telism primarily among core, co-ethnic voters and long-term favoritism in club goods to core, co-ethnic
neighborhoods, while diverse neighborhoods and swing voters benefit from unconditional transfers during
campaign periods. Wealth affects where private goods are used versus club goods. The parties distribute
private goods extensively in poor areas, but avoid this in many middle class and wealthier areas. Club goods
are used to build support in both poor and wealthier communities.
4.2.1 Who is Targeted
A large literature has explored whether parties in developing countries primarily target core or swing voters
with resources, often theorizing these strategies as an “either-or" trade-off (e.g., Dixit and Londregan 1996,
Stokes 2005, Nichter 2008, Golden and Min 2013). The canonical political economy approaches modeling
this as a trade-off are Dixit & Londregan (1996) and Lindbeck & Weibull (1987). These models treat core
voters as ideologically motivated, evaluating the positive utility of electing an ideologically-aligned party
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against direct transfers offered by the other party. Swing voters are those with less of an initial bias in favor
of either party in their utility functions. As long as the transaction cost of giving transfers to swing voters
is not prohibitive, parties can take the support of core voters for granted and instead target most of their
resources to swing voters (Dixit & Londregan 1996). But empirical evidence about which types of voters
are most likely to be targeted with resources is highly varied and often does not align with these predictions.
For example, Stokes et al. (2013) shows that parties in Latin America and India engage in more favoritism
to core supporters than Dixit & Londregan (1996) predicts. Kramon & Posner (2013) find considerable
variation within African countries in the extent to which core or competitive districts are favored by the
same governments with different resources. One explanation for this empirical variation is that parties
prioritize both types of distribution at once – going after unaligned voters with one set of resources, while
favoring core supporters with another.
Conceptually modeling core voters as voters having an innate valence shock in favor of an aligned
party – as in the many models based on Lindbeck & Weibull (1987) and Dixit & Londregan (1996) – does
not translate well to contexts where core voters are defined based on their ethnicity and ethnicity has an
instrumental relationship with vote choice (see Chapter 5). In these settings, the valence shock of electing
an ethnically-aligned party and the transfers a voter expects from that party become the same thing: the
importance of co-ethnicity to the voter is an outcome of her expected transfers from electing a co-ethnic
party. Co-ethnic voters cannot be taken for granted. If these voters stop expecting to be favored by their
party compared to the other party, they will stop being core supporters. Empirical support for this claim is in
Chapter 5. I find that when co-ethnic voters do not expect to be favored with benefits by their co-ethnic party,
they stop being especially likely to vote for that party and become swing voters, with similar probabilities
of supporting each party.
The core status of voters is then conditional on their expectations of continued benefits from their party,
similar to the model in Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2015).10 Parties must continually transfer some of resources to
co-ethnic voters to maintain support in future periods and perpetuate their’ expectations of favoritism. But
this does not require all of a party’s resources – only that the party continue providing more to these core
10Also see Gottlieb & Larreguy (2015), which also emphasizes that the ability of core voters to defect requires incumbents to
continue favoring them in resource distribution.
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voters than the other party (Padro i Miquel 2007).11 A party can also attempt to expand its base by targeting
the remainder of its budget to unaligned or swing voters, especially in the period right before the election.12
In this conditional model, swing voters are more complicated to define; rather than being defined ex-
ogenously as in Dixit & Londregan (1996), the definition of who is a swing voter is partly endogenous to
the previous distributive decisions that the parties have employed. Swing voters are a combination of the
minority of each party’s co-ethnics who do not expect to benefit significantly more from their co-ethnic
party than the other party, or voters from unaligned ethnic groups that have not been affiliated with either
party. Both of these latter types of voters likely swing between the parties from election to election based on
perceptions of performance as well as other valence (quality, trustworthiness, personality) characteristics of
the parties and their candidates. Attempts to build better reputations of performance in the period before the
election may help win over at least some of these voters.
4.2.2 How They are Targeted
The manner in which parties engage with core and unaligned or swing voters differ, however. Existing
literature argues that a key constraint on the ability of parties to engage in clientelistic transactions with
unaligned voters is whether or not they can monitor and enforce vote buying transactions (Stokes 2005). If
parties cannot explicitly monitor vote choice (which they cannot in Ghana, see below), a party cannot be sure
that an unaligned voter who takes money or other benefits will follow through with her vote. Where this is
the case, Nichter (2008) argues that parties focus instead on using inducements to mobilize core supporters,
who are unlikely to renege and defect to the other party, rather than attempting to buy off unaligned voters.
Moreover, where local party organizations and local politicians are primarily drawn from a party’s core eth-
nic groups, parties will have significantly more information on co-ethnic voters than voters from unaligned
ethnic groups or ethnic groups affiliated with the other party, better able to identify their individual needs and
monitor their political activities over time.13 Giving a patronage good to a co-ethnic voter is a significantly
11This does not mean that parties must provide a large amount of benefits in absolute terms to co-ethnic voters, only that they
provide enough to maintain co-ethnic voters’ expectations that they will receive more from their aligned party than the alternative
(Padro i Miquel 2007).
12Faller (2013) makes a closely related argument about variation across the electoral cycle, suggesting that the Ghanaian parties
target competitive districts with club goods in election years, while favoring core districts in the years after the election.
13The Dixit & Londregan (1996) model does suggest that when parties are somehow constrained in their ability to identify and
engage with swing voters they will target transfers to core voters instead.
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less risky proposition, because there is a much greater probability that a co-ethnic voter is a core supporter.
A party is better able to ensure that this results in electoral support (Cox & McCubbins 1986). As a result,
individual-level clientelism is more likely with a party’s co-ethnics. Similarly, investments in club goods in
neighborhoods where more co-ethnics live are the most likely to be returned with support.
But rather than withholding resources entirely from unaligned or swing voters, or from ethnically diverse
neighborhoods that are not clearly affiliated with a party, a third option is also available: parties can accept
that they cannot bind these voters to support them, but still provide particularistic goods in an attempt to
build positive reputations of performance that could sway some of these voters’ decisions. Kramon (2011)
and Guardado & Wantchekon (2014) argue that much of what is called “vote buying" during campaigns in
Africa conforms instead to a logic of “reputation building," with particularistic goods given out mainly to
enhance reputations of performance, not as a clientelistic exchange or enforceable contract for votes. Be-
cause there is such significant demand for particularistic goods in the urban electorate, many urban voters
equate good performance with a politician or party’s ability to deliver better local public infrastructure and
services. Among voters who do not have clear long-term expectations that they will get better service deliv-
ery from one party or the other, short-term spending on particularistic goods could sway them to a party’s
side. As long as voters are myopic in their perceptions of the performance of each party, unconditional dis-
tribution of particularistic goods is most valuable in the period immediately before the election. By contrast,
clientelistic distribution meant to maintain the core status of co-ethnic voters over time can be politically
useful throughout the electoral cycle.
Moreover, if one party distributes benefits to swing voters in this fashion, the opposing party may feel
obligated to do so as well, fearing that swing voters will punish the party for being stingy and disrespectful
if it withholds similar benefits. For example, Lindberg (2010) suggests that many MPs in Ghana distribute
gifts and handouts to voters to avoid the negative reputation costs of not providing them, even though the
MPs know some of these gifts will not commit recipients to support them. Because voters who receive
these benefits may still vote for the opposing party, a party will like invest less valuable benefits on this
strategy. In terms of private goods, this means giving small gifts of food, clothing, or petty cash rather than
public sector jobs, loans, or other more substantial benefits that require more extensive, repeated interactions
between the party and recipients. These more valuable benefits can instead be distributed as part of longer-
term clientelistic relationships with co-ethnic voters, who the party can better and monitor over time and are
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more likely to respond with support.
4.2.3 What is Distributed
Parties can use either private or club goods to engage in each of these strategies: clientelism with core
voters or distributing patronage goods to build reputations of performance with a broader set of voters.
Whether parties use private goods will depend primarily on the wealth of urban neighborhoods. Whether
they distribute club goods will depend more instead on the ethnic composition of neighborhoods.
As shown in Chapter 3, poorer voters highly value private goods from politicians, while middle class
and wealthy voters usually do not. Pre-election handouts of private goods are thus more likely to be effective
in poor neighborhoods, where parties meet more poor voters as they canvass and hold rallies – the two main
ways handouts are distributed. In addition, distributing private goods as part of longer-term clientelistic rela-
tionships is also more cost effective in poor neighborhoods. Single-shot, pre-election gifts can be distributed
without detailed knowledge of the recipients or having any local organization in place, but clientelistic dis-
tribution requires gathering information on and building sustained relationships with individual voters. This
means investments in a local organization of party agents, deeply embedded in communities. Maintaining
this level of organization is most worth the cost in poor neighborhoods, where a greater number of residents
value the private goods that these party agents can provide.
It is more difficult to develop an extensive patronage network in areas where few residents are potential
recipients. Some voters in middle class and wealthier neighborhoods will still be poor and value private
benefits. But settlement patterns and social ties among residents in poor neighborhoods are more conducive
to penetration by party patronage networks than in middle class and wealthier areas. In poor urban neigh-
borhoods, residents live in close daily proximity, often sharing cooking facilities, toilets, and various public
social spaces. This allows party agents in the neighborhood opportunities for regular interactions with vot-
ers. In middle class or wealthier areas, residents are more likely to live walled off from each other, with less
social interaction and more anonymity within the community. The poor residents who do live in wealthier
neighborhoods are also more likely to be transient, changing residences on a regular basis because of the
insecurity of their property rights in these areas.
Unlike private goods, club goods can be used to build support in both poor and middle class neighbor-
hoods. Middle class and poorer voters both demand these services, as shown empirically in the previous
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chapter. The probability that a party builds club goods in an area should depend instead on the area’s ethnic
composition (Ichino and Nathan 2013, Ejdemyr et al. 2015). Benefits from club goods are geographically
excludable; all residents, regardless of ethnicity, within the catchment area of the good usually benefit, while
people beyond that area do not. In homogeneous areas dominated by a party’s aligned ethnic groups, a party
can reach many co-ethnics with a club good; few benefits will be wasted on voters supporting the opposing
party, as they would if club goods were distributed in homogenous areas dominated by the other party’s
co-ethnics.14 But in ethnically diverse neighborhoods, a party cannot specifically target its co-ethnics by
building a club good. Voters from many different groups will benefit, including those aligned with the other
party. Similar to the distribution of private pre-election gifts, the ruling party can engage in reputation build-
ing with club goods in diverse neighborhoods, increasing spending on local infrastructure to demonstrate
its performance for voters. But there is no reason for one party to systematically favor diverse areas of the
city over the other with these types of benefits. In more ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods dominated
by each party’s core ethnic groups, however, only the party aligned with those groups is likely to make
significant investments in club goods.15
4.3 Evidence
Using interview and focus group evidence, I show that two different types of private goods distribution
occur in Greater Accra, with unconditional distribution of handouts during campaigns alongside sustained
clientelistic relationships with core supporters. Next, combining the qualitative evidence with survey data, I
show that this private goods distribution is concentrated in the poorest neighborhoods of the city, while club
goods are delivered in both poor and wealthier neighborhoods.
Because of measurement difficulties, however, I cannot directly test whether club goods are targeted
more often by the NDC to urban neighborhoods dominated by its affiliated ethnic groups than to neighbor-
hoods inhabited by co-ethnics of the NPP. My survey data primarily allows for observation of whether club
14If the core status of co-ethnic voters is conditional on continued access to benefits, as argued above, it is theoretically possible
for a party to woo co-ethnic voters of the opposing party by distributing resources to them. But this is unlikely to work absent
a substantial, sustained investment of resources over time that can offset these voters’ pre-existing, established expectations that
they are more likely to benefit from their own co-ethnic party.
15In line with this argument, I find in Chapter 5 that voters do not expect to benefit more from a co-ethnic party than a non-co-ethnic
party in the distribution of club goods in diverse urban neighborhoods, but expect significant favoritism from ethnically-aligned
parties in more homogenous neighborhoods.
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goods have been built in a specific place, not which actor built them and when. This data thus likely captures
goods distributed by different political actors at different points in time. Even if all of these politicians en-
gaged in ethnic favoritism, there may not be clear patterns of favoritism in the aggregate data.16 Despite this,
I show in Chapter 5 that voters’ expectations of where they will receive club goods from the two major par-
ties are consistent with the predictions about club goods above. In Chapter 6, I use the limited data on club
goods delivery that is available to provide suggestive evidence that district governments in Greater Accra
appear to target more spending on road and school construction to their co-ethnics and to NDC stronghold
neighborhoods.
4.3.1 Two Types of Private Goods Distribution
Focus group participants as well as local party executives, polling station agents, and parliamentary candi-
dates described two different types of private goods distribution in Greater Accra. First, during campaigns
there is widespread distribution of small gifts to mobilize voters. But voters and politicians alike made
clear that these gifts were distributed even to voters that parties knew were unlikely to support them. It is
not possible for the parties to monitor vote choices of people receiving these gifts; many go to voters with
whom the parties do not have any pre-existing relationship. Separately, voters and local politicians both also
described private goods distribution to core supporters of the winning party after the election. The parties
engage in more sustained clientelistic relationships with these voters.
Discussing the first type of private goods distribution, a resident of Kpone, made clear that voters do not
believe parties can monitor or enforce voting behavior after giving gifts during the campaign: “At the end of
the day, when I come to the booth, it’s between me and God. They may not know whether I voted for them...
But normally they do go around and give people things to convince them."17 As a focus group participant in
the ethnically diverse Ashaiman slum described it, “The MP will come and say take these Ghana cedis... and
since that person has taken that money, they will say ‘oh I will vote for you.’" But this statement is not meant
16The national ruling party is not the only actor capable of building club goods. As described in Chapter 2, MPs (including those
from the NPP) control a discretionary constituency development fund that they also use to make small-scale investments in basic
club goods such as roads and schools. Other club goods may have been built by the previous NPP government, before the NDC
came to power.
17As another resident of Kpone described, “Last year, they had a campaign team that goes round house to house to do their
campaign... Door to door... They give money. They buy drinks... It’s not only the NDC, [but also the NPP]." This is typical of
participants’ descriptions of the main campaign activities undertaken by the parties throughout the different focus groups. Focus
group, Kpone, Kpone-Katamanso constituency, Greater Accra, 19 June 2013.
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to be sincere: “its up to you to decide who you want to vote for. You have the power to vote."18 Participants
in the Kaneshie neighborhood of Accra, another ethnically diverse area, expressed similar sentiments: one
said, “for the money, I will just collect it, but it will never have any influence on you"; another argued, “even
though I don’t want the person to win, I will collect it if they bring it."19 Participants in Kaneshie made
clear that this type of gift distribution only occurs before the election and is not part of a repeated exchange.
“During the elections, they came to give chairs, furniture, and some bags of rice... So they just brought these
things to flatter us during the election." But the participant continued, “its only during the election... After
the election, nothing. You won’t even see them [the party agents], let alone their shadow."20
Party leaders and agents also noted that these gifts did not create enforceable commitments. For example,
an NPP party agent complained: “We say ‘take it, vote for me’... Some people do it... But some... [they]
still won’t vote for you. ‘I’ll take it, but I’ll not vote for you. Because when I get to the polling booth,
I’m the only person there. It’s only me and God.’ This is our complaint. ‘Hey, I voted for you’, but it’s a
lie!"21 But consistent with the discussion above that parties feel pressure to distribute these gifts to maintain
reputations of performance, this party agent strongly believed the party had to give gifts when canvassing
to avoid negative consequences: “if [our parliamentary candidate] says he doesn’t have [anything to give],
they’ll go and say ‘Oh, that man is a bad man! ’... So that makes the politicians think they must bribe the
people with money. If they don’t give out, they won’t vote for you."22 An NDC parliamentary candidate in
Accra similarly described his gift distribution as a means to maintain his reputation: “What I do is I have
a wad of notes [flashes a thick wad of cash]. When I get pestered too much while campaigning, here’s
something small for water, just get off my back so we can move on."23 Another local NDC executive also
argued that campaign season gifts do not bind people to the party, but are meant to improve the party’s
reputation: “[We] don’t give money like ‘I am sharing money, take this and vote for me.’ No... For example
there is a church here and I want to speak to the church people so that they vote for me. After speaking to
18Focus group, Zongo Laka, Ashaiman constituency, Greater Accra, 3 July 2013.
19A similar attitude about gift giving is captured in Lindberg (2010), which argues that urban voters treat campaign periods as a
“harvesting season" for handouts they can collect from parties and candidates. But these gifts are not seen as binding.
20Focus group, Kaneshie, Okaikwei South constituency, Greater Accra, 26 June 2013.
21The party agents who were interviewed frequently stated that they had no way of monitoring vote choice (e.g., interview with
NPP party agent, Okaikwei Central constituency, 19 March 2014).
22Interview with NPP party agent, Madina constituency, 29 June 2012.
23Interview with NDC parliamentary candidate, Ablekuma North constituency, 23 July 2012.
95
them... I will acquire some paint and get the place painted. And they will announce it at church. ‘He has
painted the church. Praise God. The NDC has painted our church.’"24
This gift distribution often extends beyond core, stronghold neighborhoods, with some benefits even
going to voters from ethnic groups affiliated with the other party. The parties know that many people
will take the gifts and not support them. The goal is to pick up enough votes in competitive areas and
front non-co-ethnics to add to their core supporters and form a winning coalition. For example, one NPP
parliamentary candidate said he often gave out small gifts in areas where he knew his co-ethnics – Akans –
were less numerous, even though many of the recipients would likely support the NDC. “I target most where
our people are not many because I know if I win just a little there to add to where my people are... I will
have won."25
But his co-ethnic core supporters are still favored in the distribution of private benefits over time, espe-
cially if his party’s presidential candidate wins and the party takes control over each district government.
Both the focus group participants and local politicians described significant private goods distribution after
the election, with core supporters of the ruling party disproportionately benefitting. Unlike the campaign
gifts, these exchanges are described as involving repeated interactions between the party and voters that the
party already “knows" (the word of choice among interview subjects). For example, NPP party agents in
Ledzokuku constituency discussed their expectations that loyal party supporters would get jobs in the local
municipal government if the NPP had won in 2012: “When you are in the party and... the party gets into
power, definitely there are positions. Automatic positions for you. You see Ghana politics is a winner take
all system. Like LEKMA assembly, there are so many positions and they are going to be automatic for you
in the party when your presidential candidate wins."26 A NDC constituency executive in Accra described
using his party connections after the NDC took power in 2009 to find civil service jobs for local supporters:
“People in my community, they need job... So when they come to me I say, ‘I’ve learned [the Prison Service]
24When campaigning door to door, he claims private gifts are a way to show respect to voters: “You can’t invite somebody... sit
them down, talk to them... then when you finish you say, okay, let’s see you tomorrow. At least some motivation – something
to drink or something to eat – it’s okay." Interview with NDC party executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 27
February 2014.
25Interview with NPP parliamentary candidate, Madina constituency, 6 June 2012.
26LEKMA is the Ledzokuku-Krowor Municipal Assembly, the district government in the area. Interview with NPP party agents,
Ledzokuku constituency, Greater Accra, 1 August 2013.
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is doing recruitment. If you are interested... I’ll go and lobby for you.’ This is what we did."27 Supporters
who own small business are also first in line to receive work from local governments if their party takes
power. As the NPP party agent in Madina described it, “this man [gesturing to an NPP supporter], he’s a...
[cement] block maker. So if you want somebody to buy blocks from, where are you going to go and buy
the blocks from? That contract will go to him." Similarly, “we have carpenters [who support the party]. If
there’s any contract, our carpenters go ahead" of non-NPP carpenters.28
In addition, an NPP executive in Weija constituency described how the NPP MP invested in the busi-
nesses of supporters once taking power: “The women who are poor. You see? They expect that when
you come to power, you will help them... Our MP was giving money to the women to trade. 100 Ghana
cedis each. About 200 women."29 Similarly, NPP constituency executives from Okaikwei North in Accra
described how the MP in their constituency provided long-term financial support for poor market traders
and also paid health insurance registration fees for supporters after winning the election: “If you go to the
markets, she did a lot for the market women... When we come to health insurance... many people were not
able to afford registering for the NHIS. About 4000 people, she registered for them. She pays the fee."30
A focus group respondent in Kpone described: “Some people have been put into trading by the [NDC]
MP. He’s trying to let them get something to do on their own. They’re in the training process. So some
of them, he volunteers to give them machines, hair driers for the hair dressers, so it will help them... With
regards to those who sew, he gave them machines." The participant continued: “But he hasn’t done it for
everybody. It’s some few people," indicating that NDC supporters were favored in this assistance for small
businesses.31 This gift distribution is sometimes openly formalized; NPP constituency executives in Okaik-
wei Central described running a micro-finance loan scheme for local party supporters directly from their
branch office.32
27Interview with NDC constituency executive, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 23 July 2012.
28Interview with NPP party agent, Madina constituency, Greater Accra, 29 June 2012.
29Interview with NPP constituency executive, Weija constituency, Greater Accra, 29 July 2013.
30NHIS is the “National Health Insurance Scheme," established by the previous NPP government. Chapter 3 discusses how NHIS
insurance registration is often distributed as patronage, even though the program is meant to be available to all Ghanaians.
Interview with NPP constituency executives, Okaikwei North constituency, Greater Accra, 6 August 2013.
31Focus group, Kpone, Kpone-Katamanso constituency, Greater Accra, 19 June 2013.
32Interview with NPP constituency executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, 4 March 2014; interview with district assembly
member and former NPP constituency executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, 12 March 2014.
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Focus group participants had clear expectations that these benefits would go primarily to core supporters.
As another participant in the Kpone focus group described: “Here it is a political environment... So if for
example, if you’re from party A, you’ll be helping me during the campaign. And [then] if you come to
power, I know that you’ll help me out. But if you come to power and... [I’m] not part of your party, it will
be difficult."33 A nurse in the Dzorwulu neighborhood stated: “But most of their gifts are given to the party
members, to those they already know. It’s not everybody it comes to. It’s to whom they know."34 A resident
of Tema had similarly expectations about who would get patronage jobs: “If you go for a job and you don’t
have a party card, they never give you a job. It’s about who you know."35
These expectations extend to benefits from official government programs. For example, when asked
about a micro-finance program initiated by the previous NPP government, a resident of Odorkor reported:
“MASLOC? I’ve heard of it. It came under the NPP time... I had a friend who was part of the NPP team
and he got the MASLOC loans. But people like us... who are not part of the party, didn’t get it... If it wasn’t
for him, I wouldn’t even know that there was MASLOC." Another participant in the same focus group
concurred: “if you are not a member of that [party]... when the loan comes and you want to get some, they
wouldn’t give it to you."36 A participant in the Mataheko neighborhood had similar expectations: “Things
like this... the distribution of the money, it will go to the people who are close to the party."37
While local party organizations cannot explicitly monitor vote choice, they are deeply embedded in the
social fabric of some urban neighborhoods, especially in poorer communities. These organizations are capa-
ble of identifying individual party supporters, targeting personalized support, and repeatedly interacting with
them over time, all of which are necessary for the clientelistic distribution of private goods. Ghana’s parties
have active committees of agents at each polling station in most urban neighborhoods (clusters of 1000-2000
33Being among those who are said to be “part of" or “close to" a party is very loosely defined in Ghana. This is largely another way
of saying “strong supporter." A subset of these people will actively participate in party campaign activities as party agents. But
overall, party members are far more often regular people who are the recipients of patronage than the activists who participate in
distributing it. Focus group, Kpone, Kpone-Katamanso constituency, Greater Accra, 19 June 2013.
34Focus group, Dzorwulu, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 21 June 2013.
35Pilot survey discussion with randomly selected respondents, Tema Community 8, Tema Central constituency, Greater Accra, 23
August 2013.
36MASLOC is the government’s “Micro-finance and Small Loans Centre." It is meant to be a universalistic program assisting the
poor nationwide, but in practice benefits are often distributed as patronage. This is similar to the other national anti-poverty
programs is in Chapter 3, and mirrors patronage distribution of officially universalistic anti-poverty programs in other countries
(e.g., Weitz-Shapiro 2012). Focus group, Odorkor, Ablekuma North constituency, Greater Accra, 1 October 2013.
37Focus group, Mataheko, Ablekuma Central constituency, 1 October 2013.
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voters) reporting to ward-level coordinators, who in turn report up to constituency-level executives and MPs.
Under these polling station committees there can sometimes be informal networks of party members (“foot
soldiers" or “party boys") who assist local party leaders with various activities.38 As noted by Paller (2014),
informal community leaders in slum areas often simultaneously serve as leaders within these party organi-
zations. Ward-level city councilors (district assembly members; see Chapter 6), who serve as the formal
leaders of urban neighborhoods and help determine where local government spending is delivered, are often
also simultaneously party executives at the constituency or polling station levels.
These organizations sometimes collect systematic data used to identify and keep track of local party
supporters. For example, an NPP MP candidate and a constituency executive each described systematically
going through official voter rolls to identify potential supporters based on the ethnicity of their surnames.39
An NDC constituency executive in Okaikwei Central similarly described: “Every polling station is a branch.
We encourage the [party agents] to identify the people there [at the polling station]. So in every house when
I enter the house, I already know that in this house we have 10 NPP, 5 NDC." 40 The NPP MP candidate
also described using additional data collection to help register co-ethnic supporters before the 2012 election:
“Before the voter registration we went to houses, wrote their names, which party they belong to, did you
vote last time, or are you a new voter, your age. We did all the statistics. So before we move into voting
registration we knew how many new voters were coming in and where they are from."41 More recently, the
NDC has announced plans to create an official “biometric register" of its members, issuing ID cards so that
it can identify supporters in each community.42
This information can then used to target private goods and government programs to supporters. An
NDC party agent in La Dade Kotopon constituency described using a database of local supporters to allocate
38Qualitatively, the proportion of local members appears who actively attend meetings and participate with campaign activities
appears to vary significantly across neighborhoods. Systematic data on the number of party members is not available.
39The candidate showed me his printed copy of the voters’ register, which had check marks by each Akan name. Interview with
NPP parliamentary candidate, Madina constituency, Greater Accra, 6 June 2012; interview with NPP constituency executive,
Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 4 March 2014.
40Interview with NDC party executive, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 27 February 2014.
41“Where they are from" is a general indicator of ethnicity. Interview with NPP parliamentary candidate, Madina constituency,
Greater Accra, 6 June 2012.
42It is still unclear whether this effort will be successfully competed, or whether the party will then use this
database to target government benefits. For example, see “NDC sets May deadline to register all members
biometrically," My Joy Online, 9 April 2014, http://www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2014/april-9th/
ndc-to-finish-biometric-registration-of-members-by-may-ending.php.
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patronage jobs after the party took power: “I’ve made a database of all our people, I’m updating it, what
skills do you have... We are prioritizing ‘foot soldiers,’ but also people out of that... So per this database,
we can know who wants work, what skill sets you have, and then we can match you to a job. We can look
at the vacancies and push for you. So that’s what we are doing for our people."43 Moreover, local party
organizations may have inherently more information about the needs (and identities) of co-ethnic supporters
than voters from other ethnic groups. While representative data on the composition of party organizations
is not available, it appears that the local polling station- and constituency-level executives for each party are
mostly drawn from the ethnic groups affiliated with that party: the clear majority of NPP party agents and
leaders interviewed were Akans; nearly all from the NDC were Gas, Ewes, or Northerners. Given the likely
ethnic nature of many social networks, this may give parties more information on local co-ethnics than other
voters.
But why do local party organizations funnel these benefits after the election to voters who already sup-
port the party? In line with the theoretical discussion above, the party agents interviewed described this
both as necessary to reward core voters for their support and to ensure that they continued to be core voters
in the future. The NDC agent in La explained it concisely: “it’s like a blackmail situation." Supporters
often threaten to leave their party if they do not receive enough patronage. For example, the La party agent
described, “I had to get some jobs for them yesterday, for the youth in the constituency... This lady who
called marshaled 20 people to me, to bring a protestation that [they] would switch to the NPP based on
failed promises from [the NDC MP]. And I had to plead with them, but the deal was that I had to get them
jobs. So that’s what I’m doing."44 This is a common news item in the Ghanaian press, with groups of ruling
party supporters holding press conferences to publicly threaten to switch to the opposition party unless more
patronage is given. Based on their frequency, these protestations must often have the desired effect.
4.3.2 Private Goods in Poor vs. Wealthy Urban Neighborhoods
Both of these types of private goods distribution are concentrated within poorer neighborhoods of the city.
As a telling example, polling-station-level NPP party agents in a wealthier neighborhood of the Krowor con-
stituency said they distributed financial assistance and other private goods to supporters, much like similar
43Interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, Greater Accra, 27 February 2014.
44Interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, Greater Accra, 27 February 2014.
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agents elsewhere in the city. But they described driving to a nearby slum (Nungua) and concentrating their
efforts there even though it was outside the catchment area of their own polling station. These practices
would be more viable in the poorer area.45 Focus group respondents in wealthier neighborhoods similarly
believed that most patronage distribution was concentrated in poor areas. For example, when asked about
access to government anti-poverty programs, such as the MASLOC program noted above, a poor participant
in Dzorwulu, a wealthy neighborhood, said: “This area consists of high class people of the society. So when
such things are given, they rather give it to those parts, the slum areas surrounding here, because they are
in need. It seems like sometimes the government thinks, ‘these people... they don’t need such things, so
why not channel it to the slum zones?’" But the participant noted that despite living in a wealthier area, he
himself was just as poor as those in the slums (he lived in a temporary wooden structure) and he also wanted
these benefits. “Government thinks that because you are here, in this residential area, you have money,"
even if you do not.46
The reason he is excluded may be more nuanced, however. Wealthier neighborhoods in urban Ghana –
and in many other African cities – are not uniformly wealthy, as described in Chapter 2. Poor residents, like
this focus groups participant, often live among the wealthier homes. But these voters are more difficult for
party organizations to build sustained relationships with. Some poor residents live in wealthier neighbor-
hoods as household staff, laborers on construction projects, or as street-side shopkeepers.47 Many others live
there as “caretakers." Developers and wealthier families in urban Ghana often build homes in stages. In the
interim, poor families are invited to squat on the property in order to keep watch (Gough &Yankson 2011).48
The remaining poor residents are squatters in illegal structures in empty lots. These types of residents can
be very transient. This makes it more difficult for local party agents to develop long-term relationships nec-
essary for clientelism; there is little guarantee that a caretaker or laborer who receives support from a party
45They claimed to have (illegally) registered supporters from this nearby slum to vote at their wealthier polling station. A higher
vote total would signal their competence as agents, supporting possible promotions to higher positions in the party. Interview
with NPP party agents, Krowor constituency, Greater Accra, 23 February 2014.
46Focus group, Dzorwulu, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 21 June 2013.
47It is typical in Ghana for roadside shopkeepers to live in informal structures behind their shops and for construction workers to
bring their families to live in temporary housing next to their worksites.
48Many homes are built one floor or room at a time, as funding permits. In other cases, land remains vacant for several years
until the owner raises construction funds. Caretakers prevent thieves from stealing construction materials and prevent others from
squatting on the lot in return for free (temporary) housing.
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agent today will be in the area to vote for the party by the next election.49 Even if parties distribute some
handouts and gifts to reach these poor voters in wealthy areas during the campaign, the parties appear to
concentrate efforts at building patronage relationships in more uniformly poor communities.
These differences across levels of neighborhood wealth can be seen more systematically using the survey
data. In addition to the questions about door to door campaigning and gift distribution during the campaign
examined in Chapter 3, the survey includes questions about the distribution of more valuable private bene-
fits in non-election periods, which can better measure the presence of clientelism. Respondents were asked
open-ended questions about whether they knew of any benefits local politicians, including the MP, had deliv-
ered to residents of their neighborhood.50 Up to four verbatim responses were recorded for each respondent
and subsequently blind-coded as representing club goods (those with benefits to a neighborhood) or private
goods (those with benefits to specific individuals). Separately, respondents were asked whether they knew
about anyone in their neighborhood benefitting from a series of prominent government anti-poverty pro-
grams, which are frequently alleged to be distributed as patronage to individual ruling party supporters (see
above; or Chapter 3).51
Overall, 36% of the respondents could report at least one activity done by local politicians in their area.
30% of the total respondents could name at least one club good, and 10% of the total respondents named
at least one private good.52 Table 4.1 lists typical responses to the open-ended questions about activities
by local politicians in the neighborhood. The private goods that most respondents reported are consistent
with the more valuable clientelistic benefits described in the previous section, not with small gifts during the
49E.g., interview with NPP party agent, Okaikwei Central constituency, Greater Accra, 19 March 2014.
50This involved two separate questions: “Think about your MP. Do you know of any activities or projects your MP has done for
people here? This could be to help the whole community or to help individual people here. Can you give examples?"; immediately
followed by: “Think about other politicians in this area. Do you know of any activities or projects other politicians have done
for people here in the community? This could be to help the whole community or to help individual people here. Can you give
examples?"
51“Do you know anyone in this neighborhood here who has received a job or loan facility through a government program, such
as NYEP, GYEEDA, MASLOC, or LESDEP?" The NYEP is the “National Youth Employment Program," created under the
NPP government and renamed GYEEDA (“Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency") by the NDC
government. The program provides jobs and job training to unemployed young people. MASLOC, discussed above, is a micro-
finance loan program. LESDEP is the “Local Enterprises and Skills Development Program," which also provides micro-finance
and job training to the poor.
52It is likely that each of these questions undercounts the full extent of private goods distribution because of social desirability
bias about reporting receiving private benefits (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012). But after controlling for respondents’ own wealth,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































campaign.53 The most common were support for education (typically tuition assistance for the children of
poor voters) and assistance finding jobs. For the question about job and loan programs, 30% of respondents
personally knew or had “heard about" a beneficiary in their neighborhood. Importantly, a job, loan, or tuition
payments for a child are types of benefits that can be revoked in future interactions. Once voters receive
these benefits from a local politician, they are likely more dependent on the politician for continued support
than when receiving a handout such as cash or food – common pre-election gifts – which do not require
continued goodwill from the politician over time to enjoy.
Knowledge of private goods distribution was more common in poor neighborhoods. Figure 4.1 plots
summary statistics to these two sets of questions, as well as the question on door to door campaigning (see
Chapter 3), aggregated by each of the 48 sampling locations in the survey. On the x-axis is the average value
of the neighborhood development index for each location.54 The city-wide mean on this index is 0, such
that areas to the left of 0 are poorer than the average neighborhood in Greater Accra, and areas to the right
are wealthier. On average, 36% of respondents in the poorer survey locations – and as many as 60% in one
location – knew recipients of the government anti-poverty programs, as shown in the top-left panel of Figure
4.1. Only 23% on average knew about recipients in middle class and wealthy neighborhoods, with fewer
than 10% aware of recipients in the wealthiest areas in the survey. For the open-ended questions, an average
of 15% of respondents in poor neighborhoods could name specific instances of private goods distribution
compared to just 3% in the wealthier neighborhoods, as shown in the top-right panel. In over three quarters
of the middle class and wealthy survey locations, 0% of respondents reported any private goods distribution
at all in the open-ended questions, suggesting that this is relatively rare in wealthier neighborhoods. By
contrast, respondents reported that local politicians delivered club goods at fairly equal rates in wealthier
and poorer neighborhoods, consistent with the argument above that politicians target club goods to both
poorer and wealthier voters. This is shown in the bottom-left panel.55
53The respondents made clear that they viewed small pre-election handouts in a categorically different manner from the other
types of private goods that politicians distribute. The majority of respondents (69%) reported knowing about distribution of
these gifts when asked about it directly, but essentially none mentioned small gifts of food, cash, or clothing in response to the
open-ended questions about politicians’ activities. Instead, only more valuable types of private benefits were discussed in the
open-ended questions on goods distribution. For this reason, it is appropriate to view these open-ended questions as measuring
goods distribution that is separate from the small handouts passed out during the campaign period.
54See Chapter 2 for definition of this index.
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Door to Door Campaigning




















Middle Class / Wealthy Areas
Poor Areas
Figure 4.1: Summary Statistics, Reported Goods Delivery by Sampling Cluster (Urban Areas): Each panel
plots the percentage of respondents in each of the 48 sampling clusters, or neighborhoods, in the urban
survey who reported knowledge of the outcome listed at the top of each panel. The x-axis is for the average
value of the neighborhood wealth index for each sampling cluster. The mean neighborhood in Greater Accra
is a 0 on this index. The hashed lines plot the averages across locations to the left and right of the city-wide
mean.
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These differences persist after controlling for individual-level characteristics of the respondents, as well
as for other neighborhood characteristics. Table 4.2 reports the results of a series of multi-level logistic
regression models (Gelman & Hill 2007), which take the form:
P (yi) = logit
 1(↵j[i] + ✓k[j] +  1NeighWealthi +Xi  + Zj )
where yi is a binary indicator for one of the questions in Figure 4.1. Intercepts are partially-pooled by the 48
sampling locations (j) in the survey, to account for the clustered nature of the sample,56 and I also include
constituency fixed effects for each constituency (k) to control for baseline differences in strategies across
constituencies.57 NeighWealthi is the development index for the 500 meter radius around each respondent
i, calculated as described in Chapter 2. All models include two sets of controls;Xi is at the individual level,
and includes: age, gender, an indicator for being a Muslim, indicators for each major ethnic group, the
education/employment and assets indices described in Chapter 2, and two indicators for the quality of the
survey interview.58 Zj includes the population density of the sampling location and 2008 presidential vote
share in the Electoral Area (ward) of the sampling location, to account for possible partisan patterns in goods
distribution.
Consistent with Figure 4.1, I find in Table 4.2 that neighborhood wealth is a significant predictor of
respondents reporting private goods distribution, but not club goods distribution. Simulating from column
1, as a respondent moves from a neighborhood 1 standard deviation below the citywide mean in wealth
to a neighborhood 1 standard deviation above the mean, the respondent is 12 percentage points (95%CI:
-1.7, 25.3, p = 0.08) less likely to be aware of people in her neighborhood benefitting from government
job or loan programs.59 Simulating from column 2, as a respondent moves from a neighborhood 1 standard
deviation below the citywide mean in wealth to a neighborhood 1 standard deviation above the mean, the
respondent is 18 percentage points (95%CI: -0.3, 34.8, p = 0.051) less likely to name at least one private
56Results are also robust to instead using clustered standard errors by sampling cluster (not shown).
57Party organizations are structured by constituency, with campaign strategy decisions made separately by party executives and MP
candidates at the constituency level.
58These are whether respondents were reported as being cooperative and whether the enumerator made errors in filling out the
survey form.
59All simulations are N = 1000, using the method from Hanmer & Kalkan (2013).
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Table 4.2: Respondent Reports of Goods Distribution (Urban Sample)
1 2 3 4
Outcome: Jobs and Loans Private Goods Club Goods Door to Door
Neighborhood Wealth Index (500m)  0.324†  1.362† 0.101  0.307⇤
(0.188) (0.696) (0.179) (0.154)
NDC 2008 Pres. Vote Share (by ELA)  2.419  4.375 1.901 1.096
(1.744) (4.341) (1.625) (1.316)
Population Density (by cluster) 0.017⇤ 0.026 0.014† 0.003
(0.007) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007)
Years in Neighborhood 0.016⇤ 0.003 0.015† 0.014⇤
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007)
Age 0.001 0.011  0.010 0.013†
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007)
Muslim 0.735⇤ 0.544  0.150  0.767⇤
(0.366) (0.534) (0.373) (0.336)
Male 0.111 0.318  0.034 0.211
(0.185) (0.308) (0.183) (0.155)
Ewe 0.207 0.115  0.134  0.129
(0.244) (0.438) (0.245) (0.207)
Northerner  0.685†  0.394  0.175 0.586†
(0.389) (0.566) (0.390) (0.356)
Ga-Dangme  0.168 0.717† 0.407† 0.227
(0.246) (0.414) (0.231) (0.205)
Education/Employ. Index  0.050 0.074 0.158  0.011
(0.108) (0.177) (0.105) (0.089)
Assets Index 0.048  0.260  0.145  0.202⇤
(0.111) (0.197) (0.109) (0.090)
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y
N 669 669 669 930
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Multi-level logistic regressions with inter-
cepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, as in Gelman and Hill (2007). All models include
parliamentary constituency fixed effects. The outcome in column 1 is whether a respondent is
aware of people in the neighborhood benefiting from government job and loan programs. The
outcome in column 2 is whether a respondent listed any private good among the goods she is
aware of local politicians delivering in her neighborhood. The outcome in column 3 is whether
a respondent listed any club good among the goods she is aware of local politicians delivering in
her neighborhood. The outcome in column 4 is an indicator for the respondent remembering door
to door campaigning by the parties in the neighborhood before the 2012 election. The questions
in columns 1-3 were only asked to a randomly chosen two thirds of respondents in each location.
Akan is the omitted ethnicity category.
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good in response to the open-ended question about activities by local politicians.60
The private and club goods identified by respondents in the open-ended questions (columns 2 and 3)
could be provided by multiple different actors: the NDC national government, municipal governments (con-
trolled by the NDC), MPs (from either party), district assembly members (from either party), or local agents
(from either party). Because of this, it is not possible to ascertain from these questions whether there was
partisan or ethnic targeting of these benefits. But the job and loan programs in column 1 could only have
been distributed by the NDC, through control over each local government. While there is strong reason
to believe based on the qualitative discussion above (and the survey experiment in Chapter 5) that individ-
ual NDC supporters are the primary recipients of these programs, the insignificant coefficient on NDC 2008
vote share in column 1 suggests that the NDC government does not target these benefits differentially to core
neighborhoods within the city. This suggests that NDC supporters can access patronage benefits from their
party in poor neighborhoods even when many of the surrounding residents are supporters of the NPP. This
follows the theoretical discussion above and differs from the results for rural areas (see below). I discuss the
implications of this for voting behavior in Chapter 5.
Finally, the models in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4.2 indicate that Ga respondents were particularly likely
to be aware of goods distribution throughout in Greater Accra, consistent with the unique position of the
Ga ethnic group within the city discussed in Chapter 2. Ga respondents were 65% more likely to name
at least one private good distributed by politicians than other respondents.61 Ga respondents were also 8
percentage points (95% CI: -0.3, 16.9, p = 0.08) more likely than other respondents to know about club
goods distributed in their neighborhood. Both are consistent with Gas having more access to patronage
goods (whether private or club) throughout the metropolitan area. I return to this result for Gas respondents
in the discussion of voting behavior in Chapter 5, in which patterns for Gas diverge from the other ethnic
groups in the city, likely because of their greater access to patronage goods from the ruling party than other
voters throughout Greater Accra.
60But in Column 3, I find that neighborhood wealth does not predict where respondents report club goods delivery as occurring.
Column 4 replicates the results for door to door campaigning from Chapter 3 for comparison.
616 percentage points more likely than other respondents (95%CI: -0.4, 12.8, p = 0.08).
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4.4 Comparison to Rural Areas
In rural areas, parties may place less emphasis on individual-level clientelism, especially outside of the large
rural towns and in areas dominated by an opposing party’s co-ethnics. Instead, there is likely more emphasis
on using club goods to build support among rural voters. This is for two main reasons. First, parties do not
need to take on the costs of building dense patronage networks capable of engaging in repeated clientelistic
interactions with large numbers of individual voters if they can use local elites as intermediaries to engage
with voters on their behalf (Koter 2013a). Traditional chiefs and other village-level elites can serve this
role in much of rural Africa, delivering blocs of votes from their communities in return for benefits given
to these local elites, not directly to individual voters (e.g., Baldwin 2014). For example, Lindberg (2010)
discusses how rural MPs in Ghana often respond to demands from village chiefs to provide club goods that
benefit entire communities and then expect the chief to organize political support in return. In urban areas,
however, traditional leaders are far less socially powerful. In most urban neighborhoods, there simply are
not universally recognized local elites capable of serving as intermediaries and organizing residents to vote
in a bloc. Parties must instead either engage with voters individually or distribute club goods without a local
enforcer capable of ensure that the party receives support from the community in return.
Second, there are higher costs to maintaining individual-level patronage networks in sparsely populated
rural communities than in most urban slums. While parties can engage with many poor voters who live in
close proximity and are in regular daily interaction by embedding agents in slum neighborhoods, developing
a patronage network in a rural area often requires having capable party agents who can distribute benefits
and monitor voters stationed in many different villages. In small villages, where few voters live, the costs of
identifying and empowering such an agent may not be worth the potential benefits, especially in comparison
to just distributing club goods to the entire village or working with existing village leaders. Parties can still
distribute small handouts before the election in villages where they do not have a strong local organization,
but clientelism entails greater costs. In larger rural towns, however, more potential patronage recipients are
concentrated in the same place, similar to urban neighborhoods, and developing local party networks capable
of individual-level clientelism may be more cost effective. In addition, maintaining patronage networks may
be especially difficult in villages that are enclaves of an opposing party’s ethnic groups. There are fewer
potential agents to employ as brokers in these areas and fewer voters that could be won over absent a
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substantial investment of resources. Village leaders aligned with the opposing party may also erect barriers
to organization and campaigning by a new party.62 Considering these two factors together, there may be
more individual-level clientelism and private goods delivery by parties in the poorest slum neighborhoods
in cities than in the typical rural village.
These differences are well summarized by an interview with an NDC constituency executive who man-
aged his party’s campaign in an urban constituency in Greater Accra (Krowor) during the 2008 election
and then in a rural constituency in Eastern Region (Akropong) during the 2012 election.63 Comparing the
differences in how the NDC interacts with voters between these urban and rural constituencies, he said:
“In Akropong the money [distributed to voters] will not be so much like in Krowor. In Krowor,
the money is more. Because in Akropong you have 11 or 12 villages comprising the con-
stituency... You need to travel from one town to another town, some villages are up on moun-
tains... If they need something you can go help them by, let’s say, building a public toilet....
In Accra here people will be coming to you differently... People will be coming to you [di-
rectly] because almost everybody knows you [the party agent]. In Akropong, they wouldn’t
know you. The village leaders will know this man is good, so let’s go support him, and then
they [the voters] all follow. But in Accra it’s not like that. In Accra you have to work so hard
house to house... In Akropong Township it’s done like that, but just in the main town... But in
some villages where it’s not a big place, you tell the NDC coordinator who is in that village
to organize people who love your party to come for a meeting and then you can go and talk to
them together. You don’t go to each house. You go to somebody’s house in the villages if the
person is an opinion leader, just for really important people. But in Greater Accra you need to
move to all the individual work places, shops [to interact with voters]."64
The party leader touched on several key contrasts. He said it is more difficult for the party to engage with
individual voters in far-flung villages in the rural constituency than in the urban constituency (or the large
rural town). Instead, he described the party as engaging with voters in rural villages all together at once,
either by providing a club good that brings benefits to an entire village (building a public toilet) or by
62Moreover, many party activities in Ghana and other countries are locally financed at the constituency level. Financing to support
local organizations and attract new members with patronage is likely lower in rural constituencies dominated by an opposing party
than in more competitive areas or a party’s own strongholds. But this difference is likely less pronounced in urban areas, where
financing for party activities may be higher across the board because of the significantly larger business communities seeking
access to government contracts in urban areas. Urban party organizations should be better financed, and thus relatively better able
to engage in clientelism, even in neighborhoods where a party’s co-ethnics are less numerous.
63The party leader is originally from Akropong, but lives in Krowor. Krowor is a competitive constituency (53% NDC, 46% NPP
in the 2012 presidential election) split between a large slum – Nungua – and several middle and upper class neighborhoods.
Akropong leans more to the NPP (65% NPP, 34% NDC in the 2012 presidential election) and consists of villages surrounding a
single large town (Akropong). This is among the wealthier and most densely populated rural areas in Ghana; the contrasts the
party leader describes may be even more stark in less developed rural areas.
64Interview with former NDC constituency executive, Krowor constituency, Greater Accra, 19 March 2014.
110
working through village elites (“opinion leaders" and “village leaders") as intermediaries. These will often
be chiefs or elders from the indigenous ethnic group in a village. The party leader still noted a strategy of
favoring core supporters, gathering those “who love your party" for rallies or meetings in each village, at
which attendees are often given gifts and small amounts of money. But the local party organization was not
directly engaging with these supporters at an individual level. By contrast, in the urban area, the party leader
suggested that individual voters have direct relationships with the party organization and that the party does
not reach them through traditional elites.
This is in part because the types of village elites that the party leader described working with in Akro-
pong are not socially powerful in the city, especially among non-Gas. For example, when asked about the
role of traditional elites in a focus group in Ashaiman, the largest non-Ga slum in Accra, one participant
noted that traditional leaders from various ethnic groups live in the community – as private citizens – but
have no social or political power: “The chiefs are many here. They have more than 20 northern tribal
chiefs... We barely see them. Even if a chief is passing by you, you would never know it’s a chief." Instead,
the strongest community leader in his neighborhood is an elected official working directly for the NDC:
“[The assemblyman] is the person who has the kind of cohesion of everyone. It’s the assemblyman who is
the more important leader."65 Many of these assembly members in Accra are local executives in one of the
major parties (see Chapter 6).66
These differences between urban and rural areas can be seen by comparing the two surveys. The rural
survey was conducted in five parliamentary constituencies, randomly selected from all rural constituencies
in five regions of southern Ghana (excluding Greater Accra Region).67 The sample contains two very ho-
mogeneous, stronghold constituencies (Kpando, Volta Region, 89% NDC in the 2012 presidential election;
Manso Nkwanta, Ashanti Region, 82% NPP), two less homogenous constituencies that leaned to each party
(Lower Manya Krobo, Eastern Region, 67% NDC; Offinso South, Ashanti Region, 65% NPP), and a highly
diverse, competitive constituency (Offinso North, Ashanti Region, 50% NPP, 47% NDC).68
65Focus group, Zongo Laka, Ashaiman constituency, Greater Accra, 3 July 2013.
66Paller (2014) also documents how powerful community leaders in other slums in Greater Accra have direct ties to the local party
organizations, rather than drawing on traditional social authority.
67The sampling frame and selection procedures are described in more detail in Chapter 2.
68This is in line with the actual distribution in southern Ghana, where there are relatively few diverse or politically competitive
constituencies in comparison to urban areas (see Chapter 2).
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In the open-ended questions about activities that local politicians had carried out in the community,
urban and rural respondents were similarly likely overall to say that private goods had been delivered (10%
urban vs. 9% rural). But clear differences appear between poor urban neighborhoods and rural villages
when examining variation across sampling locations (neighborhoods or towns/villages). Distribution of
valuable private goods, such as those listed in Table 4.1, were reported in the poorest urban neighborhoods
at significantly higher rates than in almost all of the rural survey locations. For example, in 5 of the urban
survey locations (all of which are below 0 on the neighborhood wealth index; see Figure 4.1) more than 30%
of respondents reported that these types of private goods had been delivered to residents; the percentage
reporting private goods was lower in every rural survey location. In 10 of the 48 urban locations, more than
20% of respondents reported private goods delivery, compared to in just 3 of the 25 rural survey locations.
In 6 rural survey locations, no respondents reported any private goods delivery at all, similar to the many
wealthier survey locations in the urban sample where no private goods delivery was reported (see Figure
4.1).69
As discussed above, there are two main reasons there may be less private goods delivery in rural com-
munities. First, parties face higher costs in less developed, less densely populated areas than in dense urban
slums to maintaining grassroots patronage networks capable of monitoring and interacting with a large num-
ber of individual voters over time. These costs are especially high outside of the larger rural towns, as argued
by the NDC leader quoted above. Second, parties have less of a reason to invest in building relationships
with individual voters if they can use powerful local elites – such as traditional village leaders – as interme-
diaries, targeting benefits to these leaders, who then organize support for the party in the community. The
urban and rural respondents reported significantly different rates of interaction with local traditional leaders.
Only 15% of the urban survey respondents in Greater Accra reported meeting with a chief or other tradi-
tional leader in the last year, with many of these responses coming from the indigenous Ga ethnic group.70
By contrast, 42% of rural respondents reported interactions with a traditional leader.
69Overall rates of gift distribution in the immediate period before the election were similar, however. In the rural areas, 86% of
respondents knew about or “heard about" the distribution of small gifts to voters during the campaign period, more than the 69%
who knew of these handouts before the election in urban areas. Unconditional gifts can be given even in areas where a party
does not have a dense local organization and does not require longer-term relationships between party agents and voters. The
percentage aware of these gifts in rural areas is likely higher because the average rural voter is poorer than the average urban voter
and, as documented in Chapter 3, the parties avoid giving campaign gifts to middle class and wealthier voters.
70In Chapter 5 I show that these ties to chiefs are an important determinant of vote choice for Ga respondents in the urban area, but
play no role in voting behavior for respondents from other ethnic groups.
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Logistic regressions in Table 4.3 provide evidence consistent with these two reasons for an urban-rural
difference in goods distribution. In models similar to Table 4.2 and the equation above, I regress binary
indicator variables for whether the rural survey respondents know about the different types of good delivery
on a series of individual characteristics, as well as the neighborhood wealth index. In rural areas, this
index captures differences in overall levels of development among communities. Large towns typically have
better infrastructure and more educated populations and thus score more highly on the index than small
villages, which will lack most of the types of infrastructure included in the neighborhood wealth index (see
Chapter 2 for definition of this variable). Because rural communities can be much more spatially dispersed
than urban neighborhoods, I now calculate the neighborhood wealth index as a weighted average of census
characteristics in a 2km radius around respondents, rather than the narrower 500m radius used for analysis
in the urban sample. In each column of Table 4.3, I also include indicators for whether each respondent is a
member of political party and has met with a traditional chief in the last year.
Voters with direct ties to political party organizations or to traditional chiefs were more likely to be
among the small minority (9%) of rural respondents who reported private goods delivery in the open-ended
questions about politicians’ activities. In column 1 of Table 4.3, I find that respondents who are self-reported
members of a political party are more likely to know about private goods delivery.71 This suggests that in the
rural communities where party networks are more active, private goods delivery may be more common.72
Moreover, I estimate that respondents in each rural constituency are 6.4 percentage points (95% CI: -0.3,
14.0, p = 0.08) more likely to report private goods delivery if they have met with a traditional chief in
the past year.73 The probability of reporting private goods delivery on the open-ended questions is nearly
zero among rural respondents who did not interact with their local chief. This is consistent with many of
the private goods that do reach rural voters being delivered through chiefs who serve as intermediaries. By
contrast, in a similar model among non-Ga respondents in the urban survey, contact with traditional chiefs
does not predict whether the respondents know about politicians distributing private goods (not shown).
Non-Ga respondents in the urban survey are those for whom traditional leaders are not active within the city.
71When including constituency fixed effects in column 2, this difference is signed similarly, but no longer statistically significant
(p = 0.13).
72This is also consistent with Lindberg (2010), which suggests that a small group of local party members receive the majority of
private benefits distributed by rural MPs, while most voters receive nothing. These local party members serve as voters in primary
elections and can use that position to extract concessions from MPs (Lindberg 2010, Ichino & Nathan 2012).











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In columns 5-8 of Table 4.3 I analyze the question about official government job and loan programs.
While the open-ended questions capture private goods that could have been delivered by multiple actors,
including NPP MPs, these job and loan programs are all controlled by the NDC. Rural respondents were
significantly more likely to know recipients of these programs in more developed locations – towns – rather
than in small villages. As the neighborhood wealth index changes from the value for the least developed vil-
lage in the rural survey (Apatem, Offinso North constituency) to the value for the wealthiest town (Kpando,
Kpando constituency) respondents are 36 percentage points (95% CI: 14.7, 56.0) more likely to know re-
cipients of the government job and loan programs, based on the model in column 5 of Table 4.3. This is
the exact opposite of the pattern for urban areas, seen in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2. In urban areas, valuable
private benefits are more likely to be distributed in the poorest neighborhoods, not more developed areas.
But as described in the quote above from the NDC party leader, the parties may only distribute these types
of benefits in major towns in rural areas where they have organizations capable of maintaining clientelistic
relationships with larger numbers of individual voters.
Despite this difference in awareness of beneficiaries of these private goods across levels of develop-
ment within rural areas, urban and rural respondents were similarly likely overall to be aware of program
recipients. In each sample, 30% of respondents knew recipients of these programs. But differences be-
come apparent when responses are broken out by constituency. In the two constituencies in the rural survey
that the NDC won in the 2012 presidential election, 44% of respondents knew beneficiaries of these NDC-
managed job and loan programs, higher than the urban average. But in the three constituencies in the survey
won by the NPP, only 20% of respondents knew about program beneficiaries.74 The percentage in rural
NPP constituencies is less than the percentage of respondents knowing about program recipients even in the
average wealthy urban neighborhood in Figure 4.1.
This difference is consistent with it being more difficult for the party to maintain a grassroots organiza-
tion that can identify and monitor individual recipients in rural regions that are strongholds of the opposing
party, as argued above. Both parties in Ghana have offices and local executives in every parliamentary
constituency in the country. But the extent to which those local organizations are active at the grassroots,
especially in villages outside the constituency capital, may vary significantly. For example, in Akan villages
74In urban areas, this difference was less pronounced, with 32% of respondents knowing recipients of jobs or loans from the NDC
government in constituencies that the NDC won in the 2012 election, compared to 26% in the NPP constituencies.
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in the Ashanti Region, there likely are not many active NDC party agents, even if there are NDC executives
sitting in the constituency-level office. The NDC may not have the on-the-ground knowledge about many
individual voters in these opposition constituencies necessary to target jobs and loans to core supporters as
efficiently as the party can do in urban areas, or in its rural strongholds. Within these NPP constituencies,
NDC supporters, or co-ethnics of the party in general, do not appear more likely than NPP supporters to
know the people who receive any benefits from these programs that are still distributed there.75 In column
7 of Table 4.3, I repeat the model from column 5, sub-setting to the thre NPP constituencies in the rural
sample. Respondents who voted for the NDC are not particularly likely to know beneficiaries of these pro-
grams; neither are Northern or Ewe respondents who have ethnic affiliations with the NDC.76 By contrast, in
the rural NDC strongholds (column 8), respondents who voted for the party are significantly more likely to
know about program beneficiaries, consistent with these benefits being targeted as favoritism to the party’s
core supporters, similar to what is argued to occur in the urban areas (see above).77
Finally, the rural survey supports the argument of the NDC leader quoted above about the relatively
greater importance of club goods distribution in underdeveloped rural areas. Where the costs of private
goods distribution are too high, parties can instead build support through club goods that benefit entire
villages, as described above. The rural respondents were significantly more likely to report the delivery
of club goods than urban respondents: 42% of rural respondents named a club good in response to the
open-ended questions about politicians’ activities compared to 30% of urban respondents. As shown in
Column 3 of Table 4.3, reports of club goods delivery were especially common in the least developed
rural communities, in the inverse of the pattern for the job and loan programs. Simulating from column
3, I estimate that respondents in the least developed rural survey location were 36 percentage points (95%
CI: 10.0, 57.9) more likely to report club goods delivery than in the most developed rural location. It is
especially in these poor, remote rural communities where individual-level clientelism is most costly and
club goods distribution becomes a more cost effective alternative. Taken together with the results for private
75These anti-poverty programs are typically administered by district, with some minimum amount of program benefits allocated to
each district. The ruling party thus has some jobs and loans to provide even in opposition constituencies, and cannot concentrate
all funding on these programs in its own strongholds.
7632% percent of respondents supported the NDC in these constituencies and there were also many Northern respondents. But there
were only 7 Ewes, which explains the large standard errors on the Ewe indicator in column 7.
77When repeating column 8 after removing the NDC vote variable, Ewe respondents (NDC co-ethnics) are also significantly more
likely to know about program recipients (not shown). Being Ewe and being an NDC supporter is highly correlated.
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goods in rural areas, this suggests that voting behavior in many rural villages will depend more on voters’
expectations about where parties will distribute club goods than their expectations of who is more likely to
benefit from private goods. I return to this point in Chapter 5.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter suggests that patterns of distributive politics in urban Ghana are affected by each of the major
features of urban growth described in Chapter 1. Scarcity in access to basic services creates demand for
particularistic goods in the electorate, including demands for club goods from many poor and middle class
voters alike. This makes patronage-based appeals viable. Differences across neighborhoods in the wealth
of voters affect where clientelism in the distribution of patronage resources is most effective. Differences
in the political importance of chiefs and other traditional leaders create variation in how politicians build
support among Ga voters versus other urban residents, as well as between urban and rural voters overall.
And, finally, differences in the ethnic diversity of urban neighborhoods affect whether club goods can be
targeted as patronage. Ultimately, the chapter describes variation in distributive outcomes across multiple
dimensions: between strategies of clientelism and reputation building, between the use of private or club
goods, and across different types of voters and neighborhoods.
If the types of benefits voters can receive from politicians are so varied within a single city, there should
also be intra-urban variation in patterns of vote choice. And if the ways in which parties engage with
voters differ between rural and urban areas, voting behavior should also differ between cities and rural areas
overall. In the next chapter, I apply the argument about distributive politics developed here to an examination
of voting behavior in Greater Accra. I show that voters have significantly different incentives to support each
major party depending on where they live within the city and argue that voters’ expectations about club and
private goods are weighted differently in their voting calculations between urban and rural areas.
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5 | Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Urban Areas
5.1 Introduction
Modernization theories predict that the political importance of ethnicity should diminish as societies urban-
ize and develop due to a series of individual-level social transformations (e.g., Lerner 1958, Lipset 1960,
Severino and Ray 2011). Urban voters are thought to develop cross-cutting social ties, placing less emphasis
on traditional identities and social institutions like chieftaincy that bind them to their ethnic group. Wealthier
and better educated voters, heavily concentrated in Africa’s cities, are thought to be more policy-motivated,
less likely to automatically support co-ethnics. Consistent with these hypotheses, recent studies suggest
that ethnicity is less salient at an individual-level among urban Africans (Green 2014, Robinson 2014).
Others find that there is less ethnic voting reported in national-level surveys in urban than rural areas
(Conroy-Krutz 2009), and that class-based identities may be more politically important in cities than ethnic-
ity (Resnick 2014).1
Changes in the social importance of ethnicity brought about by modernization should primarily affect
the prevalence of ethnic voting if we an assume an “expressive" theory of ethnic voting (Horowitz 1985; also
see Ferree 2006), in which voters are thought to have innate preferences in favor of co-ethnic politicians.
As social identities change and voters become better educated, the strength of innate preferences in favor of
co-ethnic politicians are expected to diminish. But such a prediction is in contrast to the dominant theory in
recent literature on ethnic voting in Africa. Instrumental theories of ethnic voting argue instead that ethnicity
is not an innately relevant variable for voters, but a means to an end: voters support co-ethnics politicians
or parties affiliated with their ethnic group if they expect better performance – access to state spending –
from them (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Ferree 2006, Ichino & Nathan 2013, Carlson 2015a). In line with this
1But as described in Chapter 1, this reverses literature on mid-20th century urbanization, which argued that ethnic competition was
instead exacerbated in cities (Epstein 1958, Melson 1971, Baker 1974, Wolpe 1974, Ekeh 1975, Gugler & Flanagan 1978).
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view, I argue that urbanization in Africa does not affect ethnic voting directly through the individual-level
transformations described by modernization theories, but instead indirectly through changes to patterns of
distributive politics, which determine voters’ expectations of the prospective benefits of electing ethnically-
aligned politicians.2
But as the previous chapter demonstrates, patterns of distributive politics are not uniform within African
cities. Chapter 1 describes how urbanization is creating heterogeneity in local neighborhood characteristics.
In particular, while cities are now home to growing middle class and wealthy neighborhoods, urbanization
has also meant the simultaneous rapid expansion of slums (UN-Habitat 2010). Moreover, while rural-urban
migration has made some urban neighborhoods incredibly diverse, ethnically segregated enclaves within
cities also persist and continue to grow. Chapter 4 argues that these differences create incentives for parties
to engage with urban voters in these areas in different ways. In turn, there is neighborhood-level variation
in voters’ incentives to support co-ethnics. As a result, where a voter lives within a city significantly affects
how she votes.
Building directly from Chapter 4, I develop a theory about how the interaction of two neighborhood char-
acteristics – local ethnic composition and wealth – influences urban voters’ expectations about receiving the
two types of goods commonly distributed where patronage politics is prevalent: club and private goods. The
ability of politicians to reward ethnically homogeneous concentrations of co-ethnics with geographically
excludable club goods – such as schools, roads, and water – is at the root of existing explanations for ethnic
voting in rural areas in Africa (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Kimenyi 2006). But I predict that voters in much
more diverse urban neighborhoods are less likely to expect that club goods will be targeted on the basis of
ethnicity, lowering incentives to support co-ethnic parties. And in more homogeneous urban neighborhoods,
voters face incentives to vote across ethnic lines when living as a local minority in an area where they can
benefit from club goods delivered by a non-co-ethnic party (Ichino & Nathan 2013). But neighborhood
wealth moderates these effects of neighborhood ethnic composition. In the poorest neighborhoods, dense
concentrations of poverty allow politicians to extensively distribute private benefits to co-ethnics. In poor
areas where private goods distribution is prevalent, voters have strong incentives to continue supporting their
2Separate from changes in the salience of ethnic identity, wealthier voters could also have different policy preferences (Kitschelt
2000), changing the instrumental value of a co-ethnic. But I find that middle class urban voters are just as likely as the poor to
demand local public (“club") goods from the government (see Appendix), due to short-comings in service provision in urban areas.
Because of these demands, relatively prosperous voters still can have incentives to support ethnically-aligned parties.
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ethnically-aligned party, regardless of the ethnic composition of the neighborhood.
I examine voting in presidential elections in Greater Accra to study the contest with the greatest influence
on distribution of state resources, and to hold candidate characteristics – such as ethnicity, policy programs,
and economic performance – fixed, comparing voters facing the same exact choice across neighborhoods. I
define ethnic voting as support for the party affiliated with each voter’s ethnic group (see below).
I find that support for ethnically-aligned parties ranges from neighborhoods where ethnicity perfectly
predicts vote choice to those where ethnicity and vote choice are uncorrelated. I find no evidence, however,
the mechanisms expected by a modernization hypothesis explain this variation. Individual characteristics
such as wealth or education do not predict ethnic voting, and there is no evidence that there is less ethnic
voting among voters for whom ethnicity is less salient.
But neighborhood characteristics do predict differences in ethnic voting, similar to Ichino & Nathan
(2013). Using enumeration area-level census data, I find that ethnic voting is less common among otherwise
similar voters in two types of neighborhoods: diverse, middle class areas, where voters generally do not re-
ceive private goods and expect to receive similar amounts of club goods regardless of a party’s ethnic profile;
and middle class areas where voters live in the local ethnic minority and benefit from club goods targeted to
that area by their non-co-ethnic party. But ethnic voting remains very prevalent in slums and in wealthier,
segregated areas where voters are in the local majority. I also find suggestive evidence of similar patterns
in polling station results. An original survey experiment measuring the hypothesized mechanism finds that
voters’ expectations of benefiting from each party vary across neighborhoods in line with the argument. I
find little support for alternative explanations, such as endogenous residential sorting or socialization.
Although a nascent literature documents overall rural-urban differences in voting and ethnic politics
in Africa (Conroy-Krutz 2009, Harding 2010, Koter 2013b, Resnick 2014), a full understanding of these
differences is not possible without considering variation within cities. Existing studies average over or
ignore the intra-urban variation documented here, extrapolating from patterns that may only hold in specific
parts of a city to make claims about urban Africa in general. By considering this variation directly, I develop
a more comprehensive explanation for how urban context influences voting. This extends existing theories
of ethnic voting to show that differences between rural and urban voters can be accounted for by a common
underlying model. More broadly, this suggests that to explain vote choice in the developing world, we
must account for how local neighborhood contexts affect political behavior. A large literature examines the
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influence of neighborhoods in the United States (e.g., Key 1949, Hopkins 2010, Enos 2014), but other than
Ichino & Nathan (2013) and Kasara (2013) there have been few examinations of neighborhood effects on
political behavior in Africa.
5.2 Ethnic Voting in African Democracies
There is often a strong, but imperfect, correlation between ethnicity and vote choice in Africa. But many
accounts, implicitly or explicitly drawing from modernization theories (e.g., Lerner 1958, Lipset 1960),
expect less ethnic voting in urban areas, especially among the wealthier and better educated voters who are
concentrated there (e.g., Conroy-Krutz 2009). These accounts suggest that as voters move into urban areas
and become wealthier and better educated, the social salience of ethnicity should decline and voters should
lose their ties to traditional ethnic institutions (e.g., chieftaincy) (Severino & Ray 2011, Green 2014).3 As
these identities lose salience and voters gain social and economic independence from ethnic elites, voters
should become less beholden to ethnicity at the ballot box. These expectations are often implicitly rooted
in “expressive" theories of ethnic voting, in which voters are thought to support co-ethnics as an act of
allegiance to their identity group (Horowitz 1985).
But expressive explanations for ethnic voting find little empirical support in recent literature, which
instead supports an instrumental theory arguing that voters support co-ethnics if they expect better perfor-
mance from them (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Ferree 2006, Carlson 2015a).4 In this second theory, ethnicity
has a conditional relationship with vote choice; a candidate or party’s ethnic profile serves as an informa-
tional cue about the benefits voters can expect after the election; voters only disproportionately support
co-ethnics when they expect more benefits and access to state resources from them. Even if urban voters
place less individual emphasis on ethnic identity in daily life (Robinson 2014), instrumental incentives to
support co-ethnics can persist in cities if voters expect ethnic favoritism in the distribution of valuable state
resources.5
3Early Africanist research in fact suggested the opposite: ethnicity gained salience among rural-urban migrants (e.g., Gugler and
Flanagan 1978).
4Expressive explanations cannot account for links between ethnic voting and performance expectations in experimental research
(Conroy-Krutz 2013, Carlson 2015a) or for variation in ethnic voting after changes in electoral institutions (Posner 2005).
5For example, Burbidge (2014) qualitatively documents how middle class voters in Kenya still vote along ethnic lines even as they
place little emphasis on ethnicity in their daily lives.
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These expectations grow from a long record in many countries of ethnic favoritism in distribution of
state resources (Franck & Rainer 2012).6 This includes the distribution of private goods, but especially the
distribution of club (local public) goods (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Kimenyi 2006). When ethnic groups
are spatially clustered, as they are in much of rural Africa, club goods – with benefits excludable outside,
but not within, a given area – can be targeted to specific groups based on where they are built. This is
often a more efficient means to favor ethnically-aligned areas than private goods distribution; if an area is
homogeneous, parties can reach many voters at once with a club good and monitor their behavior through
aggregate election results, avoiding the organizational and monitoring costs of individual-level patronage
strategies (Ejdemyr et al. 2015).7
An instrumental theory predicts geographic variation in ethnic voting if there are differences in voters’
expectations of benefits – private and club goods – in different places. Ichino & Nathan (2013) argues
that when voters expect a party to target club goods to areas where more of its co-ethnics live, a voter’s
probability of benefitting from a non-co-ethnic party is increasing in the population of that party’s ethnic
groups in the surrounding area, regardless of a voter’s own ethnicity. Consistent with this argument, Ichino
& Nathan (2013) finds significant cross-ethnic voting when voters live as local minorities in rural areas
of Ghana dominated by groups aligned with their non-co-ethnic party.8 Similar variation in ethnic voting
within urban areas should also occur if parties target different types of resources to different places.
6Although Kramon & Posner (2013) finds that the empirical record of favoritism is mixed in many countries, many voters still
believe there will be favoritism in resource distribution. For example, Posner (2005) shows that voters in Zambia believe that
government co-ethnics are systematically favored even in cases when this is false; these voters’ beliefs are entrenched by past
experiences of favoritism. The survey experiment below shows empirically that voters in urban Ghana have strong expectations of
ethnic favoritism.
7Some Africanist literature views club goods as “developmental goods" distinct from patronage (Weghorst & Lindberg 2013). But
this departs from the much larger literature theorizing club goods distribution among the set of non-programmatic, patronage-based
strategies parties could employ (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Cammett and Issar 2010, Hicken 2011, Kramon and Posner
2013, Stokes et al. 2013, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2015). Classifying club goods delivery as a possible patronage strategy does not
imply that delivering these resources cannot also represent good performance. For example, clientelistic politicians perform well
from the perspective of voters who benefit from goods they distribute. The logic of instrumental ethnic voting is that voters support
politicians they expect to perform best for them – ethnicity is an indicator for who this is likely to be. In this model, performance
and patronage expectations are not competing explanations for voting.
8Ichino & Nathan (2013) do not find this pattern in urban areas, but have a limited, non-representative sample of urban respondents
and less detailed urban census data than in this study.
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5.3 Expectations Across Urban Neighborhoods
Taking instrumental theories as a starting point, I develop a theory showing how differences in the char-
acteristics of urban neighborhoods can affect the importance of ethnicity for vote choice. I begin with the
simplifying assumption that voters support the party they expect to benefit from most after the election. In
reality, voting behavior may also be affected by voters’ assessments of a party’s macro-economic perfor-
mance, major policy proposals, and/or candidate (and valence) characteristics.9 But while these variables
may help explain aggregate shifts in election outcomes, they cannot explain systematic differences in vote
choice between otherwise similar voters in nearby neighborhoods of the same city choosing among the same
options in the same election because each of these features is held constant between these voters.10 What is
not constant across neighborhoods are the types of patronage goods that each party is likely to deliver after
the election. Predicting vote choice then requires a theory of distributive politics – of what voters living in
different neighborhoods can expect to receive. By generalizing from the argument in Chapter 4, I develop
predictions about where within cities voters will expect to benefit the most from ethnically-aligned parties.
These predictions are most easily illustrated using a simplified example of an African city. Consider a
hypothetical city with two ethnic groups –A andB – and six types of neighborhoods, as in Figure 5.1. There
are neighborhoods made up mostly of each group, while others are more mixed. Within these neighborhoods
(diverse, A dominated, B dominated), some are slums, while others are upper or middle class. Typical of
most African cities, in poor neighborhoods, most residents are poor themselves, while upper and middle
class neighborhoods have a mix of poor and wealthier residents.
Each group has an affiliated party – party A and party B – competing in an election, with all votes
counting equally.11 Assume that the parties do not offer ideologically-differentiated policies – similar to
most African parties, including in Ghana (see Chapter 3) – but motivate voters through patronage and lo-
9For example, Posner & Simon (2002), Bratton et al. (2011), and many others, find that African survey respondents’ evaluations
of the incumbent’s economic performance predicts vote choice. There are reasons to be concerned, however, that performance
evaluations on surveys are outcomes (not causes) of party support, rendering their correlation with vote choice uninformative (see
below, and Carlson (2015b)).
10Aspects of government performance that have highly localized impacts usually pertain to the delivery of club goods (e.g., was a
road built in this neighborhood?), and thus remain within the theory below. Partisanship for some voters may also be fixed. But
if most voters’ choices are fixed and not affected by current incentives, the neighborhood variation in vote choice predicted here
should not exist.
11Voters cannot take an A victory for granted just because they live in a locally-A area.
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Figure 5.1: Predictions in “ideal type" neighborhoods.
calized services – by providing private or club goods. After the election, the winning party gets a budget to
allocate in each area; party leaders can vary its size across neighborhoods, but there is some non-negligible
minimum to be spent at each place. For each neighborhood, party leaders choose howmuch (above that min-
imum) and what type of good(s) to deliver. All else equal, club goods will be more cost effective for parties
than private goods. Club goods benefit many voters at once without incurring large organizational costs
to the party. But a party must identify and monitor individual private goods recipients through long-term
patronage relationships, requiring a dense local organization.12
Consistent with patterns of ethnic favoritism, and the argument in Chapter 4, both parties avoid giving
benefits to voters they expect will not support them and use ethnicity as a heuristic for who is a likely
supporter. The parties may target benefits to perceived swing neighborhoods, but they have little incentive
to provide club goods where most residents are from the opposite party’s ethnic group.13 And because
vote buying transactions are not fully enforceable, they do not direct private goods to the opposite party’s
group (Nichter 2008). The parties must also consider voter demands. Middle class and poor voters both
12Following the evidence in Chapter 4, private goods are not only one-shot payments immediately before elections, but the broader
range of private goods – such as jobs, loans, and on-going assistance with expenses – delivered by machine parties as part of long-
term patronage relationships. I assume that this latter group of benefits is more important for vote choice than small unconditional
gifts just before elections.
13Chapter 4 argues that parties will target a mix of goods to core and swing areas. But the exact ratio of core versus swing targeting
is not relevant for the predictions about vote choice here, as long as the parties play similar strategies. The only assumption
necessary is that each party avoids targeting significant resources to core groups of the opposing party. This assumption is shared
by all of the canonical swing and core voter models of distributive politics described in the previous chapter (e.g., Dixit and
Londregan 1996).
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demand club goods from politicians.14 But demands for private goods are primarily from poor voters, for
whom benefits that directly address pressing economic needs (unemployment, a child’s tuition) can be more
immediately valuable than services for the neighborhood.
Chapter 4 argues that the ethnic composition of neighborhoods influences where each party invests
in club goods, while the wealth of neighborhoods affects distribution of private goods. In A dominated
neighborhoods (column ii), party A will invest the most in club goods, as primarily A voters will benefit.
The same holds for party B in B neighborhoods (column iii). Neither party promises many club goods in
neighborhoods dominated by the other group. In diverse neighborhoods (column i), the parties cannot target
club goods to a specific ethnic group because any benefits reach both groups. Even if some club goods are
still distributed in diverse areas, there is no systematic reason why one party is more likely to favor diverse
areas than the other.
Chapter 4 also demonstrates that in wealthier neighborhoods (row 1), relatively few voters demand
private benefits or can be reached through social networks by clientelistic brokers (Koter 2013b, Luna 2014),
and middle class voters may punish parties seen engaging in clientelism as corrupt (Weitz-Shapiro 2012).
The poor voters who do live in these areas are often more transient, making it harder for the parties to
build sustained patronage relationships with them over time. Ultimately, too few potential recipients live
in these neighborhoods to justify the organizational cost of patronage networks needed for private goods
distribution. In poor neighborhoods (row 2), by contrast, there are large concentrations of poor voters who
highly value private benefits, often more than club goods. Through sheer population density and close social
ties within slums, party agents can reach individual voters more directly and at lower cost than in wealthier
neighborhoods or in rural villages.15
14See Chapter 3. Following the argument in chapter 3, some urban voters will primarily demand universalistic policies. Vote choice
for these voters likely does not depend on expectations about where particularistic goods will be delivered. But Chapter 3 shows
that these voters are significantly less likely to turn out to vote in the first place. And to the extent that they do turnout, their
presence in the electorate should bias against finding significant differences across neighborhoods in voting behavior among
otherwise similar voters.
15A party’s local organization is likely relatively weaker in poor urban neighborhoods where the other party’s ethnic groups domi-
nate (row 2, column iii) than in its own stronghold neighborhoods (row 2, column ii). But there are still incentives for the party to
deliver private goods to the small number of co-ethnics who live in minority neighborhoods. Because all votes count equally ev-
erywhere in the election, a party still benefits from targeting some resources to co-ethnics in these neighborhoods to maintain their
support rather than ignoring the areas completely and allowing co-ethnics who live there to vote for the other party. Moreover,
because institutional rules insure that the winning party has some minimum budget to spend in each local area (see Chapter 4),
the winning party will still have to spend some amount on voters in these neighborhoods, and this can be most valuably channeled
as private goods to the party’s co-ethnics who are in the area.
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These differences in goods distribution inform a voter’s beliefs about what she is likely to receive. In
diverse neighborhoods, a Group A voter’s expectation of benefitting from club goods will not depend on the
ethnic profile of each party because she receives similar benefits regardless of which party wins (column i).
In A neighborhoods (column ii), mainly party A will be expected to deliver club goods. But when she lives
as a local minority in a B neighborhood (column iii), party B is more likely to deliver club goods, which
still benefit the A voter.
An A voter’s private goods expectations will depend on the wealth of her neighborhood. In upper or
middle class neighborhoods (row 1), she expects little from either party, even if she is poor herself. But if
the A voter is in a poor neighborhood (row 2), she can benefit from valuable private goods from party A.
This is even the case in poor neighborhoods where the A voter is in the local minority (row 2, column iii).
Even if party A’s organization is relatively weaker in these neighborhoods than in its strongholds, party A
will gain control over distribution of valuable private benefits in the neighborhood if it wins the election (see
above). As one of the few A residents in the area, an A voter in a poor B neighborhood may be one of the
first in line to benefit from party A’s victory. As a result, an A voter may get relatively more private benefits
from party A when living in a poor neighborhood with fewer other A voters than when surrounded by many
other potential recipients of party A’s private goods.
Predictions for vote choice come from adding together each cell of Figure 5.1. Rather than ethnic voting
being uncommon across the entire city, support for party A by an A voter will be relatively low in two types
of neighborhoods: (a) in wealthier, diverse neighborhoods (row 1, column i), there is no difference in the
club or private goods an A voter expects from either party, making her indifferent between parties; (b), in
wealthier, B areas, the A voter receives few private benefits from either party, but club goods from party
B, encouraging cross-ethnic voting for party B. But in the other four neighborhoods, the A voter still has
incentives to support her co-ethnic party. Where there are many other A voters (column ii), the voter will
expect more benefits from party A than B. In poor, diverse neighborhoods (row 2, column i), the voter
expects private benefits from party A, pushing her to support party A. Finally, in poor, B neighborhoods
(row 2, column iii), the A voter is likely poor herself (living in a poor neighborhood, as described above).
To the extent that this means she values private goods that address immediate needs over club goods for her
neighborhood, she has an incentive to still vote more for party A.
Compare this to predictions for rural areas in Ichino & Nathan (2013). A similar pattern holds in the
126
distribution of club goods, depending on the ethnic composition of each local area. But in comparison to
urban slums, fewer rural voters are likely to receive private goods directly from each party. While there is
non-conditional distribution of small gifts before elections, African parties typically lack the grassroots or-
ganizations in rural areas to engage in long-term patronage relationships with a large set of individual clients
spread out over sparsely populated areas (van de Walle 2007). This is especially in the rural homelands of
the opposite ethnic group – party A will often lack the networks to reach many individual A voters with
private benefits in primarily-B villages. Instead, as argued in Chapter 4, while parties engage in clientelistic
relationships in rural areas, this often is targeted as club goods to entire (relatively homogeneous) communi-
ties. Private goods that are distributed are often delivered indirectly through chiefs or other traditional elites,
absent in almost all urban neighborhoods (Lindberg 2010, Koter 2013a). As a result, in rural areas, spatial
variation in vote choice in this model predominately follows expectations about club goods. As Ichino &
Nathan (2013) find for rural Ghana, a rural A voter will support party A in A areas, but has incentives to
vote instead for party B instead when living in predominately B areas. The analysis below instead tests the
predictions for urban areas.16
5.4 Data Sources
I combine data from the main voter survey analyzed in the previous chapters with the census data and polling
station results from the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. The main explanatory variables – neighbor-
hood wealth and ethnic composition – are measured from the census data. As described in Chapter 2, I
follow Ichino & Nathan (2013) and Reardon & O’Sullivan (2004), defining local neighborhood characteris-
tics as weighted averages of census characteristics around each survey respondent, with information closer
to the respondent weighted higher, and all data outside a given radius weighted as 0. This means that each
neighborhood is measured relative to each respondent’s own GPS location. The main radius used is 500m
around each respondent.
16I do not attempt to replicate Ichino & Nathan (2013) and examine rural vote choice using the rural survey data analyzed in Chapter
4. Because the rural survey is based on a sample of only 5 districts, there did not end up being enough variation in the ethnic
composition of the areas around respondents of each ethnic group to estimate the vote choice of A voters living in locally-B
areas. For example, only 6 Akan respondents on the rural survey were interviewed in areas where the majority of the population
is non-Akan. Only 7 Ewes were sampled in majority Akan areas. All of the Ga respondents were in a single district – Lower
Manya Krobo – which is majority Ga. Afrobarometer surveys have more variation on these dimensions in rural areas, but this is
the data already analyzed in Ichino & Nathan (2013).
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I measure neighborhoods at a smaller scale than parliamentary constituencies for several reasons.17 First,
given the structure of Ghanaian local governments highlighted above, much of the opportunity for ethnic
favoritism in the distribution of local public spending involves targeting by district and constituency-level
leaders (all from the president’s party) to local areas within constituencies and districts, not only among
them. Second, many club goods (e.g., new drains and public toilets, paving residential streets) have benefits
at a very localized scale within cities due to the high population density (over 90,000 per sq. km. in some
areas). These goods reach areas much smaller than constituencies. Third, it becomes increasingly difficult to
differentiate pockets of ethnic homogeneity at higher levels. An area comprised of two separate, segregated
neighborhoods with different ethnic groups would appear as uniformly heterogeneous at higher aggregation.
But as long as politicians can selectively target resources to only one of the two neighborhoods, which they
can in Ghana, more localized measures are needed.
Neighborhood wealth is calculated as the first dimension in a factor analysis of census questions on
assets, education, and employment.18 Local diversity is measured as the Herfindahl fractionalization index
for the weighted average of the ethnic group shares within the same radius. Population density is the pop-
ulation of the enumeration areas covered by each sampling cluster, divided by the area. At an individual
level, wealth, education, and employment status are measured through the same indices used in the pre-
vious chapters. Importantly, because there are poor voters living amidst otherwise wealthy neighborhoods,
there are sufficient numbers of poor respondents in wealthy neighborhoods to estimate relationships between
neighborhood wealth and voting while controlling for individual wealth. The wealth and ethnic diversity
of neighborhoods also are not strongly correlated, such that the six types in Figure 5.1 are present in the
sample.19
17The average sampled constituency is 29.8 sq. km, larger than the 0.79 sq. km circles measuring neighborhoods.
18Variables that only measure service provision are excluded. The index includes: % with running water (privately provided by
wealthier residents via tanker or borehole); % with a flush toilet, % with electricity (available to all who can afford it), % in a
single-family home (excluding informal structures); % with a computer; % adults with more than a middle school education; and
% adults employed in the formal or public sectors. The index is scaled in standard deviations from the city-wide mean of 0. In
the survey sample, the variable ranges from -1.4 to 3, with a mean of -0.10.
19In areas with above average ethnic fractionalization, the wealth index ranges from -1.1 to 2.4. In areas with below average




The main outcome is whether a voter’s ethnicity explains how she voted in the 2012 presidential election.
Focusing on the presidential election allows me to hold candidate characteristics fixed while comparing vot-
ers facing the same choice in different places. The presidential election also has by far the most influence
on the distribution of state resources. The president’s party controls most state spending in Ghana through
national ministries and through local governments via the appointment of District Chief Executives (may-
ors).20 This means that the ruling party controls resources that can be targeted as favoritism to different
areas within each district, even in opposition stronghold regions. In addition, the president’s national ruling
party places leaders of its constituency-level party organizations into positions in each district government
from which they steer local spending and, sometimes, run clientelistic networks distributing private goods
to local ruling party supporters.21
I define ethnic voting as support for the presidential candidate of the party affiliated with each respon-
dent’s ethnic group (if one exists), not only as a direct match between the ethnicity of candidate and voter.22
As described in Chapter 2, the opposition NPP draws strong support from the Akan, particularly the Ashanti,
Akyem, and Akuapem sub-groups. The ruling NDC draws support from the Ewe and many predominantly
Muslim groups of northern Ghana, especially now that the NDC president is a Northerner.23 The NDC
20The president also appoints one third of each (otherwise elected) district assembly, solidifying the ruling party’s control over
every local government in the country.
21By contrast, parliamentary elections in Ghana are ill-suited for examining the theory. First, MPs have very little control over state
spending, with access only to a small constituency development fund. Second, many parliamentary contests are intra-ethnic, with
both candidates from the same locally dominant group. Third, the selection of parliamentary candidates is itself endogenous to
neighborhood characteristics, complicating estimation of independent effects of neighborhood conditions on vote choice separate
from differences in the candidates on the ballot in different places. In robustness tests in the Appendix, however, I consider
whether features of each parliamentary contest may have carry-over effects on voting in the presidential election. The results
below are unaffected.
22In African countries where no group is large enough to win on its own, many parties combine support from multiple groups,
even as their presidential candidate is only from one at a time (e.g., Arriola 2012). But when over 90% of Ewe in rural districts
of Ghana’s Volta Region voted for non-Ewe NDC presidential candidates in the country’s last four elections, or similar super-
majorities of Kalenjin voted for a Luo and then a Kikuyu in Kenya’s 2007 and 2013 elections, this is “ethnic voting." Ethnicity
overwhelmingly explains these voters’ choices, even though no Ewe or Kalenjin presidential candidates contested. A narrower
definition that defines ethnic voting based only on a match between candidate and voter would ignore these voters, arbitrarily un-
derstating the importance of ethnicity. Nonetheless, I re-estimate the main results below for only co-ethnics of the two presidential
candidates, not each party, and find substantively identical results (see Appendix).
23There are several dozen small Northern ethnic groups, not all of which are affiliated with the NDC (see Chapter 2 for more detailed
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historically has also drawn most votes of the Ga. Thus, for Akan respondents, I code ethnic voting as sup-
port for the NPP candidate, while I code support for the NDC candidate as ethnic voting for Ewe, Ga, and
Northern respondents.24
Respondents were asked to mark their vote choice in the 2012 presidential election on a confidential
ballot, obscured from the enumerator, and to place it in a sealed box. This replicates a procedure from
Carlson (2014, 2015a) that has been shown to mitigate post-election desirability bias and non-response bias
in self-reported vote data.25 Vote choice is only measured for respondents who reported turning out in the
election. Seventy-six percent (76%) of respondents reported support for their ethnically affiliated party. But
there is variation across locations: in 13 survey locations, over 85% of respondents reported support for their
ethnically-affiliated party, indicating that ethnicity strongly predicts vote choice; but in 7 locations, the rate
was below 60%, with little correlation between ethnicity and voting.
To explain this variation, the theory makes two central predictions: (a) that there will be less ethnic
voting in more diverse areas, primarily when the area is wealthy (row 1, column i of Figure 5.1); and
(b) that there will be cross-ethnic voting when voters are surrounded by a larger population from groups
affiliated with a non-co-ethnic party, especially in wealthier neighborhoods (row 1, column iii of Figure
5.1).
To test the first prediction, I regress a binary indicator for support for each respondent’s co-ethnic party
on neighborhood- and individual-level predictors. The preferred specifications are multi-level logistic re-
gressions, which partially pool intercepts by sampling location to account for clustering in the sample
(Gelman & Hill 2007).26 Models follow the form:
P (yi) = logit
 1(↵j[i] + ✓k[j] +  1Fractionalizationi +  2NeighWealthi +  3Densityj+
 4Fractionalizationi ⇤NeighWealthi +Xi )
discussion). But a shared Northern identity is politically relevant in southern Ghana, due to significant north-south cultural and
religious differences and the clustering of many Northerners in the south into set-aside slums known as “Zongos."
24181 respondents reported that they are members of two groups. They are coded as members of the first group mentioned to the
enumerator, and then indicators control for whether respondents are members of other ethnicities.
25Non-response was 4% and the survey responses closely match the real election results, suggesting it is unlikely that there was
response bias: 53% reported voting for the NDC and 45% for the NPP, compared to 52% and 47% in the same constituencies in
official results.
26Results are robust to instead clustering standard errors by location. Location fixed effects are not possible because there is not
sufficient variation in the explanatory variables (neighborhood characteristics) within survey locations.
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where i indexes respondents, j indexes sampling clusters, and k indexes constituencies. yi is an indicator
for voting for the ethnically-aligned party. Fractionalizationi,NeighWealthi, andDensityj are defined
above. All specifications include parliamentary constituency fixed effects, ✓k[j], to identify localized varia-
tion while controlling for baseline differences in party organizations and local governments.27 Xi is a matrix
of individual-level predictors: the assets and education/employment indices, age, gender, and whether the
respondent is Muslim, indicator variables for each ethnic group, whether respondents or their immediate
family are party members, and whether a respondent reported her ethnicity as the type of identity she feels
“closest to," to measure the individual salience of ethnicity. To control for endogenous sorting (see below),
I also include indicators for whether a respondent found her current home through family or ethnic group
ties and the number of years each respondent lived in the neighborhood.28 29
In Table A.12, I find no evidence consistent with the individual-level mechanisms of modernization
theory. The wealth and education/employment indices do not predict ethnic voting; middle class and wealthy
voters are just as likely as the poor to vote for ethnically-affiliated parties.30 Moreover, the salience of ethnic
identity at an individual level does not predict whether respondents vote for an ethnically-affiliated party,
inconsistent with “expressive" theories of ethnic voting and predictions that changes in social identity should
reduce ethnic voting.31
But after controlling for these individual-level characteristics, greater diversity in each voters’ neighbor-
hood predicts lower support for co-ethnic parties in column 1 of Table A.12 (p = 0.08), consistent with
less ethnic voting in more diverse neighborhoods. A 1 standard deviation (10.7 percentage point) increase
in fractionalization around each respondent is associated with a 27.9 percentage point decrease in the prob-
ability of voting for a co-ethnic party (95% CI: -36.9, 8.8).32
In column 2 of Table A.12, I interact fractionalization and neighborhood wealth. Consistent with the
27The agents distributing benefits differ by constituency, as do their budgets. It is also possible that features of each concurrent
parliamentary race have spillover effects on the presidential election. I add additional controls for this possibility in the Appendix.
28Two additional indicators control for interview quality: whether enumerators made logistical errors (12% of interviews) or noted
respondents were uncooperative (10%).
29Voters may also choose parties they believe will perform better economically, but the main results hold controlling for economic
performance evaluations (see Appendix).
30I also show this using additional measures of education (see Appendix).
31Social identification is measured exactly as in Eifert et al. (2010), asking respondents to name which identity group they feel
closest to (see Appendix).
32Predicted probabilities calculated following Hanmer & Kalkan (2013).
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Table 5.1: Support for Co-Ethnic Party in the 2012 Presidential Election
1 2 3 4
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)  2.513†  3.522⇤  3.506⇤
(1.428) (1.528) (1.529)
Neigh. Wealth (500m)  0.163 2.091† 2.066†
(0.170) (1.165) (1.164)
Eth. Fract.* Neigh. Wealth  3.396†  3.362†
(1.740) (1.739)
Pos. NDC Econ. Performance 0.149
(0.262)
Pop. Density (by cluster)  0.007  0.011  0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Assets/Wealth Index 0.074 0.066 0.036 0.064
(0.107) (0.108) (0.101) (0.108)
Education/Employ. Index  0.083  0.073  0.092  0.079
(0.104) (0.105) (0.103) (0.105)
Ethnic Identity “Closest"  0.083  0.078  0.095  0.082
(0.181) (0.181) (0.179) (0.181)
Moved for Family / Ethnicity 0.047 0.053 0.054 0.049
(0.205) (0.206) (0.205) (0.206)
Age 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Muslim 0.137 0.141 0.020 0.126
(0.374) (0.374) (0.370) (0.375)
Male  0.110  0.119  0.084  0.124
(0.182) (0.182) (0.181) (0.183)
Ewe 0.439† 0.465† 0.403 0.452†
(0.266) (0.268) (0.267) (0.269)
Northerner  0.836⇤  0.859⇤  0.865⇤  0.860⇤
(0.388) (0.389) (0.386) (0.389)
Ga  0.420†  0.402†  0.356  0.406†
(0.235) (0.236) (0.232) (0.236)
Years in neighborhood 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Party member 0.226 0.242 0.223 0.241
(0.202) (0.203) (0.201) (0.203)
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y
N 797 797 797 797
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Logistic regressions partially pooled by
sampling location. The outcome is 2012 vote choice for each respondent’s co-ethnic party;
those who did not vote in 2012 or who do not have a co-ethnic party are dropped from this
analysis. Akan is the omitted, baseline ethnicity category. Note that the minimum value of
ethnic fractionalization in the data is 0.38, not 0.
difference between diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods being greater in wealthier areas, I find that ethnic
voting is less common at high levels of diversity in wealthier neighborhoods (p = 0.051). Figure 5.2 shows
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significantly less ethnic voting after a 1 standard deviation increase in diversity around each respondent in
wealthier neighborhoods, but no difference in poorer neighborhoods. The effect of neighborhood wealth is
also signed as predicted. There is not a significant difference in ethnic voting from a 1 standard deviation
increase in wealth in the most homogeneous neighborhoods, but a predicted 7.7 percentage point decrease




































































Figure 5.2: First differences in the probability of voting for co-ethnic party after a 1 standard deviation
increase in fractionalization, by neighborhood wealth, with 95% confidence intervals.
The interaction between neighborhood diversity and wealth in Figure 5.2 persists after controlling for
other variables expected to affect voting behavior. In column 4, I repeat the model from column 2 while
adding an indicator for whether each respondent evaluates the incumbent NDC government’s economic
performance positively. As expected by Bratton et al. (2011), I show in the Appendix that macro-economic
performance evaluations are positively correlated with voting for the incumbent NDC. But column 4 of
Table A.12 shows that controlling for these performance evaluations does not alter the relationship between
33The theory argues that the reason for this interaction is the presence of private goods delivery in poor, but not wealthy areas.
Consistent with this argument, I show in Chapter 4 that respondents are significantly more likely to report distribution of private
goods in poorer neighborhoods, consistent with the theory.
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neighborhood characteristics and support for co-ethnic parties depicted.
For the second main prediction of the theory, I find less ethnic voting in wealthier neighborhoods where
respondents are more likely to benefit from club goods from their non-co-ethnic party. I change the outcome
variable to a binary indicator for NDC vote and replace the fractionalization variable with the share of the
population from each major ethnic group around each respondent. While there are not clear differences in
the full sample, this changes once Ga respondents are removed. As described in Section 4, the minority Ga
occupy a unique position in Greater Accra. As indigenes, Gas have greater access to patronage benefits than
other residents regardless of where they live, particularly from the NDC. Clientelism is targeted to the Ga
through chiefs and family heads, who are more powerful than for other groups in Greater Accra, providing
networks that the NDC uses to distribute goods. Chiefs also use land ownership to lobby for club goods in
Ga neighborhoods and Gas are heavily represented in local governments, as well as in the local leadership
of the NDC. This allows for higher rates of both club and private goods distribution by the NDC to Ga
communities relative to other voters.34 If voting is influenced by differences in expectations of benefits
between the parties, Gas are least likely to be sensitive to the composition of other groups around them.
Once Ga respondents are removed, I find evidence of cross-ethnic voting in neighborhoods dominated
by other groups. Figure 5.3 shows that a 1 standard deviation (15 percentage point) increase in the Akan
population around each respondent predicts lower NDC support (greater NPP support), particularly at higher
levels of neighborhood wealth – even among respondents affiliated with the NDC. This is consistent with
all respondents voting more for the NPP where only the NPP likely will deliver club goods. Similarly, a
higher Ewe and Northern population – or Northern population alone – both predict more NDC support,
especially at higher neighborhood wealth.35 In the bottom-right panel of Figure 5.3, however, I find no
similar relationship between NDC vote and the Ga population in each area (see Appendix). I report results
for Ga respondents in the Appendix.
34I find that whether Ga respondents have close ties to traditional chiefs is a strong predictor of vote choice for the NDC (see
Appendix). But ties to traditional leaders do not predict vote choice for all other respondents (see Appendix). Chiefs for non-
indigenous groups are not active within Accra; these groups lack the local organization of the Ga.
35Because the percentage of Ewes in all neighborhoods in the survey is very low, I use the combined percentage from the Ewe and
Northern groups as a measure for non-indigenous NDC groups in each area.
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Figure 5.3: First differences in probability of voting for NDC after a 1 standard deviation increase in neigh-
borhood population share of each of the listed groups, with 95% confidence intervals. Corresponding table
is in the Appendix.
5.5.2 The Mechanism: Favoritism Expectations
The proposed mechanism for these patterns is voters’ expectations about which party is more likely to benefit
them in each area. I measure these expectations using a survey experiment similar to an “endorsement
experiment" (Bullock et al. 2011). Each respondent was read a prompt about a hypothetical activity to be
conducted by the government and asked if they expected that they (or their families) would benefit. The
first treatment cued whether the activity would be done by the NDC or an NPP government, had they won
in 2012. The second treatment was the project – one of three examples each of either a private or a club
135
good.36 Collapsing across examples, this makes 4 conditions (NDC v. NPP, club v. private goods).37
The treatment effect of interest is the difference in the proportion of respondents expecting to benefit from
their co-ethnic party versus their non-co-ethnic party for each goods type.38 This is the causal effect on
anticipated benefits from switching between a co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic government. This can also be
re-labeled as the difference in expectations between the NDC and NPP for all respondents. Each treatment
effect thus measures the relative difference in expectations between parties, not the overall level of goods
expected.
Consistent with instrumental theories, respondents have clear overall expectations of favoritism from
their co-ethnic party relative to their non-co-ethnic party. I estimate the co-ethnic party treatment effect in
multi-level logistic regression models with the same predictors as above, where the outcome is expecting to
benefit from the good in the prompt (see Appendix). Overall, respondents are 13.7 percentage points (95%
CI: 7.8, 19.4) more likely to expect to benefit from their co-ethnic than non-co-ethnic party.39
More importantly, expecting to benefit from a co-ethnic party in the experiment is strongly correlated
with actual ethnic voting. Among those receiving the co-ethnic party treatment (T = 1), respondents were
20.6 percentage points more likely (95% CI: 12.6, 28.0) to vote for that party when answering that they
expected to benefit from the example good. Sub-setting instead to the reverse condition (T = 0), I similarly
find that respondents are 20.7 percentage points more likely (95% CI: 11.5, 31.0) to report cross-ethnic
voting for the non-co-ethnic party when expecting that it would benefit them instead.
Not only are expectations in the experiment correlated with ethnic voting, but the treatment effects vary
across neighborhoods in patterns consistent with the theory and the results for vote choice. I discuss the
results for the experimental questions about club goods and private goods separately. For club goods, I find
36Multiple examples were used to average over idiosyncratic features of any specific good. They are: loans, job training, or financial
assistance for private goods; school construction, water pipes, or drains and public toilets for club goods. All six are among the
most common goods respondents reported politicians delivering in their areas in open-response questions.
37To address the risk that respondents would answer more favorably about preferred parties simply as an expression of partisanship
(Carlson 2015b), prompts began with discussion of scarcity to decouple answers about the specific example from judgments of
a party overall. Respondents were willing to admit they would not receive goods from a favored party: 50% of NDC voters and
52% of NPP voters said they would not benefit from the good from their party. Example wording: “The national government has
limited resources, so when they do something like [EXAMPLE], they can’t do it everywhere. They have to do it in some places
first before going to other places. If the NDC government was [EXAMPLE], do you think that neighborhoods like this would get
it or would they do it more in other places? I’m asking for your personal opinion." See the Appendix for full wording.
38T = 1 for Akans asked about the NPP and Ewes, Northerners, and Gas asked about the NDC. Balance statistics are in the
Appendix.
39Favoritism expectations are also positive and significant for the club and private goods separately.
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that the co-ethnic party treatment effect for club goods is smaller at higher levels of neighborhood diversity.
Panel (a) of Figure 5.4 shows the expected difference in club goods from a co-ethnic versus non-co-ethnic
party declines as local diversity increases, consistent with voters expecting no difference in the club goods









































































































(b) Private Goods Expectations


















Figure 5.4: First differences for the co-ethnic party treatment effect for questions about: (a) club goods
expectations, by ethnic fractionalization; and (b) private goods expectations, by percentage of population
in the local neighborhood from ethnic groups affiliated with the respondent’s co-ethnic party. Both panels
include 95% confidence intervals. See Appendix for table.
Also as in Figure 5.1, respondents are more likely to expect club goods from the party not affiliated with
their ethnic group when surrounded by more co-ethnics of that party.40 Restricting to non-Gas for compara-
bility to Figure 5.3, I reclassify the treatment effect as the difference between the NDC and NPP cues for club
goods and interact an indicator for the NDC treatment with the population share of each ethnic group in the
area. I estimate these models for all neighborhoods, as well as after splitting the sample by the mean value
of the neighborhood wealth index (-0.1), to test the double interaction between neighborhood composition,
wealth, and the NDC treatment (see Appendix). Moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of the Akan per-
centage in areas with above average wealth results in a predicted 26.4 point increase in expected favoritism
40This only holds in wealthier areas, but this is where club goods expectations are most important for vote choice under the theory.
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for club goods from the Akan-affiliated NPP over the NDC (p = 0.08, 90% CI: -49.8, -2.2), regardless of
each respondent’s own ethnicity. Similarly, moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of Northern popula-
tion in neighborhoods with above average wealth results in a 31 percentage point shift in expectations of
favoritism for club goods towards the Northern-affiliated NDC (95% CI: 2.8, 62.5).41 Also mirroring Figure
5.3, expectations about club goods do not vary across the share of Gas in the neighborhood.42
Results of the survey experiment for private goods are also consistent with the theory. This is shown
in two ways. First, I find that respondents’ expectations about private goods in the survey experiment
only correlate with their support for ethnically-affiliated parties in poorer neighborhoods where respondents
report that private goods distribution actually happens (see Appendix). This is consistent with private goods
expectations primarily influencing ethnic voting in poor neighborhoods, as predicted in Figure 5.1, but not
in wealthier neighborhoods, where these goods are rarely distributed (as shown in Chapter 4).43
Second, in the theory above I argue that voters may be particularly likely to benefit from private goods
distribution from their ethnically-affiliated party when they live in a poor neighborhood in which they are
in the local ethnic minority. As one of the few co-ethnics of the government living in these neighborhoods,
minority group voters may be first in line in these areas to benefit from private goods that their co-ethnic
party gains control over if it wins the election. Consistent with this argument, in Panel (b) of Figure 5.4 I
interact the co-ethnic party treatment in the experiment with the percentage of residents in the respondent’s
neighborhood from ethnic groups affiliated with the respondent’s co-ethnic party. I show that expectations
of ethnic favoritism in the distribution of private goods are largest in neighborhoods where respondents are
in the local minority. This means, for example, that Akan voters particularly expect to benefit from private
goods from the NPP instead of the NDC when living in poor neighborhoods with few other Akans. As
discussed above, this can explain why there is still significant ethnic voting in poor neighborhoods even
when voters are in the local ethnic minority.44
41The combined Ewe and Northern percentage variable does not significantly predict differences in the NDC treatment effect,
however, although the interaction is still signed in the expected direction.
42Expectations for Ga respondents alone also match the results for vote choice, consistent with the unique position of Gas (see
Appendix).
43In wealthier neighborhoods, the survey experiment asks a question about who respondents think would benefit from hypothetical
private goods distribution that rarely occurs in practice.
44Figure 5.1 suggests that voters should have expectations of ethnic favoritism in private goods distribution in poor neighborhoods
at all levels of ethnic fractionalization (all columns of Figure 5.1). Consistent with this prediction, I also find that expectations of
favoritism about private goods in the survey experiment are constant across levels of neighborhood fractionalization.
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5.5.3 Polling Station Results
Official polling station returns similarly suggest that there is less ethnic voting in more diverse neighbor-
hoods. This is even though analysis of polling station results is constrained by data limitations and rests
on ecological inferences that less accurately capture individual behavior than survey data. Voters in urban
Greater Accra cast ballots at 2090 and 3654 polling stations in the 2008 and 2012 elections, respectively.
Because there is no official map of locations, research assistants physically located a random sample of
37.8% of polling stations for 2008 and 37.3% for 2012. In addition, because of missing data, it is only
possible to analyze voting at 19 constituencies in 2008 and 17 constituencies in 2012.45 I am thus only able
to analyze the relationship between neighborhoods and voting at 587 and 650 polling stations in 2008 and
2012, respectively.46
To approximate catchment areas for each station, I calculate the weighted population share from each
ethnic group in the 500m radius around it. I then measure characteristics of the broader neighborhood around
those voters as the same characteristics in a 2km radius. With NDC presidential vote share as the outcome in
a series of OLS regressions, I examine how the correlation between a station’s results and the composition
of its electorate (the smaller radius) varies with ethnic diversity in the area around the polling station (the
larger radius).47 I combine the 2008 and 2012 results, including constituency-year fixed effects.
Consistent with an overall pattern of ethnic voting, I find that the Akan proportion of the population
at each polling station predicts greater NPP vote share and the Ewe, Ga, and Northern proportions predict
greater NDC vote share (see Appendix for table). And consistent with less ethnic voting in more diverse
areas, I then find that the correlation between the Akan population at the polling station and NDC vote share
significantly weakens in the most diverse areas. Similarly, I find a significantly weaker correlation between
the Northern population and NDC vote share in more diverse areas (see Appendix). I also show that the
45While all 2008 election results are available, results for 7 of the 28 urban constituencies are missing in official 2012 polling station
results. In addition, digitized boundaries for census enumeration areas in 4 other constituencies in 2012 (3 constituencies in 2008)
have not been produced by the Ghana Statistical Service.
46These are at 492 and 342 unique locations for 2008 and 2012. I aggregate to a single observation per location. Results in this
subset are similar to the full results (see Appendix).
47I do not test the second prediction of cross-ethnic voting for the party affiliated with the largest nearby group. There is significant
imprecision defining catchment areas for urban polling stations. Without a catchment area map (none exists), it is unclear whether
any correlation between vote share and the population of an ethnic group around the station (larger radius), controlling for that
group’s population at the station (smaller radius), is evidence of a neighborhood effect of living near more people from that group
or instead evidence that some of the people slightly outside the smaller radius also vote at the polling station.
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correlation between Ga population percentage and NDC vote share reduces at higher levels of diversity
(although p = .16 on this last interaction, see Appendix).48
5.6 Alternative Explanations
Because neighborhoods are not randomly assigned, the selection, or sorting, process of voters into neighbor-
hoods may confound any correlation between neighborhoods and vote choice. And even if these correlations
are real, a different mechanism, such as cross-ethnic socialization, may be operating. I find little support for
either alternative, however. Importantly, each of these alternative explanations – sorting and contact – likely
operates as much in poor areas of the city as in middle or upper class areas.49 This is inconsistent with the
interaction terms above between neighborhood ethnic composition and wealth; if the correlation between
ethnic context and voting was driven by sorting or social contact, the correlation should be at least as strong
in poor as in wealthier areas.
5.6.1 Endogenous Sorting
Two different types of sorting could confound the results. First, voters could have explicitly selected into
neighborhoods on the basis of partisanship, choosing locations in a way that creates a spurious correlation
between neighborhoods and voting. Second, voters may have implicitly sorted if their ability to choose
locations was constrained by individual characteristics, such as ties to their ethnic groups, which also affect
vote choice.
In the first type of sorting, Akans who support the NDC could be more likely to move to non-Akan
neighborhoods than Akans who support the NPP. Respondents were asked open-ended questions about
how they came to live in their current homes. But zero respondents listed partisanship as a motivation for
choosing their residential location.50 Greater Accra suffers from a severe housing shortage (see Chapter 2),
48In a second series of models, I test the double interaction between ethnic composition, neighborhood wealth, and ethnic diversity,
to see if there evidence of less ethnic voting in less diverse areas primarily when they are wealthy, as predicted above. The
coefficients on the double interaction are not significant for any of the four ethnic groups, although the interaction terms for the
Akan, Ewe, and Northern percentages are signed in the predicted directions.
49There is little reason respondents would sort based on partisanship in wealthy neighborhoods but not also in poor neighborhoods.
And there is likely more direct interaction among neighbors in dense slums than wealthy neighborhoods with private, single
family homes.
5010.8% of survey respondents listed access to club goods and public services among their reasons for choosing a neighborhood.
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with high rents relative to income, and real estate markets are informal, with high transaction and search
costs to re-location (Ardayfio-Schandorf et al. 2012, Arku et al. 2012). Residents face a limited menu of
neighborhood options, constraining the extent to which they can explicitly sort based on non-economic
factors like partisanship.51 Moreover, if this type of sorting is a confounder, there should be a correlation
between having moved (and thus actively chosen a neighborhood) and vote choice. But re-estimating Table
A.12 including an indicator for whether a respondent moved shows no correlation between moving and
ethnic voting (see Appendix).
But some respondents are better able to sort than others. As in Hopkins & Williamson (2012), I identify
respondents most likely to have been able to sort on non-price factors if they had wanted. Respondents were
asked if they had considered living in other neighborhoods when searching for a home, or only considered
one community. Overall, 20.3% overall reported searching in multiple neighborhoods, which indicates hav-
ing chosen a neighborhood among alternatives. But there are no differences in the results when controlling
for this and explicitly choosing neighborhoods is not correlated with ethnic voting (see Appendix). Wealth
is also a key determinant of the ability to explicitly chose neighborhoods. All analyses above already control
for measures of wealth, employment, and education. I also drop the top 25% of the sample on the wealth or
education/employment indices, removing those likely to have had the widest range of neighborhood choices.
Results remain the same (see Appendix).
That many residents are constrained, however, raises concern over the second type of sorting. By far
the most common means respondents reported finding housing was through family members or co-ethnics;
75% of respondents came to their current locations to join family or people from their home town or ethnic
group. This would account for the results if voters with closer ties to their ethnic group, or for whom ethnic
identity is more salient, are both more likely to find housing where more family and co-ethnics live, and also
more likely to vote for their ethnically-aligned party. But respondents who found their homes through these
ties are not actually more likely to live in less diverse areas, inconsistent with this being a confounder. All
models already control for whether respondents moved for these reasons and this does not predict voting
But the main results hold when either controlling for this or dropping these respondents entirely (see Appendix).
51Ghanaian landlords typically require two years rent in advance and tenants have little recourse to reclaim it upon moving, further
constraining sorting (Arku et al. 2012). Even in the United States, where residential mobility is substantially easier, practical
concerns over neighborhood quality, commuting, and housing costs have been shown to trump preferences for living near co-
partisans (Nall & Mummolo 2013). Abrams & Fiorina (2012) also shows that there is not strong evidence of large-scale partisan
residential sorting in the US.
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(Table A.12). In addition, all results already control for the individual salience of ethnicity (Eifert et al. 2010)
and it also does not predict voting behavior (Table A.12).
The results may also be due to ties to rural areas.52 Earlier literature attributes the politicization of
ethnicity in urban areas to a struggle among rural-urban migrants to capture wealth and target it back to rural
homelands (Ekeh 1975, Gugler & Flanagan 1978, Bates 1983). This would explain the results if respondents
in neighborhoods with larger populations from their own ethnic groups are more likely to have these rural
ties, and vote for co-ethnic parties because of them. I control for ties to rural areas in three ways. First, results
in Table A.12 are robust to controlling for whether respondents regularly visit home regions outside Accra.53
Respondents were also asked if they prefer that the government focus more resources on the community
where they live now or the community “they hail from." Controlling for whether respondents prefer that
state resources be targeted outside Greater Accra does not change the findings and is not correlated with
ethnic voting. I also control for the percent of each respondent’s life lived in Greater Accra, as a measure of
recency of rural-urban migration, and find no differences.
5.6.2 Socialization and Contact
A different mechanism could also explain the results. Voters in more diverse neighborhoods will have more
socialization with other ethnic groups. This could explain the results if these voters develop more positive
views about other groups and become more likely to vote for parties affiliated with them.54 The most direct
form of cross-ethnic contact is when voters have family members or share their homes with people from
other ethnic groups. The survey recorded the ethnicity of the other people in each respondent’s household;
24.5% of respondents live with family or other household members from a group aligned with their non-co-
ethnic party. Re-estimating Figures 5.2 and 5.3 controlling for this returns substantively identical results,
however, and this does not predict vote choice (see Appendix). Among respondents with the most contact
with other ethnic groups, the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and voting is unchanged.
In addition, a socialization mechanism would explain the results if the neighborhood variables used here
are proxies for voters’ social ties. But these variables are likely poor measures of social networks. All
52The majority (55%) of respondents in the survey were born in Greater Accra and are not migrants.
53This is also robust to controlling for remittances sent outside Greater Accra. Neither variable predicts vote choice.
54Kasara (2013) shows how inter-ethnic contact affects trust in other groups in Kenya. Ichino & Nathan (2013) finds no correlation
between these same attitudes and vote choice in Ghana, however.
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urban residents likely have regular interactions with people from other groups, regardless of the specific
composition of the area within 500 meters of their homes. This is especially the case for the 36% of
respondents who commute to a different neighborhood. For those spending much of their time away from
home, a variable measuring the ethnic composition of the area directly around their home is least likely
to accurately measure their social network. If the results are only due to social ties, correlations between
neighborhood characteristics and voting should be significantly weaker for these respondents. I repeat the
analysis interacting an indicator variable for those respondents who commute to work elsewhere with the
neighborhood characteristics variables (see Appendix). I find no significant interactions – among those who
do commute, correlations between neighborhood characteristics and voting behavior are the same as for
those who do not, suggesting that differences in social ties are unlikely to explain the results.
5.7 Conclusion
Modernization accounts predict that African democracies will transition away from ethnic competition as
they continue to urbanize. But rather than uniformly less ethnic voting in urban areas, I find significant
within-urban variation in ethnic voting. This is not explained by the mechanisms expected by modernization
theories: differences in voters’ wealth, education, or social identification. Instead, this variation is due to
differences in voters’ instrumental expectations of the resources they will receive in different places within
the same city. Ethnic voting in many urban neighborhoods areas is strengthened by patronage distribution
that breeds on shortcomings in service provision that characterize many African cities.
While I can only examine a single city, focusing on Greater Accra allows me to study the relationship
between highly localized neighborhood characteristics and voting using census data at a level of detail not
available for most other African cities. As highlighted in the discussion of external validity in Chapter 1, I
expect similar results to hold elsewhere as long as three underlying assumptions hold. First, there is variation
in neighborhood diversity and wealth within cities. Second, ethnicity is politicized in the party system and
there is ethnic targeting of state resources, as in many African counties. And third, ethnic cleavages are
not so ossified by violence or inequality (e.g., as along racial lines in South Africa) that it is implausible to
benefit from club goods targeted to a nearby group.
Ultimately, these results suggest that rather than consistently reducing ethnic political competition, urban
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growth may be pulling ethnic politics in two directions at once. Even as urbanization creates more diverse,
middle and upper class neighborhoods, where I find the connection between ethnicity and vote choice is
fraying, urbanization also means the rapid expansion of slums (UN-Habitat 2010), where incentives for eth-
nic voting are being reinforced. Ethnic voting also remains common in ethnically segregated neighborhoods,
even when they are wealthy. We cannot point to the wealthy, diverse neighborhoods alone and claim that
modernization theory’s predictions are being borne out, while ignoring the remainder of these cities. As
urban slums grow and ethnic segregation persists, political dynamics in the neighborhoods with significant
ethnic voting are just as much outcomes of urbanization as in the neighborhoods without it. Accounts of
the political effects of urbanization must recognize that these realities can co-exist next to each other in the
same city at the same time.
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6 | Capture and its Consequences in Local Governments
6.1 Introduction
The previous three chapters have focused on national-level electoral competition in urban areas, examining
the distributive decisions of the major parties alongside turnout and voting behavior in presidential elec-
tions. But many of the same patterns found in Chapters 3-5 are apparent in local government elections in
Greater Accra as well, with neighborhood-level variation in political participation, patronage distribution to
politicians’ co-ethnics, and ethnic voting. These outcomes each also have significant effects on the quality
of democratic accountability in the city’s municipal governments.
Chapter 3 finds that voters in the urban middle class who do not want particularistic goods from politi-
cians that can be targeted as patronage are less likely to turn out to vote or to participate in other forms
of political life. The effects of low participation by policy-motivated and middle class voters may be most
observable in elections for urban municipal governments. Successful candidates need only cater to the par-
ticularistic needs of narrow groups of poor voters to win local elections. Candidates from ethnic groups that
have more at stake in winning local power and can draw on pre-existing social networks to mobilize support
can dominate municipal elections, even if they only comprise a minority of the population. These groups
can then steer a disproportionate share of local government resources to themselves, resulting in widespread
dissatisfaction with local government performance – among poor, middle class, and wealthy voters alike.
Local elections in Ghana are held separately from presidential and parliamentary elections, with voters
selecting representatives from single member wards to serve on “district assemblies," equivalent to city
councils. These wards, called “Electoral Areas" (ELAs), have an average of 14,200 residents in the urban
districts of Greater Accra. ELAs usually cover several neighborhoods of the city. Assembly members
become official leaders for these communities and can provide particularistic goods to constituents, often
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targeted in practice as political patronage. Voters who instead prefer universalistic public policies, especially
those who can privately provide basic public services to themselves, are unlikely to see these local assembly
members as useful sources of support and are less likely to vote in local elections.
I examine the determinants and effects of participation in local elections by combining results from the
2010 local government elections and survey data on the performance of assembly members and the distribu-
tion of several local public goods in Greater Accra. I find that turnout in assembly elections is 50% lower in
urban than rural areas of Ghana, and is especially low in urban neighborhoods where more middle and upper
class residents live. This is consistent with lower turnout in areas where fewer voters want the particularistic
benefits that local politicians can provide. But turnout in local elections is higher in urban strongholds of the
ruling party, where voters can expect more patronage benefits from municipal governments. And while they
are partially empowered by the appointment decisions of the national government, I show that low turnout
in local elections helps the Ga ethnic group control municipal governments in Greater Accra; this minority
group can better mobilize supporters both by drawing on pre-existing networks that other ethnic groups in
the city lack and by playing on a sense of threat about the group’s diminishing position within the city.
Ga candidates are significantly more likely to win assembly seats in wards with lower turnout, allowing an
ethnic group with one quarter of the metropolitan area’s population to hold half of local government seats.
Overrepresentation of this ethnic minority reduces approval of local government performance. Ga res-
idents are significantly more likely to see their local assembly member as helpful than other residents. But
in general, the city’s residents disapprove of the performance of Ga assembly members compared to local
representatives of other ethnicities. I find that this is especially the case when survey respondents live in
ethnically segregated wards where assembly members can target resources to small geographic areas where
Gas are concentrated while ignoring surrounding communities.1 By contrast, when survey respondents live
in wards with high turnout, they are substantially more likely to have positive experiences with their assem-
bly members, consistent with these representatives facing greater pressure to serve their constituents and
deliver services where more voters participate in local elections. Finally, data on the distribution of new
schools, roads, and streetlights within Greater Accra suggests that Ga overrepresentation in district govern-
ments leads to favoritism to Ga neighborhoods in the distribution of some locally controlled club goods,
1This is consistent with recent research suggesting that local public goods in Africa are particularly likely to be targeted to areas
where a politician’s co-ethnics are spatially segregated from other groups (Ejdemyr et al. 2015).
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while other goods are instead targeted to ruling party strongholds in the city.
This chapter provides further evidence for the relationship between class differences in political par-
ticipation and the persistence of patronage-based politics discussed in Chapter 3; despite a large mid-
dle class in Greater Accra, I show that municipal politics remains centered on the targeted distribution
of particularistic goods, in contrast to evidence from Latin American cities suggesting that local gov-
ernments will forego clientelism in municipalities with relatively large middle class populations (Weitz-
Shapiro 2012, Luna 2014).
But these findings also have broader implications for understanding the effects of decentralization in
Africa. District governments in Greater Accra were created through a decentralization process in the late
1980s similar to the widespread decentralization reforms seen elsewhere in Africa and the developing world
in recent decades (Bardhan 2002, Grossman & Lewis 2014).2 While proponents view decentralization as a
means to improve local accountability by “bringing government closer to the people," the capture of local
governments by local elites, who siphon off resources either as private rents or as selective benefits for a
subset of residents, has been a persistent problem stymying decentralization reforms (Olowu & Wunsch
2004, Reinikka & Svensson 2004, Bardhan & Mookherjee 2006). Along these lines, national governments
are believed to create new local government units, like those in Greater Accra, as a form of patronage
to the local majority ethnic groups that national leaders expect will be able to capture and control local
governments (Green 2010, Hassan 2014). But I suggest that because of low turnout, local governments can
be dominated even by local minority groups. Moreover, I show that capture by narrow ethnic interests occurs
even in the most cosmopolitan urban areas and is not exclusively a phenomenon of the rural countryside in
Africa (Boone 2003a, 2003b). This occurs where economic development and the growth of the middle
class has been the strongest and the overall social power of traditional elites is lowest, not only in rural
communities dominated by a traditional elite (e.g., Acemoglu et al 2013).
2Decentralization reforms in other African countries have sometimes devolved greater powers to local governments than in Ghana,
however (Olowu & Wunsch 2004). Ghanaian districts are still headed by national government appointees and depend on the
national government for much of their budget (Section 3 below).
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6.2 Turnout, Capture, and Service Delivery
Much of the variation in turnout in these local elections, both across and within districts, can be explained
with a simple assumption: those who have the most to gain (or lose) from the selection of municipal level
officials will turn out to vote and those who have less at stake will not. Past research on Ghana has attributed
low turnout and apathy in local elections to voters’ beliefs that under-funded district governments will not
be able to deliver the resources that voters want (Ayee 1996, Crook 1999, Wunsch 2001). But the extent to
which voters stand to gain from the local government is not uniform within administrative districts.
Voters who do not want the particularistic goods that district officials can actually provide, or do not
believe that they will ever get what they want from these officials, have weaker incentives to turn out than
poorer voters who have more immediate needs for basic services. Local elected officials are often explicitly
constrained to only being able to provide basic constituent services to voters; as described below, district-
level governments in Ghana, and much of Africa overall, cannot create their own legislation or initiate major
public policies without action from the national government (Olowu & Wunsch 2004). Local-level elected
officials may face similar credibility problems to those discussed for higher-level politicians in Chapter 3
when campaigning instead on policy promises (Keefer & Vlaicu 2007).3 They may see middle and upper
class voters who do not demand particularistic benefits as especially hard to convince and be unlikely to
try to mobilize support among these voters to begin with (similar to the evidence in Chapter 3). For each
of these reasons, there should be lower turnout in local elections in middle class as opposed to poor areas
within each district. There should also be lower turnout in urban areas overall, with middle class voters
concentrated in cities.
In addition, members of the ruling party and voters living in local strongholds of the ruling party within
each district should be more likely to turn out in local elections. Local governments in many African coun-
tries are closely tied to the national government; the president appoints leaders of district governments and
3Even if a policy area is largely within the administrative purview of the local government, promises to implement that policy will
still be necessarily more difficult for individual candidates in local government elections to commit to; implementation requires
coordination with multiple other local politicians (such as the mayor; a national government appointee in many countries, including
in Ghana, Kenya, and elsewhere) and often with other branches of local government (such as the district offices of national
ministries; i.e., ministry of health, education, etc.) that face different political incentives and may not support the proposed policy
change. Basic particularistic goods can be provided more immediately and directly by individual local politicians, and more
credibly promised to voters. In Chapter 7, I consider how these turnout incentives would change if significantly more policy-
making power were devolved to local governments.
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national government transfers fund the local budget (Wunsch 2001). In political systems where many voters
have significant expectations of ethnic or partisan favoritism in the distribution of state resources (e.g., Pos-
ner 2005, Franck and Rainer 2012),4 ruling party members and residents in ruling party strongholds within
districts likely expect to be the greatest recipients of resources from local governments. Successful candi-
dates for councilor positions in ruling party strongholds within each district can be expected to have signif-
icantly more power to make distributive decisions than those in opposition party wards. A local election in
ruling party areas within districts is thus more likely to have real distributive consequences, affecting which
voters within that jurisdiction benefit most from local spending. But in opposition wards within districts,
voters should expect few resources regardless of which candidate wins the local election because few re-
sources are expected to be approved for the area by the mayor in the first place. As a result, there should be
higher turnout in ruling party stronghold neighborhoods within each district.
But where few voters turn out, the candidates most likely to win local elections will be those who can
draw upon pre-existing networks to mobilize their supporters to participate at higher rates than other voters.
In general, these could be candidates from any local interest group that has a dense degree of local organi-
zation that gives it an advantage in the clientelistic mobilization of poor voters. In addition to ethnic groups,
this could be candidates from a powerful union, trade association, or local party machine.5 Moreover, can-
didates from such a group will be advantaged if they can supplement regular campaign mobilization tactics
by turning out members by appealing to a shared grievance or sense of threat, especially if the group’s fa-
vored position in the local power structure is threatened by demographic changes.6 Candidates from other
groups, lacking such a mobilizing issue, can only rely on traditional electoral inducements to turn out their
supporters (e.g., Nichter 2008), raising the costs of a successful campaign.
More specifically, in contexts where ethnic voting is common, candidates from ethnic groups with the
highest levels of local social organization and the most at stake in winning local power will have these
advantages in local elections. This is especially for indigenous urban ethnic groups in African cities. As
4See Chapter 5 for data on expectations of favoritism in urban Ghana.
5Anzia (2011, 2012) makes a closely related argument to explain outcomes in off-cycle local elections in the US, where turnout is
often similarly low. Teachers unions – a local interest group with advantages in mobilizing turnout among its supporters compared
to other voters – are able to dominate low turnout school board elections and then use their ability to capture school board seats to
enact more favorable policies for union members.
6More generally, the use of “ethnic threat" as a mobilizing issue for local minority groups fearing the loss of local political power
has been observed far beyond the African context, such as among white voters in the US (e.g., Key 1949, Hopkins 2010).
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urban areas expand and new residents migrate into cities, the original ethnic groups residing in an urban
area may be united by a sense of threat about losing control of a city that has traditionally been theirs.
These indigenous groups may find themselves economically disadvantaged relative to new urban residents
and pushed out of traditional settlements by developers and governments. This can create a shared sense of
grievance among these groups that local candidates can also play on to mobilize voters in local elections.
Long-settled ethnic groups are also likely to have the highest levels of traditional social organization, with
active traditional leaders and social ties within the group that candidates can draw upon in campaigns,
including as a means to distribute patronage. But, as described in the preceding chapters, these traditional
networks are usually weaker among ethnic groups originating outside the city. For each of these reasons,
indigenous urban ethnic groups – or other interest groups with a grievance motivating local participation and
dense local social networks that candidates can draw on – can win a disproportionate share of local power,
especially if much of the remaining population refrains from voting.7
In addition to capture by these groups, low turnout also alters the incentives of elected local represen-
tatives to provide services to their constituents. Where turnout is low, winning candidates in local elections
can win with very small bases of support. Elected officials can maintain their power by providing particular-
istic goods only to narrow sets of supporters, while consuming the remaining local government resources as
rents. But where turnout is higher, local officials need to build significantly larger winning coalitions, dis-
tributing constituent services to a larger number of voters. In higher turnout areas, the quality of residents’
interactions with their local elected officials may improve, as local residents receive better service provision
from municipal representatives.8
7Similarly, Hajnal & Trounstine (2005) show that low turnout in local elections in large US cities leads to the systematic un-
derrepresentation of Latino and Asian-American politicians relative to white and African-Americans politicians on city councils
and in mayoral races. This can be explained in part by similar differences in degrees of mobilization and pre-existing political
organization between newly arriving immigrant communities and longer settled ethnic groups.
8This can clearly be circular: in areas where more responsive services are provided, residents may be more invested in the local
government system and turnout at higher rates, which in turn will lead local officials to provide more responsive services.
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6.3 Local Government in Greater Accra
6.3.1 The Ga Ethnic Group
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Ga have become a minority in their own city. As of 2010, the Greater Accra
metropolitan area was 27% Ga, with the remaining population 40% Akan, 20% Ewe, and 13% primarily
from northern, Muslim ethnic groups. Accra itself was only 23% Ga in 2010. Despite this influx of new eth-
nic groups, Greater Accra still has segregated Ga neighborhoods in locations of the original Ga settlements
described in Chapter 2, such as Ga Mashie, La, Osu, Teshie, and Nungua. But many of these neighborhoods
have become economically marginalized (Ardayfio-Schandorf et al. 2012), with some of the most concen-
trated poverty in the city (Weeks et al. 2006). Despite this, Gas still maintain a favored position in the politics
of the city, despite their increasing economic marginalization. Leaders from the major political parties in
Greater Accra, especially the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), are drawn heavily from the Ga
community. In addition, 13 of the 19 District Chief Executives who have been appointed to lead the urban
districts of Greater Accra since the NDC came to power in 2009 have been Gas.9 Gas won half of the 28
urban parliamentary seats in 2012.
The Ga community is well poised to take advantage of low participation rates by other voters in local
elections. As they increasingly become a minority in a territory that they have traditionally controlled, Ga
elites can mobilize Ga voters by appealing to a shared sense of threat about the group’s declining status and
the need to maintain its favored position in local politics. Paller (2015) describes how Ga political opinion is
shaped by this sense of threat, which Ga political elites can play up to mobilize votes. He writes, “Residents
of indigenous settlements [in Accra] fear that they are losing control of their city to outsiders or migrants...
To bolster their own personal agenda, political entrepreneurs instigate this fear by taking advantage of their
constituents’ sense of insecurity" (19). In reaching out to voters by playing to this sense of threat, local
Ga politicians can use traditional ethnic social institutions (chiefs, family heads, etc) to mobilize support
9While DCEs are directly appointed by the president, they are subject to confirmation votes by elected assembly members, which
they do not always pass. When the opposition NPP was last in power it also favored Gas in the appointments of DCEs, even though
the NDC draws significantly more electoral support from the Ga (see Chapter 5). Four of the eight DCEs serving in these same
districts in the second term (2005-2009) of NPP president John Kufuor were Ga (the number of districts increased since then).
The other four were Akans, the ethnic group closely affiliated with the NPP. By contrast, only one of the NDC’s 19 DCEs in the
metropolitan area since 2009 has been Akan.
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that other groups of voters lack within the city.10 For example, Paller (2014) documents the use of Ga social
networks to mobilize support for a Ga parliamentary candidate in the Ga Mashie neighborhood of the Accra,
showing how the candidate successfully drew on his familial ties to Ga leaders in the community to build
a clientelistic network of support. This included ties to leaders from traditional lineage (clan) heads, who
still hold significant sway in local affairs, to pastors in Ga churches. The ability to draw on similar networks
gives Ga candidates an advantage in local electoral mobilization that candidates from other ethnic groups
lack.
6.3.2 The District Assembly System in Practice
Ghana is now divided into 216 administrative districts (also see Chapter 2). There are 16 districts in the
Greater Accra Region, 12 of which cover the metropolitan area.11 The Accra Metropolitan Assembly
(AMA) is the district government of the city of Accra, covering the original city and central business dis-
tricts.12 Each district is headed by the DCE (or MCE), equivalent to a mayor, who is appointed directly
by the president and is a member of the national ruling party (currently the NDC).13 Below the DCE there
is a local legislative body equivalent to a city council called the District Assembly, for which 30% of the
members in each district are appointed by the national ruling party and the additional 70% are elected from
single member wards called Electoral Areas (ELAs). Assembly members are elected to four year terms,
off cycle from the presidential and parliamentary elections, with the most recent election held in December
2010.14 There are currently 255 ELAs in the 12 urban districts in Greater Accra.
Assembly members are meant to serve as the official leaders of their communities, provide basic con-
stituent services for residents, and advocate for funding for these communities with higher levels of gov-
10Traditional leaders from other ethnic groups are instead active in the homelands of these groups elsewhere in Ghana.
1146 new districts were created before the 2012 presidential election, subdividing the previous 170 districts. As of 2010, there
were 11 districts in the Greater Accra Region, with 9 covering the metropolitan area. The current 12 urban districts are further
subdivided into 29 parliamentary constituencies (22 as of the 2008 election). Note that one of these parliamentary constituencies,
Amasaman, is still predominately rural, although the other half (Trobu) of its parent district, Ga West, is urbanized.
12Because it is so large, the AMA is further sub-divided into sub-districts called “sub-metropolitan assemblies." Some administrative
functions are further devolved to this level.
13District Chief Executives are instead called Municipal or Metropolitan Chief Executives (MCE) in larger districts, but these terms
are often used interchangeably in practice.
14The next assembly elections have been delayed indefinitely because of an on-going legal dispute involving the Electoral Com-
mission.
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ernment, including the DCE (or mayor). The appointed DCE is also subject to a confirmation vote from
the assembly members, and these appointments are sometimes rejected, as happened twice in the Adenta
District in Greater Accra in 2013. In theory, the district assembly votes on budgetary allocations within each
district, and elected assembly members are supposed to provide additional oversight over local spending by
participating on various sub-committees of the assembly, such as the public works or urban roads commit-
tees. The main sources of funding for the district governments include the District Assemblies Common
Fund, a formula-based allocation from the national government that funds each district (Banful 2008), as
well as locally collected taxes.15 Part of the district budget is set aside for each elected assembly member
as an annual “Electoral Area Fund," a discretionary amount for projects each assembly member can fund in
her ELA.16
Policy platforms are absent from campaigns for district assembly seats. Instead, candidates focus on
promises to on deliver particularistic goods and basic constituent services. In interviews, assembly members
describe distributing private goods to individual voters as their main activity, both once in office and as part
of their campaigns. This includes everything from money and food, to longer term support with health
expenses and health insurance fees, school tuition, and rent payments. As one assembly member described,
he pays “money, school fees, rent, whatever... Every weekend people come for funeral donations, and you
have to do it."17 Another assembly member said, “They ask for hospital money. If there is a dowry or
engagement or marriage, if you don’t go and donate they say ‘it’s a bad assemblyman.’... There are some
areas we cannot walk out in that area, because they will ask you for money... If you don’t [give], it means
you’re not a good assembly member and then they go after you."18 A third assemblyman described the
clientelistic benefits of these payments. After paying school tuition for teenage boys in his neighborhood,
“they have completed and now they are loyal to me, they respect me," and help him with political party
15The national government and Members of Parliament both also control separate streams of financing for local public spending.
For example, funding for school construction often comes through the national Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFUND), which
is led by national appointees of the ruling party. Separately, MPs control a discretionary common fund, roughly US$30,000 in
recent years, to distribute independently of the national and local governments (Lindberg 2010). As a result, decisions made by
the district assemblies only account for part of the total goods distribution occurring in the urban area.
16Members of the AMA report that this fund has been roughly US$5000 per year in recent years.
17Interview with assembly member and NDC executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 27 February 2014.
18Interview with assembly member, Ayawaso Central constituency (AMA), 27 August 2013.
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activities in the area.19
Assembly members also use their Electoral Area Fund to provide local public goods to their ELAs. This
discretionary fund is small, but supports projects such as new streetlights, digging new drainage gutters and
sewers, and providing better waste dumps. For larger projects, such as building a road, school, or mar-
ket, assembly members must obtain approval from the full assembly and DCE, or instead secure financing
independently from the Member of Parliament or a national government ministry.
ELAs in Greater Accra had an average of 14,200 residents as of the 2010 census, ranging from less
than 2,000 to more than 60,000 residents. Many wards comprise multiple neighborhoods, and current as-
sembly members were open in interviews about concentrating their efforts on the subset of neighborhoods
within their ELA where their supporters live. For example, an assembly member in the Okaikwei Central
constituency in the AMA described providing a series of goods to the slum where he lived, including a new
drainage system, Islamic primary school, and market building, while not securing resources in a middle class
residential neighborhood that made up the other half of his ELA.20 But in a neighboring ELA, the pattern
reversed: the assembly woman described providing most of her resources in the middle class neighborhood
where she and her supporters lived, while ignoring the slum community in her ward.21 When an assembly
member’s supporters are clustered in one part of an ELA, other neighborhoods may be disadvantaged in the
distribution of resources from the local government.
Assembly elections are officially non-partisan and it is illegal for candidates to campaign as members of
a party (Crook 1999). But partisan politics play a significant role in practice. Almost all assembly members
are affiliated with one of the two major parties – the NDC or opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) – and
many simultaneously hold local executive positions in their party. Candidates openly flout the law and
campaign as members of a party.22 Sitting members in many districts hold party caucus meetings to decide
on strategy before assembly meetings.23 But nominations are open, with no partisan candidate selection.
19Interview with assembly member and NDC executive, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 23 July 2012.
20Interview with assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 25 February 2014.
21“Before, all the development was concentrated on [the slum area]. They got roads in [the slum area] before I was elected... So
I’m trying to bring more development to my area," she argued. Interview with assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency
(AMA), 12 March 2014.
22Interview with assembly member and NDC executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 27 February 2014.
23Interview with assembly member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 11 March 2014.
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Many races become intra-party contests; the average assembly election in urban Greater Accra in 2010 had
3.5 candidates, with as many as 9 in one ELA.
The partisan nature of the assemblies gives the DCE discretion to direct local spending in line with the
political priorities of the ruling party. In combination with the elected members, the 30% of members who
are appointed to each assembly give the national ruling party a majority in nearly every district, allowing
the DCE to dominate disbursement decisions.24 In interviews, NPP assembly members repeatedly discussed
howNDCDCEs in Greater Accra steer more of the district budget to favored ELAs. While many of the NDC
assembly members interviewed denied favoritism by current district governments, they leveled identical
accusations for the period when the NPP was last in power (2001-2008).
For example, one NPP assembly member described how requests for funding for projects in her area
result in consistent delays because the DCE is “appointed by the government in power. The person is only
willing to help those who are on their ticket, those who are on their side... So when you write to request
for something, they will tell you follow up, follow up, because your party is not in power... When you
get to the NDC assembly member’s area, to their community, you will see they are having a whole lot of
projects."25 Another NPP assembly member said that because of delays in approval for funding projects in
his ELA, he has stopped requesting support through the normal district budget process, instead appealing
directly to the MP or individual bureaucrats in national ministries: “The power alone resides with the mayor.
Because the president appoints him, he has everybody, so if he says to do this, they’ll do it. But then your
project, you have to spend years chasing it before you get the money..... I don’t bother going to the mayor’s
office... because the mayor has his own agenda, his own political agenda... The other assemblymen will
have finished their projects, and they’ll be saying no money for you."26
While denying these accusations of favoritism under the current DCE, an NDC assembly member de-
scribed similar favoritism under the NPP. “[I]t was not easy for you to have a project in this community...
Back in that time when the NPP was in power, they did what we call [in Twi] ‘pick and choose, pick and
choose.’ So they would pick and choose... they would say ‘oh, that project that’s going in our area, we like
24Many DCEs either concurrently hold local executive positions in the ruling party or did before their appointment.
25Interview with assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 12 March 2014.
26Interview with assembly member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 11 March 2014.
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it, so it will go there.’"27 But another NDC assembly member who served during both the NPP and NDC
governments, admitted that there was favoritism by both parties. Describing requests for funding for his
ELA under the NPP, he said, “it wasn’t easy at all... [If] the man is NPP, they collaborate with the assembly
man. But if the assembly man is NDC, it doesn’t happen." With the NDC in power beginning in 2009,
this changed: “[It’s] better access. You move freely to most of the offices where you can go for develop-
ment. [My area] gets its fair share.... He’s [the DCE] a government appointee and I’m also from the same
government... He listens to the NDC assembly members more than the others. It’s the norm."28 Another
NDC assembly member who also serves as a local executive in the NDC denied that there was favoritism
by his current DCE, but admitted that he had special advantages for securing projects for his area as a party
member: when asking for funding, he argues, “they see me, they know ‘oh, this man is our party man.’ They
will have time for me and sit down and talk to me."29
In particular, the assembly members interviewed described Ga neighborhoods in Accra as major recip-
ients of favoritism from the district governments. For example, one NPP assembly member in the AMA
argued, “Some areas are benefiting more than the other areas. For example, looking at Accra itself..." –
within Greater Accra, “Accra" refers to the predominantly Ga neighborhoods of the center city – “the dis-
trict government concentrates here. The other communities that don’t even have the road tarred, they don’t
bring money there... Most of the decisions have a political undertone."30 An NDC party executive serving
as one of the appointed assembly members in the AMA admitted that Ga areas get additional resources, but
defended the practice: “That’s how it’s supposed to be. Compare it to other regions. You go to a [rural]
region, the district is made up of one tribe so when you go to the assembly, the members of the assembly
were elected from that same tribe. When the benefits come, they come to that tribe’s area. Now when you
come to Accra, it is a metropolitan area. Everybody is in Accra now and... the Ga should continue to fight
to be recognized."31
27Interview with assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 25 February 2014.
28Interview with assembly member, Ayawaso Central constituency (AMA), 27 August 2013.
29Interview with assembly member and NDC executive, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 23 July 2012.
30Interview with assembly member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 19 July 2012.
31Interview with assembly member and NDC executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 27 February 2014.
156
6.4 Data Sources
I bring together several different sources of data to examine local elections in Greater Accra. First, I use
2010 assembly election results at the Electoral Area (ELA) level. These are available for all but two districts
in Greater Accra.32 I also have national-level assembly election turnout figures at the district level. In
addition to measuring turnout in assembly elections, I use these results to identify the ethnicity of each
winning assembly member and the other candidates contesting in Greater Accra.33 Because many first and
last names are clearly identifiable with distinct ethnic groups in Ghana, the ethnicities of each candidate
were coded from their names by a team of Ghanaian research assistants.34 Each name was coded by three
RAs and each RA ranked one to three guesses for the ethnicity of the name. Using coding rules described
in the Appendix to resolve conflicts in codings between RAs, I am able to identify the major ethnic category
of 91% of the candidates and sitting assembly members. These are coded as belonging to one of four
categories: Ga (including Dangmes), Akan (all subgroups), Ewe, or as a member of an ethnic group from
Northern Ghana. The remaining names are dropped from all analysis.35
The election results are combined with the 2010 census data to measure demographic characteristics of
each district or ELA. There is no official map of ELA boundaries available in Ghana with which to match
ELAs to the census data, however.36 As a result, I create a digitized map of ELA boundaries for Greater
Accra by sending a team of RAs to physically locate a random sample of the polling stations falling within
each ELA in Greater Accra.37 I use these located polling stations and official lists of community names in
32Assembly election results are not centrally collected or recorded at the ELA level by the Electoral Commission or any other
government body in Ghana. These results were individually collected from paper records stored in district Electoral Commission
offices. The two missing districts (Ga South and Ledzokuku-Krowor) no longer had any records of these elections as of 2014.
The names of the current assembly members are available for all ELAs, however, including in the otherwise missing districts.
33It is not possible to systematically code the partisanship of these candidates. While most who were interviewed freely identified
themselves as members of a party, partisanship is not listed in any results (or on the ballot).
34The RAs were university students in Accra and were drawn from diverse backgrounds so they would be familiar with names
associated with different ethnic groups. There were two northerners, one Ga, one Ewe, and one Akan.
35The remaining 9% of names are a combination of those from smaller ethnic groups (e.g,. Guan ethnic groups) that the RAs could
not identify with confidence, or instead names that indicated membership in two distinct groups (e.g., hyphenated Akan and Ga
surnames), leading the RAs to be internally divided in their coding.
36Instead, ELAs are legally defined in two ways: (1) as a written list of the villages, towns, or neighborhoods that fall within each
ELA, given in the Legislative Instruments from Parliament that demarcate the country into administrative districts; (2) by the list
of polling stations used in local and national elections within each ELA. The Electoral Commission also has no official map of
polling station locations, however.
37This is the same sample of polling stations used to locate the polling station results analyzed in Chapter 5. Polling stations
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each ELA to trace the boundaries of each ELA. To calculate demographic characteristics at the ELA level,
I then overlay this map of ELA boundaries on the digitized map of census enumeration areas and take sums
of the census characteristics within each ELA.38
Using the census data, I calculate several measures of wealth or development in each ELA. To measure
the number of poor versus middle and upper class residents, I employ the same definition of membership
in the middle class from Chapter 3, counting the proportion of each ELA’s population that has at least
some secondary education, English literacy, and formal sector employment. I also code a continuous educa-
tion/employment index at the individual-level from the first dimension of a factor analysis of these variables
(also as in Chapter 3) and count the proportion of each ELAs population falling above the mean value of this
index. Separately, I make a local development index to measure differences in overall levels of wealth in
each ELA. This is the same neighborhood wealth index defined in Chapter 2 and used in the other chapters.39
I use attitudinal data from the survey analyzed in the previous chapters. The survey does not include a
question about turnout in the 2010 assembly election, but measures perceptions of assembly members’ per-
formance. I combine this main survey data with data gathered from the sample of polling stations described
above to produce a rough measure for local club goods distribution in the metropolitan area.40 After locat-
ing the random sample of 238 polling stations, RAs interviewed three residents in the immediate vicinity of
each polling station, randomly selected via a standard random walk procedure beginning from the polling
station. Residents who reported living in that area for less than 5 years were replaced with a new respondent
selected via the same procedure. Respondents were then asked a series of factual questions about whether
several club goods had been built in the last 5 years (the period in which the NDC had been in power) in
the immediate vicinity of their home: roads, schools, streetlights, and public toilets. They were asked to
were sampled from all districts in Greater Accra, with the number per district proportional to the number of registered voters (in
2012), and the probability of selecting each polling station within districts weighted again by the number of registered voters.
A minimum of 1 polling station was selected per ELA. Over 95% of the selected polling stations were successfully located.
Combined with additional polling stations located by matching station names to street maps, I can geo-locate 37% of the polling
stations in the metropolitan area
38For enumeration areas that cross ELA boundaries, I sum census characteristics after weighting the census data by the proportion
of the surface area of each enumeration area that falls within each ELA.
39As described in Chapter 2, the index includes: % with running water (privately provided by wealthier residents via tanker or
borehole); % with a flush toilet, % with electricity (available to all who can afford it), % in a single-family home (excluding
informal structures); % with a computer; % adults with more than a middle school education (public education is free through
middle school); and % adults employed in the formal or public sectors.
40No systematic data on the delivery of these goods is available from official sources.
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point out these goods to the RA, if possible, so the RA could visually confirm their existence.41 These same
questions about club goods were also repeated on the main voter survey analyzed in the previous chap-
ters.42 Because there is inconsistency among respondents within locations on both surveys in answers to
these questions, I collapse all of the responses to a binary indicator per location, in which survey locations
are coded as having had a good delivered during the past five years if more than half of respondents at that
location reported it.43 Combining the surveys, I have data on goods distribution at 286 random locations
throughout the metropolitan area.
6.5 Empirical Analysis
I use these data sources to establish several patterns consistent with the discussion above. First, I show that
turnout in assembly elections is lower in urban than rural areas, and especially in urban wards with large
middle class populations. Second, I show that low turnout allows the Ga minority to disproportionately win
assembly seats. Third, I examine the negative implications of low turnout and the overrepresentation of the
Ga on performance evaluations of assembly members. I end with suggestive evidence that Ga overrepresen-
tation in the assemblies has led to favoritism to Ga areas of the city in the distribution of some, but not all,
types of club goods.
6.5.1 Turnout in Assembly Elections
Turnout in the 2010 district assembly elections was lower than in the 2008 and 2012 presidential and parlia-
mentary elections, with 35% of registered voters turning out nationwide in 2010, compared to 73% in 2008
41Question wordings were: “In the last 5 years, have any roads been tarred or constructed in this neighborhood?"; “In the last 5
years, have any new streetlights gone up in this area?" ; “In the last 5 years, have any government schools been built or renovated
in this area? "; and “In the last 5 years, have any new public toilets opened in this neighborhood?" In cases where one respondent
answered “don’t know" to multiple of these questions, the RA was prompted to randomly sample an additional respondent, and
the uninformed respondent’s responses were dropped.
42In the main voter survey, a randomly selected third (7) of the respondents interviewed in each of the 48 sampling clusters were
also asked these questions. Respondents who reported living in their home for less than five years were skipped.
43If a respondent in either survey reported that a good was delivered, she was asked a follow up about who she believed was
responsible (the local government, the MP, the national government, an NGO, or private citizens). Attribution for the same
project was often inconsistent, however, in part because multiple actors often collaborate on, or at least claim credit for, the same
projects. Because of this, I do not attempt to separate out responses based on the actors attributed, using only the overall reports
of whether a good was delivered at all. The one exception is for public toilets. Nearly 90% of responses reporting new toilets
attributed them to NGOs or private citizens, not politicians. As a result, I do not analyze results for public toilets below, as they
may not indicate anything about government spending.
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and 79% in 2012. Since democratization in 1992, local elections in Ghana have always had lower turnout
than national elections (Crook 1999). Turnout may have been especially low in 2010 because the election
was postponed due to logistical difficulties at the Electoral Commission and eventually held staggered by
district between December 29, 2010 and January 4, 2011. While these delays may have depressed turnout
overall, this cannot account for the extensive variation in turnout across and within districts.44 In the rural
Upper East, Upper West, and Northern Regions, turnout was over 50%. In Greater Accra Region, turnout
was only 19%. In Kumasi, the second largest city, it was 22%. There was also wide variation by ELA within
Greater Accra. In Taifa South electoral area in the Ga East district, only 3.4% of registered voters turned out
to vote. But 58% turned out in Akweitse-Gon electoral area in the peri-urban Kpone-Katamanso district.
Nationwide, turnout is significantly lower in urban than rural areas, and especially in areas that are
more developed, with more middle and upper class residents. This is consistent with turnout for assembly
elections being highest where more voters demand the particularistic goods that assembly members can
actually provide. The average turnout rate in rural districts was 44% of registered voters, while half that –
22% – in urban districts. I estimate a series of weighted least squares regressions for turnout by district,
weighing observations by the number of registered voters (see Appendix for table).45 I find that districts
nationwide that are 1 standard deviation more developed on the development index described above have 8
percentage points lower turnout. I also estimate that a district with a middle class population percentage that
is 10 percentage points larger had 7 percentage points lower turnout.
Focusing on the urban area where turnout is lowest – Greater Accra – I examine more localized turnout
by ELA. In Table 6.1, I regress turnout by ELA on similar measures of the level of development or wealth in
each ward, as well as population density and ethnic or partisan composition. As before, I weigh observations
by the number of registered voters to account for size differences across ELAs. I also include district-level
fixed effects, to control for baseline differences in turnout across administrative districts. Because of missing
turnout data in two districts (Ga South and Ledzokuku-Krowor) and missing geo-coded census data in two
additional districts (Tema and Ashaiman), it is only possible to estimate these regressions for 131 ELAs.
44Moreover, turnout in 2010 in Greater Accra was actually slightly higher than in 2006, when 16% of registered voters turned out
in the metropolitan area. The 2006 results are no longer available at the ELA level, however.
45Districts vary widely in size. District-level turnout is available at the sub-metropolitan assembly level (sub-district level) within
Accra, so the unit of observation here is the district nationally and sub-district (more equivalent in size to other districts) within
Accra.
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Table 6.1: Turnout by Electoral Area in 2010 Assembly Election, Greater Accra
1 2 3 4 5




Middle Class (Index) %  0.118⇤⇤  0.101⇤⇤  0.086⇤
(0.040) (0.037) (0.038)
Ga % in ELA 0.141⇤⇤⇤ 0.102⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.037)
NDC 2008 Pres. Vote Share 0.101†
(0.053)
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.153⇤⇤  0.161⇤⇤  0.161⇤⇤ 0.022  0.046
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.061) (0.070)
Population Density 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.405 0.397 0.410 0.493 0.508
N 130 130 130 130 130
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The outcome is turnout as percentage of
registered voters per Electoral Area (ELA) in the urban districts of Greater Accra. Weighted
Least Squares regressions, with weights by number of registered voters per ELA, and district-
level fixed effects. Excludes ELAs where census data missing (Tema and Ashaiman districts)
and ELAs where turnout data missing (Ga South and Ledozkuku-Krowor districts). Population
density is scaled in 1000s per sq. km.
161
A clear pattern emerges, similar to the national data. In column 1 of Table 6.1, I show that the percentage
of adults in each ELA who are in the middle class strongly predicts lower turnout in the 2010 assembly
election. In column 2, I replace this measure with the same development index as above, and find a similar
correlation – significantly lower turnout in more developed ELAs. In column 3, I use a third measure of
wealth, counting the percentage of adults in each ELA with above average scores on the individual-level
education/employment index described above. Again, I find significantly lower turnout in ELAs with larger
middle and upper class populations. In column 4, I show that the proportion of an ELA’s population that
is Ga also predicts greater turnout in the assembly elections, consistent with Ga voters having the most to
gain from participating in these elections. Finally, in column 5 of Table 6.1, I find that NDC vote share in
the previous presidential election also predicts higher turnout.46 If voters anticipate the patterns of partisan
favoritism in the approval of projects and disbursement of funds described by the assembly members in the
interviews above, assembly seats will be more valuable in NDC strongholds within each district.
The average winning coalition for an assembly seat in Greater Accra in 2010 was only 6.5% of an
ELA’s registered voters. In the Dzorwulu and Abelenkpe electoral areas in Ayawaso West constituency
(AMA), mixed middle and upper class communities, the winning assembly members each won only 1.7%
of registered voters in multi-candidates races. Elsewhere, winning candidates had to bring together 15%
or 20% of the voters, requiring significantly more effort to win the seat. Where this threshold to winning
is small, candidates who can draw on pre-existing local networks of mobilized and motivated voters can
win even if they only represent a small minority in the ELA. As discuss above, the Ga are such a group
throughout Greater Accra. Along these lines, low turnout appears to allow the Ga minority to become
overrepresented in the district assemblies. The coding of assembly member names described above shows
that 48% of the elected assembly members in Greater Accra were Ga in 2010, compared to 27% of the
population. Combined with members who are appointed to each assembly by the ruling party, this makes
Gas the majority of assembly members across the urban area. Ga candidates won 52% of the seats in the
AMA, despite being only 23% of the city.47 By comparison, the Akan are the most underrepresented. Only
46As a fitting example, Taifa South, the electoral area with the lowest turnout in Greater Accra mentioned above is one of the largest
opposition NPP strongholds in the city.
47This is not unique to the 2010 election. Ga candidates also appear to be overrepresented in the similarly low turnout 2006 local
elections. I estimate that Ga candidates won 47% of the seats in the AMA and 42% in the larger metropolitan area in 2006 based
on my own coding of these names; the 2006 winner’s names were not included in those coded by the RAs. Eighty-six (from 169
to 255) new ELAs were created between 2006 and 2010, however, so candidates in the 2006 election competed for support in
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28% of elected assembly members in the metropolitan area are Akan, compared to 40% of the population,
and only 20% are Akan in the AMA, from 38% of the city’s population.48
I estimate the probability that a Ga candidate won each assembly election in 2010 using logistic re-
gressions with a Ga victory as the outcome and the same predictors as column 5 of Table 6.1, as well as
percentage turnout in each ELA. Controlling for the Ga population percentage in each ELA, which un-
derstandably predicts whether a Ga candidate wins, Gas are also most likely to win where turnout in the
elections was lowest (see Appendix for table). Simulating from this model, I estimate that a Ga candidate
is 10 percentage points more likely to have won an assembly seat after a 10 percentage point decrease in
turnout in the election (95% CI: 0.01, 14.6). Where turnout was higher, by contrast, the winner of the
assembly seat was more likely to reflect the actual ethnic composition of the ELA.
6.5.2 Where are Assembly Members Helpful?
Ga overrepresentation in the district assemblies comes at the expense of popular approval of local gov-
ernment performance. Survey respondents in the larger survey of residents of Greater Accra were asked,
“In your opinion, is your local assembly member in this area able to help community members when they
have problems?" Because the main role of district assembly members is to provide constituent services,
this question serves as a basic performance evaluation of the assembly members. Overall, 19% of the 995
respondents answered that their assembly member was either always or sometimes helpful.49 Six percent
said that their assembly member only helped other people, never the respondent, and the remainder either
said that the assembly member was never helpful to anyone (30%) or that they did not even know who their
assembly member was (45%).
I regress these responses on a series of individual-level and neighborhood-level characteristics of re-
spondents. These are multi-level logistic regressions (Gelman & Hill 2007) taking the general form:
P (yi) = logit
 1(↵j[i] + ✓k[j] +  1GaAssemblyj +Xi  + Zj )
significantly larger ELAs.
48Gas were also more likely to run for assembly seats in the first place. From the ELAs where I can code the ethnicity of all
candidate names, 45% of candidates were Ga, compared to 31% Akan. At least one Ga candidate contested for over 75% of the
seats.
49Note that this is the same percentage as the turnout rate in Greater Accra in 2010.
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where yi is a binary indicator for respondent i reporting that her assembly member is at least sometimes
helpful. Intercepts are partially-pooled by the 48 sampling locations (j) in the survey, to account for the
clustered nature of the sample,50 and I also include district fixed effects for each district k to control for
baseline differences in performance across local governments.51 In the specification above,GaAssemblyj is
an indicator for whether the assembly member in location j is a Ga. All models include two sets of controls;
Xi is a matrix of controls at the individual level, while Zj is a matrix of controls at the neighborhood level.
At the individual level, I include indicators for whether each respondent is an active (meeting attending)
member of a political party, whether the respondent is Muslim, the respondent’s gender, and membership
in each of four major ethnic categories in Ghana.52 In addition, I control for the respondent’s age, the
years the respondent has lived in the neighborhood, and an indicator for whether each respondent moved
to the area specifically because of the quality of public services there.53 Finally, I include the assets index
and education/employment index used in the prior chapters. At the neighborhood level, I include NDC vote
share in the respondent’s ELA in the 2008 presidential election, the neighborhood development index for the
immediate area around each respondent to control for differences in wealth of the surrounding community,
and population density. Results are in Table 6.2.
Ga respondents are among the most likely to approve of their assembly member. This alone may be ev-
idence of favoritism to Ga residents by assembly members. Simulating from column 1, Ga respondents are
7.3 percentage points (95% CI: 0.6, 14.0) more likely to report the assembly member as helpful than other
respondents. In addition, active members in local political party organizations have better performance eval-
uations of assembly members, particularly the minority of respondents (9%) who are ruling party members,
as shown in column 2.54 Because assembly members are often closely tied to parties, local party members
are likely to be prime beneficiaries of their patronage. And given the allegations of partisan favoritism dis-
50Results are also robust to instead using clustered standard errors by sampling cluster (not shown).
51Because sample sizes are larger within each district in the survey than in the analysis of ELA results above, I can define the fixed
effects at the level of the sub-metropolitan assemblies (sub-districts) within the AMA.
52Akan is the omitted baseline category in all models.
53As in all prior models with this data, two additional indicators control for interview quality and measurement error: whether
enumerators made logistical errors during the interview (12% of interviews), and whether enumerators noted respondents were
cooperative (90%).
54Because not all respondents reported their partisan affiliation, 191 responses are dropped in column 2. See Chapter 5 for more
information on how partisanship is measured.
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Table 6.2: Reported Helpfulness of Assembly Members
1 2 3 4 5 6
Turnout in 2010 (by ELA) 18.570⇤
(8.982)
Ga Assemblyman (by ELA)  0.808†  1.927⇤ 1.779
(0.439) (0.954) (1.358)
Ga % in ELA  7.814⇤  7.164⇤⇤  4.828
(3.814) (2.659) (3.479)
Ga Assemblyman * Ga % 5.127
(3.476)
Ga Segregation in ELA  2.393
(1.774)
Ga Assemblyman * Ga Seg.  9.708†
(5.203)
Party Member 0.720⇤⇤ 0.621⇤ 0.629⇤ 0.549⇤ 0.698⇤





Muslim 0.848⇤ 0.899⇤ 0.795⇤ 0.780⇤ 0.730† 0.857⇤
(0.357) (0.393) (0.376) (0.376) (0.378) (0.405)
Male 0.654⇤⇤⇤ 0.688⇤⇤ 0.723⇤⇤⇤ 0.716⇤⇤⇤ 0.706⇤⇤⇤ 0.817⇤⇤⇤
(0.190) (0.213) (0.205) (0.206) (0.208) (0.234)
Ewe  0.636⇤  0.452  0.565†  0.605†  0.525  0.642†
(0.307) (0.333) (0.326) (0.326) (0.329) (0.381)
Northerner  0.259  0.307  0.285  0.327  0.233  0.231
(0.384) (0.428) (0.404) (0.406) (0.413) (0.433)
Ga 0.551⇤ 0.617⇤ 0.547⇤ 0.580⇤ 0.598⇤ 0.734⇤
(0.250) (0.282) (0.275) (0.275) (0.283) (0.322)
Full Individual-level Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Neighborhood-level Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 995 804 793 793 752 584
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The outcome is a binary indicator for whether respondents
report that their assembly member is at least “sometimes" helpful. All models are multi-level logistic
regressions with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007) and
include district-level fixed effects (including for the sub-metropolitan assemblies within the AMA). All
models include the full set of individual and neighborhood-level controls described in the text (not shown
for space). Missingness in column 2 is for respondents who did not identify the party they belong to.
Missingness in columns 3-5 is because the RAs could not agree on ethnicity codings for all assembly
members. Respondents from Ga South and Ledzokuku-Krowor districts are dropped in column 6 because
turnout data was not available.
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cussed in the interviews above, NDC assembly members may be particularly able to steer benefits to ruling
party members. From column 2, I estimate that respondents who are NDC members are 11 percentage
points (95% CI: 2.8, 20.4) more likely to approve of their assembly member than respondents who are not
members of a party. By contrast, opposition NPP members are no more likely to find assembly members
helpful than those who are not in a party.55
Moreover, other respondents find Ga assembly members to be particularly unhelpful. This is seen in col-
umn 3, which includes an indicator for whether the current assemblyman is Ga.56 In column 4, I interact the
indicator for Ga assembly member with the Ga population percentage in each ELA. Although the interaction
is not significant at conventional levels (p = 0.14), it is signed in a direction suggesting that respondents
believe Ga assembly members are unhelpful primarily in ELAs with few Gas. In these areas, Ga assembly
members likely won with support from only a small minority of total voters and may be targeting benefits
narrowly to the few Gas in the area. From column 4, I estimate that in an ELA with the 10th percentile
in Ga population for Greater Accra (9.8% of the population is Ga), respondents are 21.0 percentage points
(95% CI: 2.2, 38.7) less likely to see Ga assembly members as helpful than assembly members of other
ethnicities. But in an ELA at the 90th percentile in Ga population for Greater Accra (51% of the population
is Ga), respondents see Ga assembly members as no more or less helpful than others (95% CI: -18.0, 12.6).
A different way to measure this interaction is by examining the segregation of Gas within each ELA. Ga
assembly members may be most unhelpful where the Ga community is spatially segregated from surround-
ing neighborhoods. In an ELA with a segregated Ga enclave, a Ga assembly member is likely to primarily
target spending on local public goods to that part of the ELA, at the expense of everyone else, similar to the
patterns of selective effort within wards described by assembly members in the interviews above. I measure
the presence of these enclaves using a “dissimilarity" index of spatial segregation, as defined in Reardon &
O’Sullivan (2004). This is based on comparing the Ga population percentage in each census enumeration
area within an ELA to the overall Ga population percentage in the full ELA.57 The index is scaled from 0,
where all enumeration areas within an ELA have the same Ga population percentage, to 1, where all Gas are
55NDC voters are not particularly likely to see assembly members as helpful – only NDC party members. NDC vote share in each
respondent’s ELA also does not predict helpfulness of the assembly members (see Appendix for full Table 6.2).
56202 observations are dropped in columns 3-5 because the ethnicity of an assembly member is unknown.
57This cannot be calculated in two ELAs in the survey data that correspond to only a single polygon in the enumeration area data.
An additional 41 respondents are dropped.
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clustered in only one enumeration area, and ranges from 0.02 to 0.55 in the ELAs in the survey. In column 5,
I find that respondents are significantly less likely to approve of Ga assembly members when living in ELAs
where Gas are spatially segregated from other residents. As the Ga segregation index in the ELA increases
by 1 standard deviation (0.12), I estimate that respondents become 11.1 percentage points less likely to see
Ga assembly members as helpful (95%: 2.3, 16.7). But in areas where Ga residents are spatially intermixed
with the rest of the community, respondents do not find Ga assembly members to be unhelpful compared to
those of other ethnicities.
Finally, I find that turnout in 2010 is positively correlated with perceived helpfulness of assembly mem-
bers. I include turnout in each respondent’s ELA in the 2010 assembly election as an explanatory variable in
column 6.58 I estimate that as turnout in each respondent’s local assembly election increases by 10 percent-
age points, the respondent is 15.2 percentage points more likely to approve of the local assembly member
(95% CI: 0.8, 29.4). This is consistent with assembly members providing better constituent services where
they must maintain support of a larger group of voters to remain in office and face electoral pressure to
address the needs of more constituents. But where turnout is very low, approval of the assembly members
is also dramatically lower, consistent with the evidence above that it is in the low turnout areas that local
government seats are most often captured by a local ethnic minority.
6.5.3 Implications for Goods Distribution
Finally, the combined survey data on the delivery of club goods provides suggestive evidence of distribu-
tive impacts of Ga overrepresentation. As described in the interviews above, many of the benefits that
assembly members provide to constituents are private goods and are thus largely unobservable, although the
individual-level performance evaluations in the previous section provide evidence of who may be benefiting
most from these private goods. But assembly members also allege favoritism in approval of funding for
local public goods to both ruling NDC strongholds and Ga areas of Greater Accra.
I find different patterns of distribution for three club goods measured in the combined survey data that
respondents believed were mostly delivered by government or politicians.59 Table 6.3 shows results of a
58Because assembly election results are not available for two districts included in the survey sample, an additional 168 respondents
are dropped.
59Responses about new public toilets are not examined here because respondents overwhelmingly attributed new toilets to private
initiatives, not to government or politicians (see above).
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series of logistic regressions where the outcomes are indicators for whether respondents at each location
reported a road, school, or streetlight being constructed in the previous five years (since the NDC came
to power).60 Predictors include NDC vote share in each location’s ELA in the 2008 presidential election,
the proportion Ga in the ELA, the local development index (see above), and population density, as well as
indicators for which of the two surveys each observation comes from and whether the survey enumerators
noted that the location was in a commercial or residential area. I also include a measure of the population
growth in the surrounding ELA for each location between the 2000 and 2010 censuses, which provides a
measure of need for new club goods in the area. All models include district fixed effects to control for
baseline differences in delivery of these goods across different local governments.
Controlling for variables that measure baseline needs for new roads in each location, I find in column
1 that survey locations in ELAs with a larger Ga population are significantly more likely to have reported
road construction and maintenance in the previous five years than locations in ELAs with smaller Ga pop-
ulations.61 Simulating from column 1, I estimate that a location in an ELA with the 90th percentile in Ga
population proportion in Greater Accra (51%) is 19.6 percentage points (95% CI: 0.1, 24.7) more likely to
have road construction or maintenance than an otherwise similar location in an ELA with the 10th percentile
in Ga population (9.8%).62 In column 4, I repeat the model from column 1 but replace the Ga population
percentage in the survey location’s ELA with the Ga population percentage in the 500m immediately sur-
rounding the sampled location (an area much smaller than the full ELA). Again, I find that survey locations
in local neighborhoods within ELAs with larger Ga populations are more likely to have reported road con-
struction, consistent with favoritism to Ga areas.
In columns 2 and 4, I change the outcome to an indicator for school construction and renovations. Un-
like for roads, I do not find evidence of favoritism to Ga ELAs or Ga neighborhoods in school construction.
Instead, there is evidence of partisan targeting to NDC areas. Controlling for differences in poverty, popula-
60For roads, this includes reports of road maintenance (such as re-paving). For schools this includes new government schools and
renovation of existing schools.
61I also repeat column 1 of Table 6.3 sub-setting only to the reports of road maintenance, which is entirely under control of district
governments, and find identical results (not shown).
62Conditional on being in the same place, Ga respondents are not more likely to report road construction than other respondents.
In robustness tests in the Appendix, I regress an indicator for whether each respondent in the larger survey of residents reported
road, streetlight, or school construction on indicators for their ethnicity, controlling for survey location with survey location fixed
effects. While responses vary across locations, there are no differences in reporting any of these club goods by ethnic group,
except that Ewe respondents are slightly less likely to report knowledge of roads construction (see Appendix).
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Table 6.3: Distribution of Roads, Schools, and Streetlights in Greater Accra
1 2 3 4 5 6
Good: Road School Streetlight Road School Streetlight
NDC 2008 Vote Share (ELA)  2.04 4.97⇤ 1.31  1.70 4.97⇤ 1.05
(1.73) (1.96) (1.89) (1.69) (1.99) (1.90)
Ga % (ELA) 2.61⇤ 1.37  0.79
(1.29) (1.59) (1.38)
Ga % (500m) 2.00† 1.45  0.21
(1.16) (1.42) (1.29)
Development Index (ELA) 0.55⇤  0.02 0.10
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Development Index (500m) 0.82⇤⇤⇤  0.28 0.27
(0.24) (0.25) (0.24)
Commercial Area (0,1) 0.48 0.04  0.27 0.77⇤  0.10  0.21
(0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.36) (0.39) (0.40)
Population Density (ELA) 0.01 0.00  0.00 0.01  0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
%age Growth 2000-2010 (ELA)  0.06  0.08  0.03  0.10  0.10  0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.05)
From Voter Survey (0,1) 0.88⇤  2.58⇤⇤⇤ 18.17 1.02⇤  2.67⇤⇤⇤ 18.22
(0.40) (0.47) (909.24) (0.40) (0.48) (913.00)
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 246 225 224 243 222 221
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Outcomes are binary indicators for whether each good listed
above was delivered to the immediate area around the polling station or survey sampling cluster. All models are
logistic regressions, with district-level fixed effects to control for baseline differences across local governments.
Data is from a combination of two sources – a survey of a random sample of polling station locations in Greater
Accra, and a representative survey of voters in Greater Accra, as described in the text. All but one location in
the voter survey reported streetlights being delivered (columns 3 and 6), accounting for the large standard errors
on the survey indicator variable in these columns.
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tion growth, and population density that should predict underlying needs for public schools, survey locations
in ELAs with higher NDC presidential vote share in the 2008 presidential election are more likely to have
reported school construction. As NDC vote share in the 2008 presidential election in the ELA increases
by 10 percentage points, survey locations are 8.1 percentage points (95% CI: 0.02, 11.8) more likely to
report school construction. Finally, in columns 3 and 6 I repeat these models for the construction of new
streetlights. I find no patterns of either ethnic or partisan favoritism in the distribution of streetlights.63
Visual depictions of these results are in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, which shade ELAs in the 12 urban districts of
Greater Accra by either Ga population percentage or 2008 NDC presidential vote share, and then project the
locations of road and school construction measured in the combined surveys on top of the ELAs.
It is not surprising that there is no evidence of favoritism in the distribution of streetlights. Streetlights
are the least expensive of these three goods, and the easiest for assembly members to provide from their
discretionary Electoral Area Fund without approval of the DCE or the rest of the assembly. For goods small
enough that all assembly members can fund them own their own, regardless of partisanship or ethnicity,
aggregate patterns of favoritism may be difficult to observe, as these goods are likely delivered in every
ELA.64 Roads and schools are both more capital intensive projects that require funding from the DCE and
the rest of the assembly, which can deny funding in opposition or non-Ga areas.
But why are Ga communities within Greater Accra favored in road building, while all NDC communi-
ties are favored in school construction? A possible explanation is that construction and maintenance of local
roads is entirely within the purview of each district. Requests for local road work from assembly members
go to the Urban Roads Department at each district assembly, controlled by the DCE and works committees
of the assembly.65 With Gas dominating the district assembly, Ga areas may be most likely to receive road
work. By contrast, while district governments fund some school construction through their normal bud-
gets, significant funding also comes directly from the national government, with national level politicians
above the DCE involved in allocative decisions about schools. For example, beginning in 2011, the AMA
embarked on a major campaign to construct public schools in the city funded by foreign donor money,
63There is also no favoritism towards other ethnic groups – measures of the Akan, Ewe, or Northern population at each ELA also
return null results for streetlights (not shown).
64Almost all assembly members interviewed (see above) reported providing streetlights to their communities from this discretionary
fund, including NPP affiliated assembly members, even as they complained about being blocked from delivering larger projects.
65These departments are funded by a national road fund allocated to each district, but decisions over the use of this fund are entirely
localized.
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Road Construction by Proportion Ga
20km10km
Greater Accra metro area
(by Electoral Area or Ward)
road work (2009!13)
no road work (2009!13)
Figure 6.1: Goods Distribution in Greater Accra – Local Roads: Electoral Areas (ELAs) shaded by the
proportion Ga, with darker color equal to larger Ga population. Shaded points are locations where the
combined voter and polling station surveys indicate roads were constructed. Hollow points are locations
where the combined surveys indicate no road was constructed. Gray shading indicates missing geo-coded
census data (areas dropped from all analysis).
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School Construction by NDC 2008 Pres.~Vote Share
20km10km
Greater Accra metro area
(by Electoral Area or Ward)
school built (2009!13)
no school built (2009!13)
Figure 6.2: Goods Distribution in Greater Accra – Public Schools : Electoral Areas (ELAs) shaded by
the NDC vote share in the 2008 presidential election, with darker color equal to higher NDC vote share.
Shaded points are locations where the combined voter and polling station surveys indicate public schools
were constructed. Hollow points are locations where the combined surveys indicate no public schools were
constructed. Gray shading indicates missing geo-coded census data (areas dropped from all analysis).
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organized through the national government.66 Many other school projects are funded by the Ghana Educa-
tion Trust Fund (GETFUND), a national organization controlled by national government appointees.67 If
the DCE and assembly leaders are not the only politicians approving school projects, there may instead be
pressure to favor NDC areas in general, not only the Ga in particular.
These last results must be interpreted with caution, however. Because it is not possible to identify the
exact funding source of each of project, the responses likely included some roads and schools provided by
different actors, especially when individual MPs pay for local public goods out of their own discretionary
funds. Second, while conditional on living in the same place, respondents from different ethnic groups are
not more or less likely to report any of these goods being delivered, NDC voters are more likely to have
claimed knowledge of school construction than NPP voters. The pattern of NDC favoritism in column 2
and 5 of Table 6.3 (and Figure 6.2) could thus be confounded by partisan response bias – with ruling party
supporters attempting to make the current government look better than opposition supporters by responding
more positively about school construction.68 Nonetheless, the models in Table 6.3 provide some evidence
that Ga areas of Greater Accra differentially benefit in the distribution of club goods that are controlled
directly by district governments.
6.6 Conclusion
Local government elections are often viewed as a means to prevent local capture and improve the quality of
local service delivery in developing countries (Olowu and Wunsch 2004, Ferraz and Finan 2011, Martinez-
Bravo et al. 2012, Beath et al. 2013). But in this chapter I suggest that low turnout in local government
elections, especially from middle class voters, allows a well-organized local ethnic minority to capture
disproportionate power in the local government system and redirect municipal resources to themselves at
the expense of the city at large. As described in Chapter 1, local governments in major African cities like
66By comparing media reports and the survey data, I can confirm that these schools are included in Figure 6.2.
67For an analysis of nationwide partisan favoritism through the GETFUND, see Faller (2013).
68Controlling for being in the same location, NDC voters were no more or less likely to report new roads, streetlights, or toilets,
however, only schools (see Appendix). It is not clear why there would be partisan response bias about only one type of club good
but none of the others. It is not possible to control for this in Table 6.3, however, because vote choice was only measured on
the 48 location residents survey, not the 238 location polling station survey (because of the complexity of measuring vote choice
accurately, see Chapter 5). Note that this partisan bias cannot account for the evidence of Ga favoritism in the provision of roads.
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Greater Accra likely already lack the resources and bureaucratic capacity necessary to confront all of the
developmental challenges posed by urbanization. But the capture of local governments by narrow ethnic
interests may only exacerbate this problem, with the resources that are available not being used to efficiently
address the city’s infrastructure and basic service deficits. Local city councilors in Greater Accra can get
away with this inefficient distribution of resources because their primary electoral incentive is to deliver
patronage to the narrow sets of supporters they need to win low turnout local elections.
The electoral incentives of district assembly members in Greater Accra may be self-reinforcing. Fol-
lowing the logic developed in the previous chapters, if urban municipal governments cannot address voters’
needs for basic public services, particularistic preferences will remain prominent in the urban electorate and
patronage-based appeals that selectively target access to these services will remain viable routes to elected
office. And if local governments politically target their resources based on the ethnicity and partisanship of
neighborhoods, as shown above, incentives for ethnic voting remain pronounced. But this only encourages
ethnic groups like the Ga, which believe their access to local resources is being threatened, to band together
politically to protect their interests at the expense of other urban residents.
The capture of local urban governments by narrow ethnic interests is not unique to African cities like
Greater Accra. Indeed, the situation in Greater Accra shares many similarities to the history of Irish and
Italian American political machines in many US cities in the early 20th century (e.g., Banfield and Wilson
1960, Erie 1988, Trounstine 2008). But the control of ethnic political machines in American cities largely
collapsed in the second half of the 20th century. Existing literature suggests that was not primarily a result
of modernization or economic growth. Instead, institutional reforms that constrained the ability of machine
politicians to target patronage to narrow interest groups changed the underlying electoral incentives that
allowed machines to gain power in the first place. Examining these historical experiences, I propose in the
next chapter that similar institutional reforms could allow Greater Accra to break out of the pernicious cycle
described here.
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7 | The Way Forward
7.1 The Way Forward
Even though early literature on the political effects of urbanization in Africa offered little support for mod-
ernization theories, these hypotheses once again characterize many current arguments about urban politics.
But the preceding chapters suggest that the socio-economic changes produced by urbanization in Africa do
not have uniform effects on electoral competition in urban areas. The incentives underlying ethnic com-
petition and patronage-based appeals are as much reinforced by processes of urbanization as they are un-
dermined. These features of electoral competition are not all declining in importance as urban populations
become wealthier, better educated, and lose ties to traditional ethnic social institutions. I show instead that
urbanization is pulling political competition in multiple directions – solidifying the use of individual-level
clientelism and the importance of ethnicity for vote choice in some neighborhoods, even as these are less
common in other urban neighborhoods.
Ethnic voting and patronage politics both stymie the ability of democratization in developing countries
to lead to genuine political accountability, with voters able to incentivize good performance by leaders
through elections. If we want to improve the quality of accountability in African cities like Greater Accra,
what is the way forward? Perhaps the intra-urban variation in electoral competition I document is merely
an artifact of observing a moment of flux, as the city transitions from one form of political competition to
another. I only view Greater Accra in detail at a single point in time. Maybe the answer is to wait longer,
giving processes of modernization more time to play out? In this concluding chapter, I reject this argument,
suggesting that there is little reason to believe based on the evidence in the preceding chapters that simply
waiting longer for development to progress will lead to substantial changes to the patterns described here in
the near or medium term.
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Instead, we need to take seriously the conclusions of the earlier generation of scholars studying urban
politics in Africa (see Chapter 1) and move on from viewing modernization theory as a useful paradigm for
explaining African politics. In line with what Bates (1974) already called for over 40 years ago, we can
gain deeper insights into how patterns of political competition might change in African cities if we stop
teleologically expecting further development to translate into new political outcomes and instead think more
carefully about what would actually change the underlying incentives of the main actors in urban politics.
Using this framework, I examine the experiences of other countries and conclude by arguing that a series of
institutional reforms in Ghana may ultimately be more likely to change the patterns of electoral competition
I have documented in Greater Accra than further modernization.
7.2 Keep Waiting for Modernization?
The middle class in Greater Accra is booming. But the majority of urban residents are still poor and the
urban middle class is still a small share of the overall national electorate. Although Ghana is among the
most urbanized African countries, with over half of its population in cities, the urban population is much
smaller compared to developing democracies in other world regions where competition has become signif-
icantly more programmatic (e.g., Levitsky 2003, Luna 2014).1 If we just waited longer and looked again,
giving the effects of urbanization and economic development more time to manifest themselves, perhaps
real programmatic competition will have emerged and ethnicity significantly lost its political importance.
But the theoretical argument in the dissertation suggests that this is unlikely. If Ghana becomes much
more like an advanced democracy – substantially wealthier, with a majority of the population firmly out
of poverty – the parties may have no choice but to stop most of their patronage distribution and instead
seriously engage with voters’ universalistic preferences. But there are few indications that Ghana is another
Taiwan or South Korea; that dramatic of a developmental leap is not happening any time soon. Restricting
instead to more plausible counterfactuals, there are clear reasons to doubt that gradual improvements in
development will lead to significant shifts away from the patterns documented in the previous chapters, at
least in the medium term.
For example, existing literature shows a clear cross-national correlation between levels of development
1For example, Argentina’s population is now 92% urban, Chile is 90% urban, Peru is 80% urban, and Brazil is 86% urban (United
Nations 2014)(United-Nations 2014).
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and indicators of clientelism (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; discussed in Chapter 3), consistent with
modernization theories. But Kitschelt & Kselman (2013) shows that this correlation disappears if the most
advanced democracies are removed from the sample. Among poor and middle income democracies, there is
not strong evidence that marginal increases in levels of wealth are associated with significant reductions in
clientelism. Instead, consistent with my argument in Chapter 3, political dynamics in poor countries instead
often appear to be incredibly sticky, not easily fading away.
More importantly, I have described how several characteristics of African cities interact to encourage
patronage-based political competition and ethnic voting in many urban neighborhoods: low state capacity,
significant scarcity in access to basic public services – among the poor and middle class alike – and the con-
centration of the urban poor in dense slum communities. Marginal increases in urbanization and economic
development would not change the incentives created by these factors. In some cases, this would only serve
to deepen the incentives sustaining the patterns of political competition I document.
In chapter 3, I argue that Ghana’s low state capacity hampers the implementation of universalistic policy
promises, creating a credibility problem in which middle class voters who want universalistic policies do
not trust that any politicians in the current political system are likely to deliver them. I suggest that this
credibility problem leads to the differential abstention of voters with universalistic preferences, reinforcing
politicians’ incentives for patronage-based appeals. Low state capacity also directly feeds into the inability
of the government to meet demands for public services as cities grow. Scarcity then reinforces voters’
dependence on the state for particularistic goods, sustaining patronage strategies that strategically target and
withhold these benefits as a viable route to elected office. And as described in Chapters 4 and 5, because this
patronage is often targeted along ethnic lines, low state capacity and scarcity of basic services then affect
voters’ expectations of the benefits they will receive from different parties, reinforcing the importance of
ethnicity for vote choice in many neighborhoods.
But the large literature on the origins of state capacity views it as developed through long-run historical
processes, gradually built over decades, or centuries (Tilly 1990, Herbst 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2000, Cen-
teno 2003, Fukuyama 2004). It is not a variable that quickly responds to short-term changes in economic
conditions. Ghana’s state and bureaucratic capacity is unlikely to substantially change after another decade
of growth (see below). The government will still fail to meet some of the challenges presented by urban-
ization described in Chapter 1. Scarcity in access to services in urban areas will persist as cities grow, and
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may even get much worse. Demands for particularistic goods in the electorate not fade away in the face
of additional urbanization. Patronage-based appeals will continue, which by extension, will perpetuate the
political importance of ethnicity.
Moreover, I argue in Chapter 4 that the concentration of the urban poor in slums allows Ghana’s parties to
engage in clientelistic relationships with voters more directly at an individual-level than in many rural areas,
where chiefs and other traditional elites instead often serve as intermediaries. As argued in Chapter 5, this
also influences incentives for ethnic voting in poor urban neighborhoods. But these slums are themselves
a direct outcome of urbanization (UN-Habitat 2014). With the government seemingly unable to redirect
the demographic and market forces driving rural-urban migration and urban population growth, or to solve
persistent urban housing shortages, slums are one of the only place for excess urban population to go. Even
if there is simultaneous growth in the size of the urban middle class, urbanization will also mean the further
emergence of slums.2 The growth of the urban middle class and the growth of slums are both outcomes
of urban growth; we cannot ascribe the effects of urbanization to one of these changes, while ignoring the
other. If urbanization leads to growth of slums, waiting for more urbanization to take place could lead to
more individual-level clientelism, not less.
7.3 Or Stop Waiting? Potential Institutional Reforms
Rather than simply waiting for more urbanization and economic growth to play out, existing research on
transitions away from clientelistic politics in other countries suggests that institutional reforms that alter
politicians’ incentives to provide patronage to voters and exhibit favoritism to co-ethnics may have more
immediate effects, reducing the prevalence of patronage-based appeals and the importance of ethnicity in
electoral competition. None of these reforms will be easy to implement, but they offer the potential for
more direct ways forward for improving electoral accountability in cities like Greater Accra. I consider
three here: efforts to restrict the supply of patronage and create bureaucratic autonomy in the distribution of
state resources, substantive decentralization that empowers urban municipal governments, and compulsory
voting and registration laws. Each of these can concretely alter the incentives underlying the theoretical
argument in the dissertation.
2Because they have become embedded in local power structures, pre-existing slums in Accra are also not easy for the government
to dislodge and will likely persist well into the future.
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7.3.1 Closing Off Opportunities for Patronage
Clientelism, ethnic favoritism, and ethnic voting are not unique to the developing world. They persisted
in many US cities into the mid-20th century. In patterns not unlike the stereotypical Africa democracy,
machine party organizations serving the interests of specific ethnic groups captured urban municipal gov-
ernments for decades at a time, maintaing support by targeting patronage to ethnic bases and intimidating
potential opposition supporters by threatening to cut off their access to government services. Though early
scholarship tied the eventual demise of these ethnic political machines in the US to the rising power of the
urban middle class (Banfield &Wilson 1963), in arguments akin to modernization theory, more recent work
suggests that the emergence of the middle class was not enough on its own to undermine patronage-based
electoral competition. Instead, a series of new state and federal policies that constricted the supply of pa-
tronage available to urban politicians gradually starved machines to death. It was often only after local
party organizations became unable to pay out enough patronage to keep their coalitions from splintering
that middle class reform movements were able to sweep into power in these cities and end the machine era
(Erie 1988, Trounstine 2008). As a result, the end of clientelism in the US appears to be less of a story about
demand-side changes in voters’ preferences, as theorized in the development-focused accounts described in
Chapter 3, than about supply-side changes to the ability of politicians to sustain patronage-based strategies
(Hicken 2011).
Several reforms worked in tandem to undermine the power of ethnic political machines. First, civil
service reforms adopted first at the federal level, and then gradually at the state level, created bureaucratic
autonomy within the agencies charged with determining access to state resources (Greenstein 1964, Shefter
1994, Trounstine 2008, Kuo 2014). This restricted the ability of politicians to give out bureaucratic jobs
as patronage, which in turn constrained their ability to direct the bureaucracy to target resources to favored
voters. Second, the creation of national-level universalistic social welfare programs, especially New Deal
programs such as Social Security, took control over supply of the main particularistic resources on which
the urban poor relied out of the hands of the machine parties and instead gave it to non-partisan federal
bureaucrats (Erie 1988). Access to governments benefits became determined by rational need-based criteria
(or was not means-tested at all, as with Social Security) rather than by voters’ ties to politicized urban bu-
reaucracies. Finally, many state governments seized various fiscal powers from city governments, restricting
179
the budget available for patronage distribution within cities (Trounstine 2008). While many died out, some
machine parties managed to survive for decades despite these reforms, such as the Daley organization in
Chicago. But Erie (1988) argues that these machines only survived if they were able to de-emphasize clien-
telism and switch to building support with new coalitions of non-co-ethnic voters through the universalistic
distribution of welfare benefits.
This American historical experience gives useful insights for how forms of political competition can
be changed in contemporary developing democracies. In particular, the recent success of conditional cash
transfer programs in Latin America closely echoes aspects of the US experience. Universalistic social wel-
fare programs targeted at the poor in Brazil and Mexico – Bolsa Familia and Progresa, respectively – have
received considerable attention for their perceived ability to break patronage-based modes of distribution
(De La O 2013, Zucco Jr. 2013). Much like programs such as Social Security centralized the distribution of
particularistic goods that had previously been distributed by clientelistic party agents in the urban US, con-
ditional cash transfer programs have centralized the distribution of private goods to poor voters in Brazil and
Mexico, giving control to non-partisan national-level bureaucrats charged with dispersing benefits based on
clearly defined, objective need-based criteria (Weitz-Shapiro 2014). Evidence in De La O (2013) suggests
that, at least in Mexico, these benefits are being distributed programmatically and have not become a new
avenue for clientelism.
If Ghana introduced similar forms of non-clientelistic distribution of particularistic benefits on a large
scale, it would change the incentives of voters that I document in Chapter 5. Scarcity in access to state
resources would persist, and voters’ underlying preferences for particularistic goods would be unchanged.
But the model in Chapter 5 implies that if these preferences were no longer satisfied via the clientelistic
distribution of resources on the basis of ethnicity, the importance of ethnicity for vote choice should decline,
even in the poor urban neighborhoods where I show that ethnic voting is now extensive.3 The adoption
of programs similar to Progresa and Bolsa Familia is not unthinkable in Ghana. In fact, the current NDC
government is already slowly scaling up a similar social welfare program, known as LEAP (“Livelihood
Empowerment Against Poverty" Program). This program was originally introduced by the NPP government
3Introducing these types of universalistic social welfare programs for poor voters, however, would not change the incentives of the
middle class to participate in politics, as middle class voters would not receive program benefits and do not necessarily demand
access to the particularistic resources provided by these programs in the first place. The argument from Chapter 3 would remain
in place.
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in 2008 and is being funded (in part) by the World Bank. The current number of beneficiaries is still limited,
but LEAP could theoretically be expanded into a larger-scale Progresa-style program.
But there are reasons to doubt whether such a program would be similarly successful at curbing patron-
age distribution in Ghana. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Ghanaian governments have already introduced
other supposedly universalistic social welfare programs targeted at these poor. But these programs have been
dogged by corruption and implementation failures. Access to benefits is often described as clientelistic. For
example, as Chapter 3 notes, a corruption scandal in the main national employment assistance program,
called GYEEDA (Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency; formerly the Na-
tional Youth Employment Program), revealed that there were dramatically fewer program beneficiaries than
claimed. Instead much of the program’s funding was siphoned off through no-bid contracts to businesses
with close ties to the ruling NDC who then did not provide the employment and job training programs they
were supposed to.4 The benefits that were given out have been described as a major source of patronage
to ruling party supporters.5 Supposedly universalistic government micro-credit programs have faced sim-
ilar accusations of being used a source of patronage (e.g., MASLOC and LESDEP, see Chapter 4). Even
the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), meant to provide universal basic health coverage to poor
Ghanaians, has not been truly universalistic. Due to funding shortfalls, health care providers have repeat-
edly turned away policy holders. Many Ghanaians still believe that they will receive sub-standard service,
or be denied altogether, without the ability to pay in cash despite having NHIS membership (Dalinjong &
Laar 2012).6 In addition, because enrollees must pay fees upfront to join, the enrollment of poor voters has
become a private good used by politicians from both parties, who describe signing up voters and paying
their fees as part of their pre-election goods distribution.7
In general, unless the bureaucracy that controls these programs is itself depoliticized, the programs may
simply become a new source of patronage resources for politicians to distribute. For example, Weitz-Shapiro
(2014) shows how similar programs have been clientelistic when implemented in Argentina, attributing this
4For example, see “The GYEEDA Report," Citi FM Online, http://datablog.peacefmonline.com/pages/blog/
32/.
5For media coverage, see “Teach the Foot Soldiers How to Fish," The Ghanaian Chronicle, 3 August 2010; from the fieldwork, for
example, focus group, Odorkor “Official Town," Ablekuma North constituency, 1 October 2013
6Also see Kent Mensah, “Ghana’s successful but unpopular healthcare", Al Jazeera, 6 August 2014.
7For example, interview with NDC executive, Ayawaso West constituency, Greater Accra, 23 July 2012; interview with district
assembly member, Okaikwei Central constituency, 25 February 2014.
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to differences in the bureaucracies controlling access to benefits. Progresa and Bolsa Familia are both
distributed by centralized national-level agencies.8 Benefits in Argentina’s program are instead controlled
by municipal-level politicians. District-level ruling party officials retain influence over access to benefits in
programs like GYEEDA and MASLOC in Ghana. But in the US context, the federal bureaucracies that took
over distribution of many particularistic goods through New Deal era programs were insulated from urban
machine leaders.
In settings like Ghana with substantially lower state capacity, how do you get the bureaucratic autonomy
needed for these programs to work? A central insight of Shefter (1977, 1994) is that if civil service pro-
tections and norms of bureaucratic autonomy do not precede the introduction of democratic political com-
petition, subsequent governments are unlikely to allow bureaucratic autonomy to develop – doing so would
constrain their ability to distribute the patronage that they have used to get into power in the first place.9
International development agencies, such as the World Bank, have invested heavily in recent decades in
programs to reform bureaucracies in developing countries to create autonomy and prevent patronage distri-
bution and corruption. But Cruz & Keefer (2015) shows that these reforms have often failed precisely be-
cause pre-existing clientelistic political parties have stymied their implementation in order to protect access
to patronage and rents.10Grindle (2012) observes that where bureaucracies have successfully been depoliti-
cized in Latin America, this has taken decades of very gradual, piecemeal reforms. Indeed, Kuo (2014)
describes how civil service reforms in the US only emerged over decades as the result of a gradual align-
ment of business interests, who eventually began losing more to corrupt, inefficient administration than they
were gaining from buying off government officials, with the partisan electoral incentives of the Republican
Party. Similar to the literature on the development of state capacity discussed above, the development of
bureaucratic autonomy is a long-term process, unlikely to improve significantly in Ghana in the near term.
The successful conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America offer a potential solution, however.
As Weitz-Shapiro (2014) and De La O (2013) describe, rather than reforming the existing bureaucracy,
Mexico side-stepped it entirely, creating a new independent agency run by technocratic elites without strong
8And even in Brazil, recent research by Brollo et al. (2015) suggests that access to Bolsa Familia is still partially manipulated
before elections as a form of political targeting.
9This is similar to the argument in Chapter 3 about why politicians who have specialized in providing patronage will often be
unlikely to invest instead in universalistic appeals.
10Similarly, Persson et al. (2012) describe the large collective action problems governments face in reforming corrupted, politicized
bureaucracies.
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partisan ties to distribute Progresa benefits. A series of laws and regulations were enacted to protect this
agency from subsequent political interference, including placing hard caps on the amount of program bene-
fits that could be distributed before elections. Creating a single new agency is a significantly more plausible
task for a developing country like Ghana to replicate in the short term than reforming the entire state bu-
reaucracy. This would allow social transfer programs to at least begin partially breaking clientelistic ties
with the poor through universalistic distribution of some benefits even if the remainder of the bureaucracy
remains politicized.
But under the logic of Shefter (1994), why would current incumbents agree to create such agencies?
Because there now appear to be large electoral rewards to doing so. De La O (2013), Zucco Jr. (2013), and
Labonne (2013) all show significant electoral benefits to incumbent governments for implementing cash
transfer programs similar to those the World Bank is now advocating in countries like Ghana. That these
programs benefit incumbents is one of the main selling points to the many governments in the develop-
ing world that are now considering adopting them. The ruling party in Ghana may be able to reap similar
rewards; this may be why the NDC government is investing in the LEAP program to begin with. By system-
atically and efficiently reaching a large number of voters with the particularistic goods that they demand,
similar programs may actually be a more efficient means of building support with unaligned voters than the
relatively inefficient “reputation building" strategies I describe in Chapter 4. Worryingly, as with Ghana’s
other “universalistic" programs, LEAP is currently being administered by a pre-existing bureaucracy, not an
independent, insulated agency, raising the risk it will still be used as patronage.11 But if this were to change,
and the program were significantly scaled up, this type of program could be a means to change incentives
for ethnic voting I document in Chapter 5, repeating a similar historical process to what ended the incentives
sustaining the ethnic machine parties in US cities.
7.3.2 Devolution and Local Elections
Another institutional change that would alter the incentives I document involves moving in the opposite
direction. Rather than undermining patronage by centralizing control of particularistic resources in an au-
tonomous national bureaucracy, Ghana could devolve significantly greater fiscal and policy-making powers
11LEAP is still a new program with a limited set of recipients. To my knowledge, there is currently no evidence one way or the
other on whether LEAP is being used as patronage by the ruling party.
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to district governments and introduce local elections for District Chief Executives (DCEs, or mayors).
As discussed in Chapter 6, many African governments have adopted decentralization reforms in recent
decades, primarily by creating additional local-level administrative units (Hassan 2014). But as Grossman
& Lewis (2014) describe, these reforms have not involved giving real substantive power to local tiers of gov-
ernment; if anything, decentralization has allowed national governments to re-centralize power by diluting
the bargaining power of local governments and projecting central state authority into additional local com-
munities. Decentralization has had these effects because national governments typically retain significant
control over local tiers of government in Africa, appointing local-level officials and controlling their budgets
(Olowu & Wunsch 2004). In the terminology of Boone (2003a), these states are “deconcentrated," but real
powers are not “devolved" to the local level. In the typology of Falleti (2010), there has been administrative
decentralization, but not fiscal or political decentralization.
The local government system in Ghana examined in Chapter 6 is an archetypical example of this pattern.
The leader of each district – the DCE – is a direct presidential appointee. There are local elections to
district assemblies, but 30% are direct presidential appointees, ensuring that the president’s party retains
a working majority in effectively all districts. The national government – controlled by the president’s
ruling party – controls the purse strings; most of the local budget depends on transfers from the center.
District governments have the ability to engage in limited local tax collection, but most revenue streams are
monopolized by the national government. District governments have no explicit policy-making authority
within their jurisdictions and do not have the capacity to initiate major projects on their own. Instead, they
only can oversee local implementation of policies decided on by the national government.
These limitations directly feed into the outcomes documented in the prior chapters. The only activity that
elected districted assembly members can credibly engage in is the distribution of small-scale particularistic
goods. Not valuing the services that these local officials can credibly provide, I find large-scale withdrawal
of the middle class from participation in local elections in Chapter 6, which then allows minority interests
to capture disproportionate local power and govern narrowly for their own benefit. More generally, because
the national ruling party controls most disbursements at all levels of government, there is favoritism to
co-ethnics of the ruling party in goods distribution everywhere, even within otherwise opposition-leaning
districts, which helps create the incentives for ethnic voting in many urban neighborhoods shown in Chapter
5.
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But these incentives could change if DCEs were locally elected, all district assembly seats were elected,
rather than 30% appointed by the national government, and district governments were given more fiscal and
policy-making autonomy. With more power, district-level officials could more credibly propose delivering a
broader range of policies and goods to voters, rather than only providing small-scale targeted benefits. Under
the logic of the argument in Chapter 6, there would then be higher turnout in local elections. Higher turnout
would make minority ethnic groups like the Ga less likely to capture disproportionate local power; the
benefits of local elections that other studies have identified in preventing local capture would become more
evident (e.g., Ferraz and Finan 2011, Beath et al. 2013). More importantly, with the ability to now implement
some of the policies that middle class voters demand, at least on a local scale, there will be a greater incentive
for local politicians to compete for middle class votes. Chapter 3 argues that a key constraint on the ability
of politicians to satisfy universalistic preferences of the middle class is a coordination problem with other
branches of government. Even if politicians in wealthier urban districts want to implement specific policies,
in the status quo system they would need approval from the rest of their party, which may be unwilling to
make broader policy changes that hurt their ability to distribute patronage in other areas. But if real authority
is devolved to local governments, local politicians can now adopt new policies within their districts, even as
patronage practices continue elsewhere in the country. As a result, middle class turnout in local elections
may rise.
These reforms would begin to allow for more substantive diversification in programmatic versus clien-
telistic modes of political competition at the local level across districts within urban areas, similar to
the municipal-level variation that has been documented extensively in Latin America (Luna 2014, Weitz-
Shapiro 2014, ?)12 As Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 note, districts in Greater Accra are not nearly as segregated
by wealth as in many Latin American cities. But middle class coalitions may be able to win on truly program-
matic platforms in relatively wealthier urban districts, even as patronage-based appeals remain entrenched in
relatively poorer urban districts. The intra-urban variation in patterns of political competition that I observe
in the previous chapters would intensify, but now there would be real programmatic competition in the areas
where individual-level clientelism is less prevalent.
12This is most likely where cities are split across many different municipal or district-level administrative units. In many US cities,
such as New York, Chicago, or LA, a single municipal government controls a huge swath of territory and a single machine party
can dominate the entire city. But more like many major South American cities, Greater Accra is split into 12 separate municipal
governments, allowing for different outcomes in different parts of the city.
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These changes would take place in the context of local elections, and would not immediately alter the
overall character of competition in presidential elections. But by potentially allowing programmatic political
competition to emerge at the local level, political and fiscal decentralization would create space for new
policy-based urban electoral coalitions to form. Similar to the idea that US states can be “laboratories" of
democracy in which new policy ideas are first attempted and then eventually exported nationwide, these local
policy-based coalitions in wealthier districts could eventually aggregate into political forces that become
influential in national-level politics. If this occurs, the class-based differences in participation in national-
level politics observed in Chapter 3 should decline.
But as with the universalistic social welfare programs described above, is it plausible that incumbent
national governments would ever agree to such political and fiscal decentralization? In general, national
governments are assumed to prefer to maintain their current powers (Falleti 2010).13 But O’Neill (2005)
suggests that governments will support these types of decentralization if they have long time horizons and
expect to be in the opposition in the near future. Devolving authority to lower tiers of government allows
a party to smooth its consumption of political power – giving up some power in the present to ensure that
they can maintain local power, at least in stronghold areas, deep into the future even if they lose the next
national-level elections.
With its two highly institutionalized parties that regularly rotate in power, Ghana may be the African
case in which the argument in O’Neill (2005) best applies. Unlike many other African leaders and ruling
parties (e.g., Bates 2008), democratic competition is sufficiently institutionalized in Ghana that the parties
have long time horizons. There is a reasonable expectation that they could take national power, or instead
lose it, in each subsequent national election. They both have strong regional bases, as described in Chapter
2. If power were devolved to the local level, they would be able to maintain control in these home regions
even if they lost a national election. Along these lines, proposals for fiscal and political decentralization –
especially the local election of DCEs – have already received significant consideration at high levels within
the Ghanaian government. Recently, a Constitutional Review Commission created by the NDC publicly
recommended the same changes I propose above. Senior leaders of both major parties have now endorsed
13Indeed, in Kampala, Uganda, for example, the national government undid fiscal and political decentralization, seizing back control
over budgets and policy-making in the city after opposition politicians took over the local city council and began implementing
an independent policy agenda. This local policy-making independence was seen as a political threat to the president, in part
specifically because it was helping to engender a new opposition political coalition at the grassroots level in a similar manner to
what I anticipate above (Lambright 2014).
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these proposals on the record (at least in theory), although the current NDC government has stalled at taking
significant action to set them into motion. Despite this, these types of decentralization reforms are realistic
possibilities in Ghana’s near feature, especially if a new government more committed to the Constitutional
Review Commission’s proposals takes power after the next election.
7.3.3 Compulsory Registration and Voting
A third possible institutional reform would involve changes to electoral administration. Chapter 3 argues that
politicians in Ghana will not face pressure to make credible policy-based electoral appeals that address the
preferences of the middle class, even as the middle class grows in size, if there is declining participation and
engagement by middle class voters with universalistic preferences. Compulsory voting laws and automatic
voter registration could help change this dynamic, creating a new set of incentives that encourage middle
class voters to turn out in high numbers even if current parties are not explicitly addressing their preferences.
If this happens, there would be renewed electoral pressure for Ghanaian politicians to offer policies meant
to address middle class preferences and secure the votes of this segment of the electorate. If that happens,
programmatic competition could begin to emerge as politicians compete for support of the urban middle
class.
As described in Chapter 3, Kasara & Suryanarayan (2014) finds that poor voters are more likely to turn
out than wealthier or middle class voters in much of the developing world, in the opposite of the pattern
commonly assumed to hold in developed democracies, where wealthier voters often turn out more than the
poor.14 But one region of the developing world that appears to deviate from the overall pattern Kasara &
Suryanarayan (2014) documents is Latin America, where cross-national analyses do not show evidence of
significant class-based differences in turnout rates, in either direction (Fornos et al. 2004). A key difference
setting this region apart is that compulsory voting laws are common throughout Central and South America,
but rare elsewhere in the developing world, including in Africa.15
Compulsory voting laws have long been advocated as an institutional remedy for class-based disparities
in the composition of the electorate (Lijphart 1997, Hill 2006). They are argued to produce high turnout rates
14Although see Ansolabehere & Hersh (2012), which suggests that the true extent of turnout inequality in developed democracies
may itself be overstated due to measurement problems.
15For a full list of countries with compulsory voting, see: http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm.
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and significantly reduce turnout inequality even without full enforcement (Nichter 2008). Even if many non-
voters are never punished, the existence of penalties for not voting can change norms about turnout and lead
most voters to the polls (Lijphart 1997). This is consistent with a large literature showing that small marginal
changes to the cost of voting can have big effects on turnout decisions (e.g., Brady and McNulty 2011).
Jaitman (2013) leverages a natural experiment created by age-based cutoffs in the schedule of penalties
for not turning out to vote in Argentina to show that the country’s compulsory turnout law has large effects on
turnout rates, even though the official penalties are rarely imposed for not voting. Jaitman (2013) estimates
that the mere possibility of penalties for not voting increases turnout by as much as 18 percentage points
among otherwise similar voters. This has the effect of leveling out class-based differences in the composition
of the Argentine electorate. Other changes to electoral procedures can similarly increase turnout and reduce
class-based disparities. For example, Wolfinger & Rosenstone (1980), Lijphart (1997), and Hill (2006)
discuss how making voter registration automatic can significantly increase turnout among previously low
turnout populations as opposed to making voters voluntarily choose to go through a potentially complicated
bureaucratic process in order to register. In addition, these types of laws are thought to have downstream
effects on the political preferences that are represented in the party system (Jensen & Spoon 2011). As the
range of policy preferences in the electorate changes when previously low turnout groups begin voting at
high rates, parties in many countries have begun catering more to the preferences of these new voters, as I
predict above.
The existing work looking at the effects of these new rules has been focused on reducing class disparities
in turnout that run in the other direction than in Ghana – with the goal being to increase the turnout of the
poor relative to the rich. But while Jaitman (2013) shows that effects of compulsory voting laws in Argentina
are larger among less educated, lower skill voters, the laws still were estimated to have a positive effect on
turnout among wealthier and more educated voters. With the poor in Ghana already turning out at very high
rates, there are likely ceiling effects on how much more compulsory voting or automatic registration could
increase turnout of the poor. As a result, these rules would likely still increase the turnout of the middle class
and wealthy relative to the poor. In addition, Kuenzi & Lambright (2007) show that aggregate turnout levels
in African democracies are associated with the same underlying institutional factors as have been found to
affect aggregate turnout in Latin America (Fornos et al. 2004). There is no clear reason why the effects of
compulsory voting and registration laws should operate fundamentally differently in the African context.
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While Ghana’s state capacity would constrain the ability of the government to enforce compulsory voting
rules, the research above on the effects of these laws show that they can be effective even with incomplete
enforcement. Moreover, automatic voter registration appears relatively achievable for the Ghanaian state.
The country is currently creating a national identification card for all citizens and there have been high-
level proposals that the Electoral Commission could now use this system to automatically register voters.16
Currently, Ghana’s voter registration process erects significant costs to registering – higher than many US
jurisdictions, where automatic registration is already expected to have significant effects on turnout (Hill
2006). There is no rolling registration in Ghana; people can only register, or update their registration to a
new home, in specific one or two week periods. These typically occur at some point before each presidential
election, but they are often only announced at the last minute, poorly advertised, and frequently postponed.
The parties engage in significant clientelistic mobilization of the poor to ensure that they register during
these narrow windows, but those who are not actively mobilized to register and work full-time jobs in the
formal sector, commuting to work away from their homes, face greater hurdles to registration. Automatic
registration through the national identification system would eliminate this disparity.
Ultimately, compulsory voting reforms will not undermine all of the incentives I describe in the previous
chapters. Ethnic voting will likely continue as long as patronage-based appeals continue alongside program-
matic competition. But if paired with the other institutional reforms suggested above, these changes could
collectively have concrete downstream effects on the forms of political competition that prevail in African
cities like Greater Accra.
16For example, see Godwin A. Allotey, “We don’t need new voters’ register, we need national
ID - Nduom" CitiFM Online, 30 August 2015, http://citifmonline.com/2015/08/30/
we-dont-need-new-voters-register-we-need-national-id-ndoum/. The main purpose of automatic
registration for its Ghanaian proponents is to cut down on electoral fraud, in which parties either pay supporters to register – and
then vote – multiple times or register minors and foreign nationals to vote for the party (Ichino & Schuendeln 2012). But such a
rule could also have broader effects on the composition of the electorate.
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A | Appendix: Supporting Information
A.1 Chapter 1
A.1.1 Election Results by City in Table 1.3
The column for political competitiveness in Table 1.3 codes whether a single party won more than 65% of the
vote in each city in the last election for which results were publicly available. Due to difficulty in obtaining
disaggregated district or constituency results for many countries, the election used here is sometimes the
second most recent national election, rather than the most recent one. Many cities are also now significantly
larger than their official district boundaries. Where possible I use results for the entire administrative region
surrounding a city (e.g. all of Lagos State) to err on the side of including the full metropolitan area. I list the
election year, type, data source, and main result for each city in Table 3 here:
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Table A.1: Data Sources for Table 3
Election Election Source Winning Vote
City, Country: Year Type Party Share
Lagos, Nigeria 2015 Pres. Election commission website APC 55%
Kinshasa, DRC – – none available – –
Johannesburg, S. Africa 2014 Nat. Assem. Election commission website ANC 54%
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 2010 Pres. Election commission website CCM 51%
Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire 2011 Parl. Election Passporta RHDP 52%
Greater Accra, Ghana 2012 Pres. Official EC data NDC 51%
Nairobi, Kenya 2013 Pres. Election commission website ODM 49%
Cape Town, S. Africa 2014 Nat. Assem. Election commission website DA 59%
Kano, Nigeria 2011b House of Rep. Election Passport PDP 35%
Dakar, Senegal 2012 Pres. (1st Rd) African Elections Databasec APR 27%
Ibadan, Nigeria 2011b House of Rep. Election Passport ACN 37%
Durban, S. Africa 2014 Nat. Assem. Election commission website ANC 65%
Ouagadougou, Burk. Faso 2010 Pres. Election commission website CDP >65%d
Antananarivo, Madag. 2013 Pres. Election commission website AVANA 61%
Kumasi, Ghana 2012 Pres. Official EC data NPP >70%
Bamako, Mali – – none available – –
Abuja, Nigeria 2015 Pres. Election commission website PDP 50%
Lusaka, Zambia 2015 Pres. Election commission website PF 61%
Pretoria, S. Africa 2014 Nat. Assem. Election commission website ANC 51%
Lubumbashi, DRC – – none available – –
Mbuji-Mayi, DRC – – none available – –
Conakry, Guinea 2013 Nat. Assem. Election Passport UDFG 45%
Kampala, Uganda 2011 Pres. Election commission website FDC 46%
Harare, Zimbabwe 2013 Parl. Election Passport MDC 53%e
Benin City, Nigeria 2015 Pres. Election commission website PDP 55%
a: David Lublin, ÒElection Passport,Ó American University, http:///www.electionpassport.com. b: Kano State
and Oyo State both include many rural areas not in Kano city or Ibadan . Local-level results that allowed for a disag-
gregated estimate of city vote shares itself were only publicly available for 2011. c: African Elections Database, http:
//africanelections.tripod.com/. d: Local-level results not publicly available, but based on the landslide in fa-
vor of the CDP in national-level results, it is clear than the party won more than 65% within the capital. e: Unofficial results
from Election Passport were used for Zimbabwe given the widespread allegations of rigging in the officially released totals.
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A.2 Chapter 2
A.2.1 Sampling Procedure for Urban Survey
The survey was conducted in a stratified random sample of urban Greater Accra. Using 2010 census data,
the parliamentary constituencies in urban Greater Accra were stratified by wealth (top or bottom half of the
distribution on the same wealth index in the paper), ethnic diversity (top or bottom half of the distribution of
ethnic fractionalization), and 2012 presidential vote share (as NDC or NPP stronghold, or as competitive).
Ten constituencies were then randomly selected, with the number per stratum determined by the propor-
tion of the total population in the stratum and the selection probabilities within each stratum weighted by
constituency population in 2010.
Within each constituency, five 2010 census enumeration areas were sampled with replacement, again
stratifying by ethnic diversity and wealth, with the number chosen per stratum proportional to the stra-
tum’s share of the constituency population and the selection probability of enumeration areas within strata
weighted by population. Only 4 enumeration areas were selected in two constituencies that are significantly
smaller than the others (Ayawaso East and Ayawaso North). Finally, random GPS starting points for enu-
merators were chosen within each selected enumeration area. These starting points were projected onto
Google Maps for the enumerators, who began sampling respondents upon confirming via GPS coordinates
that they had reached the sampled start point. This final step ensured that the random walks to select respon-
dents did not only begin in the more commercial part of each neighborhood, as would be the case if using
polling stations or the community center as each starting point.
Surveys were conducted by enumerators using smartphones (ODK Collect) to enter survey responses.
To select 21 respondents around each starting point, the smartphone gave each enumerator a new random
direction and number of houses to count off to recruit each respondent. The first walk began at the start
point and then the enumerators continued each new walk from the previous respondent’s home. Within
households, the phone assigned a gender to be selected (alternating by interview) and randomly selected a
specific person of that gender after ranking household members by age. Enumerators conducted “call backs"
for respondents who were initially unavailable and otherwise sampled replacements (from new households)
via the same random walk procedure.
A.2.2 Calculation of Neighborhood Characteristics
I follow Reardon & O’Sullivan (2004) and Lee et al. (2008) by calculating neighborhood characteristics
around respondents (and polling stations) as a weighted average of census characteristics falling within a set
radius from the respondent. This is the same approach taken in Ichino and Nathan (2013).





, where ⌧q is the population density at point q, ⌧qm is the population density of
group m at point q, dist(p, q) is the distance in kilometers from the respondent at point p to the centroid
of a surrounding census enumeration area (EA) at point q, and EAs are weighted by the function  (p, q) =
(dist(p, q) + 0.5) 1, as in Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004), up to a maximum distance, after which all
EAs are weighted as 0. This is calculated via the seg package in R. I set the maximum radius to 500
meters for the reasons discussed in the text. This approach finds a middle ground between calculating
neighborhood characteristics as only each respondent’s own EA or calculating these characteristics to a pre-
defined unit much larger than actual neighborhoods, such as a district or parliamentary constituency. The
former approach implicitly weights all other EAs as 0 even though neighborhoods are larger than EAs and
EA boundaries are arbitrary and not socially meaningful. The latter approach will miss significant within-
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district variation in neighborhood characteristics. Because the weights approach 0 further away from the
respondent, small changes in the size of the maximum radius (e.g., to 400m or 600m) do not significantly
affect these measures. This procedure is described in more detail in Chapter 5 as well.
A.2.3 Interviews and Focus Groups in Greater Accra, by Constituency
Interviews
Ablekuma North
Interview with NDC parliamentary candidate, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 20 June 2012
Interview with district assembly member and NPP member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 19 July
2012
Interview with district assembly member and NPP member, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 11
March 2014
Interview with NPP party agent, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 14 March 2014
Interview with NDC constituency executive, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 25 March 2014
Anyaa-Sowutuom
Interview with NPP constituency executive, Anyaa-Sowutuom constituency, 20 July 2012
Ayawaso Central
Interview with NDC parliamentary candidate, Ayawaso Central constituency (AMA), 4 July 2012
Interview with district assembly member and NPP member, Ayawaso Central constituency (AMA), 19 July
2012
Interview with district assembly member and NDC member, Ayawaso Central constituency (AMA), 27
August 2013
Ayawaso West
Interview with NPP parliamentary candidate, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 16 July 2012
Interview with district assembly member and NDC constituency executive, Ayawaso West constituency
(AMA), 23 July 2012
Interview with NPP constituency executives, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 6 August 2013
Interview with district assembly member and NPP member, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 20 August
2013
Dome Kwabenya
Interview with NPP constituency executive, Dome Kwabenya constituency, 26 June 2012
La Dade Kotopon
Interview with district assembly member and NDC constituency executive, La Dade Kotopon, 19 August
2013
Interview with district assembly member and NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 14 February
2014
Interview with district assembly member and NPP party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 14 February
2014
Interview with NPP party agent (#1), La Dade Kotopon constituency, 18 February 2014
Interview with NPP party agent (#2), La Dade Kotopon constituency, 18 February 2014
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Interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 27 February 2014
Interview with NPP constituency executive, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 4 March 2014
Interview with NPP party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 5 March 2014
Interview with NDC constituency executives and NDC MP, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 24 March 2014
Interview with NDC party agent, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 26 March 2014
Ledzokuku
Interview with NPP constituency executive, Ledzokuku constituency, 1 August 2013
Interview with NPP party agents, Ledzokuku constituency, 1 August 2013
Interview with district assembly member and NPP party agent, Ledzokuku constituency, 3 August 2013
Krowor
Interview with former NPP constituency executive and former NPP parliamentary candidate, 6 June 2012
Interview with NPP current and former constituency executives, Krowor constituency, 15 February 2014
Interview with NPP party agent, Krowor constituency, 15 February 2014
Interview with NPP party agents (#1), Krowor constituency, 23 February 2014
Interview with NPP party agents (#2), Krowor constituency, 23 February 2014
Interview with NPP party agents (#3), Krowor constituency, 23 February 2014
Interview with NPP party agent (#4), Krowor constituency, 23 February 2014
Interview with NPP party agents (#5), Krowor constituency, 23 February 2014
Interview with former NDC constituency executive, Krowor constituency, 19 March 2014
Madina
Interview with NPP parliamentary candidate, Madina constituency, 6 June 2012
Interview with NPP constituency executive, Madina constituency, 18 June 2012
Interview with NPP party agent, Madina constituency, 29 June 2012
Okaikwei Central
Interview with district assembly member and NDC party agent, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 25
February 2014
Interview with district assembly member and NDC constituency executive, Okaikwei Central constituency
(AMA), 27 February 2014
Interview with NDC party agent, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 1 March 2014
Interview with NPP constituency executive, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 4 March 2014
Interview with district assembly member and former NPP constituency executive, Okaikwei Central con-
stituency (AMA), 12 March 2014
Interview with NPP party agent, Okaikwei Central constituency (AMA), 19 March 2014
Okaikwei North
Interview with NPP constituency executives, Okaikwei North constituency (AMA), 6 August 2013
Weija-Gbawe
Interview with NPP constituency executive, Weija-Gbawe constituency, 29 July 2013
Focus Groups
Focus group, Kpone, Kpone-Katamanso constituency, 19 June 2013
Focus group, Dzorwulu, Ayawaso West constituency (AMA), 21 June 2013
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Focus group, Anyaa, Anyaa-Sowutuom constituency, 24 June 2013
Focus group, McCarthy Hill, Weija-Gbawe constituency, 24 June 2013
Focus group, Kaneshie, Ablekuma South constituency (AMA), 26 June 2013
Focus group, Labadi Market, La Dade Kotopon constituency, 27 June 2013
Focus group, Teshie, Ledzokuku constituency, 1 July 2013
Focus group, Zongo Laka, Ashaiman constituency, 3 July 2013
Focus group, Madina Zongo, Madina constituency, 30 July 2013
Focus group, Dansoman, Ablekuma West constituency (AMA), 1 August 2013
Focus group, Adenta, Adenta constituency, 7 August 2013
Focus group, Odorkor, Ablekuma North constituency (AMA), 1 October 2013
Focus group, Mataheko, Ablekuma Central constituency (AMA), 1 October 2013
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A.3 Chapter 3
A.3.1 Coding Rules for Preferences
Responses to the question about preferences were blind-coded, with all respondent information removed
except a ID number. Responses were coded on two dimensions: the category of preference and the specific
topic or issue. In terms of the category, responses were coded as either being universalistic or particularistic
and then as private or club goods within particularistic preferences. Universalistic preferences were those
that could only be satisfied by a public policy that necessarily would affect many other people, not only the
respondent or respondent’s immediate neighborhood. Club goods were preferences that could be satisfied
by providing something to a specific neighborhood or community. Private goods were preferences that could
be satisfied by providing something directly to an individual, especially the respondent. The key defining
criteria thus was: could this preference be satisfied by a politician through a clientelistic transfer or instead
only through a major public policy that affects everyone? The goal is to a provide a conservative lower
bound on the extent of universalistic demands. Responses were also coded for the substantive topics within
these categories. These topics were adapted directly from the coding categories for a similar question on
the 3rd Round of the Afrobarometer surveys (Question #63), also analyzed in Lieberman and McClendon
(2013).1
There were several ambiguities in coding the broader categories of preferences. First, demands for club
goods in which the respondent specifically specified that the beneficiaries be someone other than herself
or community are coded as universalistic. Examples include “Government has to extend the electricity in
a way that people in the rural areas could also have access to it" and “Put up education facilities in the
rural areas." Coming from urban respondents, these are statements in support of pro-rural public policies
and were coded as universalistic. But when the respondent did not specify a recipient, preferences for club
goods were always coded as particularistic. For example, “tar bad roads" would be coded as particularistic
and a club good, in the same way that the response “tar bad roads in my area" would be coded. But “tar bad
roads in rural areas" would be coded as universalistic.
Second, respondents asking for support with education expenses could have been making two different
types of demands – those asking for direct assistance for themselves or families, and those demanding the
NPP’s national free secondary education policy, which was a central element of its 2012 campaign platform,
as described in the main text. The first preference is private and particularistic and can be satisfied by
patronage to a specific voter. Indeed, local politicians in Ghana describe support for school tuition as one
of the main private goods they distribute to voters in clientelistic relationships. But the second preference is
universalistic and regards a major national public policy. To separate these preferences, any statements that
directly and specifically mentioned making secondary education free (e.g., “free shs education" or “make
shs free", where SHS is “senior high school") were coded as universalistic. But statements that made vaguer
demands for support for education expenses were coded as particularistic (e.g., “reduce cost of education"
or “make school fees affordable"), as these preferences could still be satisfied by more targeted assistance to
the particular respondent.
Third, many respondents said that they wanted the government to improve employment. These prefer-
ences were coded as universalistic only if the respondent specifically said that they wanted jobs created for
1The full list of topics that respondents raised are: 1. rates and taxes; 2. education; 3. corruption; 4. petroleum; 5. unemployment;
6. health; 7. water supply; 8. economy; 9. infrastructure and roads; 10. housing supply; 11. sanitation; 12. support to local
business; 13. governance; 14. poverty; 15. loans; 16. electricity; 17. crime; 18. social welfare; 19. farming; 20. political divisions
/ conflict ; 21. social problems; 22. public sector wages; 23. food shortages; 24. land; 25. flooding; 26. transportation; 27.
orphans.
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Table A.2: Universalistic Preferences (Replication of Table 3.2)
1 2
Outcome: Binary Binary





Assets Index  0.104  0.234⇤
(0.083) (0.106)
Individual-level Controls Y Y
N 987 619
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Logistic
regression coefficients, with intercepts partially pooled
by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007).
All models otherwise identical to column 1 of Table 3.2
in the main text.
everyone (e.g., “create jobs for all" or “create more jobs in Ghana so that living standard will improve"). Any
other statement that was vague about whether or not the respondent herself wanted the new job was coded
as particularistic (e.g., “create more jobs" or “provision of jobs"). This preference could still potentially be
satisfied by a patronage job for that respondent, her family, or those in her immediate community.
A.3.2 Table 3.2 Results without Employment
To ensure that the correlation between being in the middle class and having universalistic preferences is not
a mechanical outcome of the fact that the definition of middle class includes whether or not a respondent
is employed in the formal sector and one of the most common particularistic preferences is a demand for
employment, I repeat the main model from Table 3.2 after either: (a) only defining middle class status based
on literacy and secondary education, not employment; (b) dropping all respondents who list employment
as one of their preferences and using the original definition of middle class. Results in both alternative
specifications are substantively identical to those in Table 3.2.
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Table A.3: Preferences for Club Goods
1 2
Educ/Emply. Index  0.057  0.055
(0.089) (0.089)
Assets Index 0.092 0.101
(0.091) (0.093)
Pop. Change 10 Years (500m) 0.075⇤
0.035
Neighborhood Wealth (500m)  0.211
(0.200)
Running Water (by cluster)  0.938⇤
(0.397)
Paved Road (by cluster)  0.566†
(0.294)
Pop. Density (by cluster)  0.013⇤
(0.006)
Moved for Club Goods  0.570⇤  0.557⇤
(0.246) (0.247)
Individual-level Controls Y Y
N 987 987
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Logistic
regression coefficients, with intercepts partially pooled
by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007).
The outcome is either a binary indicator for listing at
least one club good among the responses. Other than the
outcome variable, the models are the same as columns 1
and 4 of Table 3.2 in the main text
A.3.3 Outcome as Demand for Club Goods
I also repeat the models for Table 3.2 with the outcome as a binary indicator for demanding any club good
(gutters, roads, etc). I find that differences in wealth and socio-economic class do not predict whether
respondents want club goods, such as new roads or water supply. But the variables measuring the quality
of existing service provision in the neighborhood are all strong predictors of preferences for club goods,
as described in the main text. In addition, having moved into your current neighborhood because of the
public services there (controlled for in all models), predicts lower demand for club goods, consistent with
the discussion of this in the text.
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A.3.4 Removing Electricity and Water Prices, Removing Free Secondary Education
Because turnout cannot be measured until after the election, and preferences and turnout must be measured
in the same survey, preferences are observed after the decision to vote, yet are being used as an explanatory
variable. Preferences could have been influenced by factors occurring after the election. The assumption
above is that the types of people who prefer universalistic versus particularistic goods are correlated over
time, such that respondents prioritizing universalistic policies after the election were also those most likely
to prioritize universalistic policies before the election.2 If the classification of preferences has been muddled
by post-hoc measurement, with some respondents mis-assigned to the wrong category (universalistic vs. par-
ticularistic), the measurement error should bias against seeing significant differences in political behavior
between the two groups.
But this does not mean that the specific issues that voters raise within these broader categories of uni-
versalistic or particularistic goods will be the same over time. The clearest example of this is that the
government announced increases in water and electricity prices immediately before the survey was fielded
– this likely explains the prominence of preferences for lower electricity and water prices seen in Table 3.1
of the main text.3 In the table below, I drop all respondents who would only have been coded as having
universalistic preferences because of complaints about electricity or water prices and re-estimate Tables 3.2,
3.3, and 3.5 of the main text. I find substantively identical results in the first column of the three tables
below, suggesting that the findings are not explained by a topical issue that arose after the election.
Moreover, when those with universalistic preferences did turn out to vote, they were more likely to vote
for the NPP than the NDC, even controlling for differences in ethnicity and individual-level wealth. This is
consistent with the NPP putting somewhat more emphasis on policy-based appeals in its campaign, as noted
in the main text, and with the NPP being the only viable opposition party that voters dissatisfied with the
status quo could turn to. There could be concern, however, that universalistic preferences measured after the
election are outcomes of NPP support. This is especially for those who wanted free secondary education
nationwide, which was mentioned by some who spoke about education (see Table 3.1 in the main text, 10%
of total universalistic preferences were on education). This was by far the main universalistic policy issue
emphasized in the 2012 NPP platform and campaign. In another robustness test in the second column of
the three tables below, I drop all respondents who would only have been coded as having universalistic
preferences because they wanted the NPP’s secondary education policy and re-estimate the results in Tables
3.2, 3.3, and 3.5 of the main text. I find no substantive differences with the results in the main text.
2Similarly, I make an assumption that measurement of who is in the middle class is correlated over time.
3These rates are set by the government, with a single price nationally, and thus involve a universalistic policy.
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Table A.4: Universalistic Preferences, Dropping Utility Price and Education Demands
1 2
Outcome: Binary Binary
Dropped Respondents: Utility Prices Education
Educ/Emply. Index 0.191⇤ 0.182⇤
(0.091) (0.084)
Assets Index  0.182†  0.131
(0.097) (0.088)
Pop. Change 10 Years (500m)  0.039  0.010
(0.030) (0.025)
Neighborhood Wealth (500m) 0.436⇤ 0.272
(0.198) (0.175)
Running Water (by cluster) 0.882⇤ 0.685⇤
(0.372) (0.339)
Paved Road (by cluster) 0.588⇤ 0.420†
(0.276) (0.252)
Pop. Density (by cluster) 0.021⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.006)
Individual-level Controls Y Y
N 862 961
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Logistic regression
coefficients with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, fol-
lowing Gelman and Hill (2007). The outcome is the binary indicator
for listing at least one universalistic policy. Models are the same as
Table 3.2 in the main text.
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Table A.5: Turnout and Participation, Dropping Utility Price and Education Demands
1 2 3 4
Outcome: Turnout Turnout Withdrawal Withdrawal
Dropped Respondents: Utility Prices Education Utility Prices Education
Universalistic Preferences (binary)  0.389† 0.381⇤  0.544⇤⇤ 0.365⇤
(0.219) (0.168) (0.201) (0.158)
Educ/Emply. Index  0.125 0.233⇤  0.071 0.195⇤
(0.125) (0.096) (0.112) (0.090)
Assets Index 0.204  0.164 0.164  0.116
(0.136) (0.100) (0.121) (0.094)
Neighborhood Wealth (500m)  0.094 0.178  0.039 0.153
(0.215) (0.163) (0.196) (0.160)
2008 Competitiveness (by ward)  3.153⇤ 0.622  2.438†  0.003
(1.492) (1.129) (1.367) (1.143)
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m) 1.236  0.458 0.852  0.354
(1.804) (1.342) (1.638) (1.348)
Pop. Density (by cluster) 0.007  0.002 0.009  0.002
(0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Individual-level Controls Y Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y
N 861 799 960 895
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The outcome in columns 1-2 is self-
reported turnout in the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. The outcome in
columns 3-4 is an indicator for doing only 1 or 0 of the 5 forms of participation discussed













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.3.5 Table for Interaction of Demands and Mobilization
This is the corresponding regression table for the model used to simulate differences in turnout between
those with and without universalistic preferences at different rates of reported door to door mobilization.
Table A.7: Turnout and Mobilization
1
Outcome: Turnout
Universalistic Preferences (percentage)  2.407⇤
(1.105)
Door to Door Mobilization % (by cluster)  0.508
(1.124)






Neighborhood Wealth (500m) 0.027
(0.220)
2008 Competitiveness (by ward)  2.174
(1.422)
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m) 1.130
(1.641)





***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1.
The outcome in columns 1-4 is self-reported turnout in
the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. Lo-
gistic regression coefficients, with intercepts partially
pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill
(2007). All other modeling details are identical to Ta-
ble 3.3 in the main text.
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Table A.8: Treatment Values in the Survey Experiment
Treatment: Value 1 Value 2 Value 3 Value 4
Ethnicity:
AKAN James Prempeh Emmanuel Owusu Ansah – –
EWE Joseph Dzorkpe John Dodzi – –
GA Alfred Nii Tawiah Richard Laryea – –
NORTHERN Isaac Yakubu Amadu Muntari – –
Promise:
PUBLIC Water and fuel prices National water production – –
CLUB Roads in the constituency Classrooms in the constituency – –
PRIVATE Jobs for youth Scholarships to families – –
Background text: Doctor Lecturer Lawyer Businessman
A.3.6 Experimental Vignettes
Respondents were read two pairs of vignettes about two hypothetical candidates each. After being asked to
say which of the two candidates they would rather vote for (analyzed elsewhere), respondents were asked the
follow-up question about credibility of one of the two candidates in each pair: “Do you think a politician like
[NAME] will actually deliver on a promise like [PROMISE]?" (with the treatments inserted). The candidate
that this follow-up question was asked about was randomly chosen from each pair. Each respondent thus
answered this question on credibility twice, with two different conditions for NAME and PROMISE.
The vignettes about candidates varied on three dimensions: the name (and thus ethnicity) of the can-
didate, the good he promised to deliver, and his background. Table A.8 lists the possible values of each
treatment. Inserting example treatments, the vignettes took the form:4
[AKAN 1, PUBLIC GOOD 1, LECTURER]: “Candidate A is named JAMES PREMPEH. He
is a lecturer and teacher who graduated from KNUST.5 He lives in the constituency here. If
elected, he is promising TO LOBBY FOR KEEPING THE PRICE OF FUEL AND UTILI-
TIES LOW so that everyone IN GHANA can continue to afford fuel and electricity. With your
support, JAMES PREMPEH believes he can bring about a transformation in the development
of this community."6
4All prompts were translated into three local languages (Akan, Ewe, Ga), or instead read aloud in English for respondents who
preferred the interview in English. Enumerators could select which translation they wished to have appear on the smartphone
before reading aloud the prompts.
5This is one of the three major national universities in Ghana – the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology.
6The “background" treatment also includes the “filler" text of the vignette. So for doctors, the final sentence was always “[NAME]
wants you to wants you to vote for him so he can improve the lives of people in this community." For lecturers it was: “With your
support, [NAME] believes he can bring about a transformation in the development of this community", etc. This ensured that the
exact wording of the vignette was not exactly the same for each of the four candidates and varied across the ethnicity and promise
conditions.
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[EWE 1, PRIVATE 1, DOCTOR]: “Candidate B is named JOSEPH DZORKPE. He is a doctor
who lives in this constituency and is running for parliament. He received his medical training at
the University of Ghana Medical School.7 In return for your support, he is promising TO FIND
JOBS FOR SOME OF THE YOUTH in the constituency. JOSEPH DZORKPE wants you to
vote for him so he can improve the lives of people in this community."
In each pair of candidates, respondents always received one candidate from their own ethnic group
(based on their response to a question about their own ethnicity earlier on the survey) and the other candi-
date’s ethnicity was then selected at random.8 The specific names within these ethnicities were also selected
at random. In the second pair of vignettes, respondents received the other name from their own ethnic group
and a name from one of the two ethnic groups that they had not received in the first vignette, again selected
at random. The four backgrounds were randomly allocated to the four candidates, without replacement,
such that each background treatment occurred once. In all pairs the candidates promised the same category
of good, with one promising the first example and the other promising the second example, again assigned
at random. The category of the first pair was selected at random with equal probability from the three cat-
egories (PUBLIC/UNIVERSALISTIC, CLUB, PRIVATE) and then the category of second pair selected at
random from the remaining two. The order of each specific example within these categories (PRIVATE
GOOD 1 vs. PRIVATE GOOD 2) was also randomized with equal probability, as was the order of all the
other treatments within the pairs (names, backgrounds).
For example, a single Akan respondent would receive treatments such as: PAIR 1: [AKAN NAME 1,
PUBLIC GOOD 1, LAWYER] vs. [NORTHERNNAME 2, PUBLIC GOOD 2, BUSINESSMAN]; PAIR 2:
[AKAN NAME 2, CLUB GOOD 1, DOCTOR] vs. [EWE NAME 2, CLUB GOOD 2, LECTURER]. And
then the follow-up question about credibility could have been: [NORTHERN NAME 2, PUBLIC GOOD 2,
BUSINESSMAN] for the first pair, and [AKAN NAME 2, CLUB GOOD 1, DOCTOR] for the second pair.
The questions on credibility would then take the form:
“Do you think a politician like AMADU MUNTARI will actually deliver on a promise like
CONSTRUCTING NEWWATER PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN GHANA?"
“Do you think a politician like EMMANUEL OWUSU ANSAH will actually deliver on a
promise like CONSTRUCTING AND TARRING MORE OF THE ROADS IN THE CON-
STITUENCY?"
7This is the main national medical school.
8For respondents who were not members of any of these four ethnic categories all names in the experiment were assigned at random,
with equal probability.
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Table A.9: Responses to Credibility Question by Co-Ethnicity and Good Promised
Promise: Public/Universalistic Club Private
Co-ethnic Name: 99 “Yes" (32%) 96 “Yes" (34%) 88 “Yes" (30%)
N=313 N= 285 N=292
Non-co-ethnic Name: 69 “Yes" (23%) 90 “Yes" (28%) 84 “Yes" (26%)
N=303 N=327 N=327
A.3.7 Summary Statistics for Credibility Question
In Table A.9 I provide summary statistics for responses to the follow-up question about credibility. These
are the counts of respondents in each treatment category who answer “yes," that they expect a politician to
follow through on his promise. Treatment conditions here are defined by whether respondents’ received a
co-ethnic or non-co-ethnic name and by the category of good promised. More respondents overall received
the non-co-ethnic name treatment because respondents from minor ethnic groups always received non-co-
ethnic names.
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A.3.8 Balance for Credibility Question
In Table A.10 I provide balance statistics for differences in means for key covariates between the respon-
dents receiving the credibility question in the experiment about a co-ethnic or about a non-co-ethnic. These
statistics are listed separately by the type of good referenced in the question. Balance remains imperfect
after the randomization, especially for the club goods promises. Because of this, all analysis of the sur-
vey experiment the paper includes co-variates as controls to adjust for remaining imbalance across these
conditions.
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Table A.10: Differences in Means, Co-Ethnic Name Treatment
Variable: difference in means p-value
Promise: Universalistic/Public
Universalistic preference (0,1) 0.037 0.235
Male (0,1) -0.009 0.778
Some Secondary Education (0,1) 0.003 0.926
Formal Sector Employment (0,1) 0.016 0.493
English LIteracy -0.023 0.466
Education/employment index -0.004 0.944
Assets index -0.056 0.373
Moved for club goods (0,1) 0.014 0.467
Age 0.281 0.731
Neigh. Wealth index 0.033 0.527
Eth. Fractionalization -0.017 0.016
Population Density -1.773 0.318
Promise: Club Good
Universalistic preference (0,1) 0.086 0.007
Male (0,1) -0.009 0.780
Some Secondary Education (0,1) 0.086 0.007
Formal Sector Employment (0,1) 0.063 0.007
English LIteracy 0.094 0.003
Education/employment index 0.226 0.000
Assets index 0.046 0.476
Moved for club goods (0,1) 0.039 0.041
Age -0.119 0.887
Neigh. Wealth index 0.101 0.042
Eth. Fractionalization -0.002 0.747
Population Density -1.211 0.485
Promise: Private Good
Universalistic preference (0,1) 0.063 0.047
Male (0,1) -0.087 0.006
Some Secondary Education (0,1) -0.090 0.005
Formal Sector Employment (0,1) -0.017 0.460
English LIteracy -0.057 0.070
Education/employment index -0.152 0.016
Assets index 0.024 0.707
Moved for club goods (0,1) -0.009 0.629
Age 1.034 0.217
Neigh. Wealth index -0.007 0.885
Eth. Fractionalization -0.008 0.216
Population Density -0.415 0.806
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A.3.9 Experimental Results Pooled Across Goods
I confirm that universalistic preferences predict less trust in politicians’ promises – and the respondents are
less trusting of promises from non-co-ethnics – in a single model that pools across the types of goods being
promised (universalistic/public, club, private). This model involves double counting individual respondents,
however, as each respondent answered two versions of the credibility question, one each about two of the
three types of promises.
A.4 Chapter 5
A.4.1 Main Ethnic Voting Result for Akans and Northerners Only
I also replicate the main result of the paper from Table 1 in the main text after coding only co-ethnics of
the presidential candidates as potential ethnic voters, rather than also including voters from ethnic groups
affiliated with the party overall (e.g., Ewes). The NDC candidate (and winner) in 2012 was John Dramani
Mahama, a Northerner from the Gonja tribe. The NPP candidate was Nana Akuffo Addo, an Akan, from
the Akyem sub-group. In this revised definition of “ethnic voting", only Akan and Northern respondents
are included in the model and all others are dropped, because they do not have a co-ethnic to vote for in the
race.9 I find that the results in Table 5.1 are identical in this sub-set of respondents. The interaction between
ethnic fractionalization and neighborhood wealth remains as before. Individual-level wealth, education, and
the salience of ethnic identity still do not predict ethnic voting. The results in the main text are thus robust
to using this alternative, narrower definition of ethnic voting instead of the definition used in the text.
There is also another clarification about how I define the Akan ethnic group. The Akan group is com-
prised of multiple sub-groups. While most are strongly linked to the NPP, the Fanti sub-group has been less
aligned, in part because the NDC candidate was a Fanti in 2000, 2004, and 2008.10 But the 2012 election
occurred after his death, with a Northern candidate now on the ballot for the NDC instead. Fantis in 2012
voted more in line with other Akan groups; 71% on the survey reported supporting the NPP. All results for
vote choice are robust to either including the 103 Fantis as Akans or coding Fantis as unaffiliated with any
party. Results presented throughout the text are the former.
9I code all Northern respondents as potential co-ethnics of Presidential Mahama (NDC candidate) because there are only two
respondents from the Gonja tribe, his direct tribal co-ethnics, in the entire survey. The Gonja are a minuscule group in Ghana,
representing only a small fraction of both the national and urban populations, and are a sub-group counted at a level of aggregation
below the main ethnic classifications used on the census. Mahama is generally seen as a "Northerner" in national Ghanaian politics,
targeting resources back to Northern interests, and many Northerners are proud that he is the country’s only major Northern
president (the only other, Hilla Limann, served briefly before being deposed in a coup).
10In an attempt to broaden their appeal beyond their core ethnic groups, the NDC appears to have strategically preferred this
candidate in part because he was not from these already aligned ethnic groups. This itself is evidence for why only defining
ethnic voting based on candidate ethnicities is inappropriate in a setting where ethnic voting is common but parties are trying to
build multi-ethnic winning coalitions. Specifically because there is ethnic voting for parties affiliated with your ethnic group, the
NDC knew it could count on bloc support from many voters in its core groups, so it didn’t have to nominate a candidate from
those groups. But a narrower definition of ethnic voting that focused only on direct candidate ethnicities, rather than longer-term
party-group affiliations, would assume this away in all of these elections.
223
Table A.11: Survey Experiment: Credibility of MPs’ Campaign Promises
1
Promised Good: All




Club Promise 2: New Classrooms 0.039
(0.186)
Public Promise 1: New Classrooms  0.197
(0.186)
Public Promise 2: Low Utility Prices  0.070
(0.186)
Private Promise 1: Jobs  0.071
(0.186)




Name and Background Controls Y
N 1835
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The out-
come is whether a respondent believes the MP in the vi-
gnette will actually deliver the cued good after the elec-
tion. Logistic regression with intercepts partially pooled
by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007).
Includes the same individual-level and neighborhood-
level controls the main text, as well as controls for each
additional treatment condition (name, background, etc).
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Table A.12: Support for Co-Ethnic Party in 2012: Akan and Northerners Only
1 2 3
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)  5.322⇤  5.637⇤
(2.400) (2.380)
Neigh. Wealth (500m)  0.472† 5.033⇤
(0.283) (2.550)
Eth. Fract.* Neigh. Wealth  8.236⇤
(3.845)
Pop. Density (by cluster)  0.019⇤  0.030⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.011)
Assets/Wealth Index 0.236 0.237 0.195
(0.149) (0.150) (0.139)
Education/Employ. Index  0.154  0.139  0.125
(0.134) (0.136) (0.133)
Ethnic Identity “Closest" 0.022  0.001 0.073
(0.246) (0.247) (0.243)
Moved for Family / Ethnicity 0.083 0.050 0.096
(0.262) (0.264) (0.260)
Age  0.009  0.010  0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Muslim 0.072 0.050  0.031
(0.507) (0.501) (0.497)
Male  0.626⇤⇤  0.632⇤⇤  0.556⇤
(0.243) (0.244) (0.240)
Northerner  0.521  0.547  0.659
(0.499) (0.497) (0.490)
Ga 0.770 0.817 0.818
(0.812) (0.808) (0.802)
Years in neighborhood 0.011 0.012 0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Party member 0.214 0.220 0.176
(0.264) (0.265) (0.259)
Constituency FEs Y Y Y
N 458 458 458
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. This exactly replicates Table
5.1 in the main text, but subsets to only Akan and Northern respondents –
co-ethnics of the two presidential candidates.
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A.4.2 Controlling for Characteristics of the Parliamentary Race
I focus on voting in presidential elections for the reasons outlined in the main text. There could be concern,
however, that some features of the concurrent parliamentary race in each constituency could have carry-over
effects on the party that each respondent supports in the presidential race. In particular, one key feature of
parliamentary races in Ghana is that both parties often nominate local parliamentary candidates from the
same ethnic group, selecting whichever ethnic group is the largest in the local area. Indeed, the NDC and
NPP nominated candidates from the same ethnic group in 8 of the 10 constituencies in the survey sample.
In Ablekuma North (an NPP stronghold), the NPP nominated an Akan and the NDC nominated a Muslim
Dagomba Northerner. In Bortianor Ngleshie Amanfro (an NDC stronghold), the NPP nominated a Ga and
the NDC nominated an Ewe.
In an additional series of robustness tests, I replicate the main result for presidential vote share from
Table 1 in the text (column 2), controlling for aspects of the concurrent parliamentary races in each con-
stituency. First, I control for whether respondents were in a constituency where both parliamentary candi-
dates were from the same ethnic group. This could change local ethnic dynamics in the campaign. Second,
I control for whether the parliamentary candidates for each party were from the respondent’s own ethnic
group. This could alter local incentives to support co-ethnics. But I find that the main results for presidential
vote choice in the paper are unaffected by these features of the parliamentary race.
Table A.13: Interaction of Local Fractionalization and Private Goods Delivery
1 2
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)  3.522⇤  3.504⇤
(1.528) (1.541)
Neighborhood Wealth (500m) 2.091† 2.083†
(1.165) (1.165)
Eth. Fractionalization* Neighborhood Wealth  3.395†  3.401†
(1.739) (1.740)
Parl. Candidates from Same Ethnic Group 0.891†
(0.486)
Co-ethnic Party’s Parl. Cand. from Respondent’s Group  0.583
(0.415)
Non-co-ethnic Party’s Parl. Cand. from Respondent’s Group 0.638
(0.474)
Individual-level Covariates Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y
N 797 797
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. This replicates
Column 2 of Table 1 in the main text, including additional control
variables. The outcome is still vote choice for the ethnically-aligned
party in the presidential election, not the parliamentary election.
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A.4.3 Additional Tests for Education or Employment
To demonstrate that education or employment status do not consistently predict ethnic voting, I repeat
the model from Table 5.1, column 1, where the outcome is ethnic voting, while replacing the educa-
tion/employment index with each of its component variables, as well as other variables that measure ed-
ucation or employment status. As discussed in the text, only one of these – having more than a middle
school education – is correlated with ethnic voting (at p = 0.1). Other measures of education (english flu-
ency, other levels of schooling) are not correlated with ethnic voting, however, showing there is no robust





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.4.4 Question on Salience of Ethnic Identity
The main measure of the individual-level salience of ethnic identity replicates a question from Rounds 1
and 2 of the Afrobarometer surveys. This question asks respondents how they define themselves, recording
which of multiple possible identity groups they feel they closest to. Typical responses could be an ethnic
identity (e.g., “an Akan"), a professional identity (e.g., “a nurse"), a regional identity (e.g., “native of Ac-
cra"), a religious identity (e.g., “a Catholic"), etc. This same question has been used in multiple studies to
measure how individuals socially identify themselves, most notably by Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) in
AJPS, which finds that the proportion of respondents on Afrobarometer surevys identifying with their ethnic
groups increases during pre-election periods in African democracies.
The question wording I used was (in translation): “Ghanaians describe themselves in many ways. Some
people describe themselves by their ethnic group or their religion, others describe themselves in economic
terms such as middle class or as a farmer, and others by the place where they live. Besides being a Ghanaian,
which specific group of people do you feel you belong to first and foremost? " Overall, 48.7% of respondents
named their ethnic group as opposed to religious (28.4%), occupation-based (11.0%), location-based (7.3%),
or other types of identities (4.5%). As noted in the main text, respondents who reported their ethnic identity
as most important to them personally were not any more likely to support the party affiliated with their
ethnic group.
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Table A.15: Controlling for Economic Performance Evaluations
Outcome: NDC Vote NDC Vote
Positive Econ. Performance 0.866⇤⇤ 0.836⇤⇤
(0.316) (0.316)
Neigh. Wealth (500m) 1.868⇤  0.419
(0.754) (0.297)
Akan % (500m)  2.334⇤
(2.111)
Neigh. Wealth * Akan %  3.763
(1.843)
Northern % (500m) 11.679⇤⇤⇤
(3.452)
Neigh. Wealth * Northern % 9.989⇤⇤⇤
(2.971)
Covariates Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y
N 592 592
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Replicates columns 1
and 2 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see below). Outcome is support the
NDC for all respondents, not support for the co-ethnic party. The full
set of covariates is included, but not shown for brevity.
A.4.5 Economic Performance Evaluations on NDC Support
Performance evaluations are measured through a question asking respondents if they believe the economy
has been getting better or worse over the last five years, a time period corresponding to when the current
NDC government had taken power. This is similar to the measure of economic performance by incumbent
governments used in papers on economic performance voting in Africa such as Bratton et al. (2011). I code
respondents reporting the economy is getting better as 1, and those who report it is the same or worse as
0. In the table below I replicate the main models from Figure 3 in the main text, including the economic
performance variable. I find that my results are unaffected by including this variable, but also that positive
economic performance evaluations predict NDC support, consistent with existing literature.
While this is strongly correlated with NDC support, it is not clear that this is particularly meaningful.
A positive opinion of NDC economic performance could just as easily be an outcome of pre-existing parti-
sanship as a cause of it (Carlson 2015b). The large literature on partisan bias in surveys suggests that many
voters who already support the government will claim the economy is doing well as an expression of support
for the government (and vice versa for opposition supporters).
230
Table A.16: NDC Vote by Percentage of Surrounding Ethnic Groups
1 2 3 4
Neigh. Wealth (500m) 1.867⇤  0.441  0.511 0.103
(0.749) (0.294) (0.508) (0.431)
Akan % (500m)  2.265
(2.075)
Neigh. Wealth * Akan %  3.808⇤
(1.819)
Northern % (500m) 12.031⇤⇤⇤
(2.967)
Neigh. Wealth * Northern % 10.162⇤⇤⇤
(1.165)
Ewe + Northern % (500m) 3.691⇤
(1.605)
Neigh. Wealth * Ewe/Northern % 2.164
(1.629)
Ga % (500m)  1.827
(1.456)
Neigh. Wealth * Ga %  0.115
(1.335)
Covariates Y Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y
N 592 592 592 592
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Logistic regressions pooled by
sampling location. Non-Ga respondents only. The outcome is 2012 NDC vote choice,
not ethnic voting. Coefficients for the covariates (same as Table 5.1) are not shown.
A.4.6 Regression Table for Figure 5.3
The regression table corresponding to Figure 5.3 in the main text is included here.
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A.4.7 Separate Results for Ga Respondents, Including Ties to Chiefs
Unlike the results for non-Ga respondents in Figure 5.3 of the main text, there is no consistent pattern for
Ga respondents between vote choice and the share of other groups in the neighborhood. In Table A.17, I
replicate the models from Figure 5.3 of the main paper for Gas only. Only the % Akan in the surrounding
area, and only at low, but not high levels of neighborhood wealth (interaction in the opposite direction of
Figure 5.3) is significantly correlated with Ga voting. For non-Gas these models are consistently signed,
this is not the case for the Gas.
Notably, the strongest predictor of Ga support for the NDC in all these models is whether respondents
reported contact with a traditional chief in the last year (top row of Table A.17). This has no predictive
power for other ethnic groups, however, for whom traditional authorities are not active in the city. Contact
with a chief is associated with a 19.5 percentage point greater probability of NDC support (95% CI: 5.9,
33.7) for Gas. This is consistent with the argument in the text about how the Ga have privileged access to
benefits from the NDC through strong ethnic networks that do not exist for other groups in the city.
In addition, in column 5 of Table A.17, I find suggestive evidence that Gas are more likely to vote for
the NDC when surrounded by more Gas (p = 0.11, with N = 212).
A.4.8 Survey Experiment Wording and Conditions
Six specific examples of goods were used, three for private goods and three for club goods. These were
randomly inserted into one of two texts (one each for private and club goods). The goods were then either
to be delivered by the NDC or NPP. Each respondent received one randomly assigned permutation of the
prompt (e.g., NDC, private goods example #1 or NPP, club goods example #3).
The good examples were: “giving out loans to people", “creating training programs for unemployed
youth", or “giving financial assistance to people to help pay their bills and buy food" for private goods;
“school construction", “laying new water pipes", or “constructing more drains and public toilets" for club
goods. Each represents a common good actually delivered by politicians in Greater Accra. The exam-
ples were selected because they were the most common responses to open-ended questions asking about
politicians’ activities during a pilot version of the survey.
The full prompts were as follows. For the private goods examples (in this case when cued as NPP):
“The national government has limited resources, so when they do something like [EXAMPLE], they can’t
do it for everyone. They have to do it for some people first, before giving it to other people. If the NPP had
won the 2012 election, and the NPP government was [EXAMPLE], do you think that people like you and
your family would get it or would they do it more for other people? I’m asking for your personal opinion."
For the club goods examples (in this case when when cued as NDC): “The national government has limited
resources, so when they do something like [EXAMPLE], they can’t do it everywhere. They have to do it in
some places first before going to other places. If the NDC government was [EXAMPLE], do you think that
neighborhoods like this would get it or would they do it more in other places? I’m asking for your personal
opinion."
A.4.9 Balance in the Survey Experiment
I report univariate balance statistics after randomization for the survey experiment here for the difference
between respondents receiving treatment and control conditions when these are defined either as: (a) receiv-
ing the cue from your co-ethnic party vs. non-co-ethnic party, or (b) receiving the cue for the NDC versus
the NPP. Because balance remains imperfect (due to the limited sample sizes) I control for all of the same
covariates as in Table 5.1 in the main text in all analysis of the survey experiment.
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Table A.17: Ga NDC Vote by Surrounding Ethnic Groups
1 2 3 4 5
Met Chief 1.902⇤ 2.090⇤⇤ 2.024⇤⇤ 1.964⇤⇤ 1.883⇤
(0.755) (0.796) (0.776) (0.757) (0.750)
Neigh. Wealth (500m)  1.838⇤  0.317  0.781 0.548 0.075
(0.916) (0.448) (0.703) (0.700) (0.443)
Akan % (500m)  2.610
(4.344)
Neigh. Wealth * Akan % 5.154⇤
(2.541)
Northern % (500m)  9.522
(5.838)
Neigh. Wealth * Northern % 1.466
(5.543)
Ewe + Northern % (500m)  3.822
(3.464)
Neigh. Wealth * Ewe/Northern % 2.823
(2.755)
Ga % (500m) 3.109 4.049
(2.731) (2.545)
Neigh. Wealth * Ga % 1.374
(1.583)
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y Y
N 212 212 212 212 212
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Ga respondents only. The outcome is NDC
vote choice. The models are the same as in the table for Figure 5.3 in the main text (see above).
Coefficients for covaries not shown.
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In Table A.18 I provide differences in means for the main binary covariates, along with p-values, and
show that the only variable with a significant difference between treatment and control groups for the co-
ethnic party treatment is having moved to join family or co-ethnics. For the NDC treatment there is a
significant difference between treatment conditions for the ethnicity salience variable. I thus control for
both of these in regression models for all analysis of this data. In Figure A.1 I give quantile-quantile-plots
of the balance between the same treatment and control groups for the continuous covariates. The weakest
balance is for the individual assets/wealth index for the NDC treatment, which is also controlled for in all
analysis.
Table A.18: Differences in Means (Treated v. Control) for Binary Covariates
Co-Ethnic Party Treatment NDC Treatment
Variable Diff. Means (T v. C) p-value Diff. Means (T v. C) p-value
Male -0.013 0.679 -0.007 0.827
More than Middle School education 0.031 0.323 0.013 0.691
Formal Sector employment -0.020 0.390 -0.007 0.770
Fluent English 0.022 0.478 -0.002 0.962
Party Member 0.003 0.902 -0.059 0.028
Ethnicity Salient -0.035 0.232 0.080 0.007
Moved for Family or Ethnic Group -0.058 0.037 -0.014 0.598
A.4.10 Overall Treatment Effects in Survey Experiment
To estimate the co-ethnic party treatment effect, while controlling for remaining imbalance, I estimate vari-
ants of the following models:
expectsi = ↵j[i] + ✓k[j] +  1CoEthnicPartyi +  2PrivateGoodi +  3QuestionOrderI+
 4Fractionalizationi +  5NeighWealthi +  6Densityj +Xi  + ✏i
(A.1)
expectsi = ↵j[i] + ✓k[j] +  1CoEthnicPartyi +ClubExamplei +  2QuestionOrderI+
 3Fractionalizationi +  4NeighWealthi +  5Densityj +Xi  + ✏i
(A.2)
expectsi = ↵j[i] + ✓k[j] +  1CoEthnicPartyi +PrivExamplei +  2QuestionOrderI+
 3Fractionalizationi +  4NeighWealthi +  5Densityj +Xi  + ✏i
(A.3)
where expectsi is a binary indicator for respondent i expecting to receive the good in the prompt,CoEthnicPartyi
is an indicator for the party cued in the experiment, PrivateGoodi is an indicator for whether the question
was about a private or club goods example,ClubExamplei andPrivExamplei are vectors of indicators
for each specific example of good, and QuestionOrderi controls for whether the question came before or
after a similar question about goods delivered by Members of Parliament (analyzed elsewhere). The other
covariates, modeling approach, and constituency fixed effects remain as described in the main text in mod-
els for vote choice. Using equation 1, I simulate the overall size of the co-ethnic party treatment effect as
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Figure A.1: Balance Plots for Survey Experiment Treatment Conditions: When points fall along the center
line, the data is balanced for that covariate between the treatment conditions labeled on the axes.
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Table A.19: Co-Ethnic Party Treatment Effect (Eq. 1)
1
Co-Ethnic Party Treatment 0.673⇤⇤⇤
(0.144)




Ethnic Fractionalization (500m) 0.023
(1.167)
Neigh. Wealth (500m)  0.177
(0.145)






Ethnic Identity “Closest"  0.133
(0.147)




















***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
†p < 0.1. Overall estimate of the co-
ethnic party treatment effect for all re-
spondents, following equation 1 above.
Constituency fixed effects not shown.
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A.4.11 Private Goods Expectations and Actual Private Goods Distribution
In the main text I show that expectations of goods delivery reported in the survey experiment are closely
correlated with actual ethnic voting behavior: respondents who receive the treatment about their co-ethnic
party are more likely to report voting for that party if they say they expect to benefit from the example good
from that party. This holds for expectations about both the club and private goods examples, but there are
some differences in responses by the type of good cued in the prompt.
Respondents who received the co-ethnic party treatment (T = 1) are 27.9 percentage points more likely
(95% CI: 16.7, 38.8) to report ethnic voting when expecting to benefit from a club good from that party than
when expecting “other places" to benefit from the club good instead. This is compared to only 12 percentage
points more likely (95% CI: 0.6, 22.7) to report ethnic voting when expecting to benefit from a private good
from that party compared to expecting “other people" to benefit instead.
But private goods expectations are significantly more correlated with ethnic voting in local neighbor-
hoods where private goods distribution is empirically more common. By contrast, in the neighborhoods
where private goods distribution doesn’t happen often (i.e., top row of Figure 1 in the main text), expecta-
tions about benefiting from private goods from the co-ethnic party do not correlate with voting behavior for
that party.
I show this by using the survey question discussed above that measures whether respondents know
about government private goods distribution in their neighborhood. I aggregate these responses by sampling
cluster to produce a measure of the percentage of respondents in each neighborhood who are aware of private
goods distribution. In Table A.20, I split the sample to only those respondents who received the co-ethnic
party treatment (T = 1) and estimate a multi-level model in which the outcome is ethnic voting and the
main explanatory variable is whether you report expecting to receive the good from your co-ethnic party.
I find a significant interaction between expectations of receiving the private good and actual private goods
distribution (column 4), but there is no similar interaction for expectations about club goods distribution –
instead, club goods expectations are correlated with ethnic voting everywhere (see column 2), consistent
with the assumption in the theory section that club goods are distributed by the parties in both poor and
middle class neighborhoods (both rows of Figure 1).
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Table A.20: Ethnic Voting by Club or Private Goods Expectations from Co-Ethnic Party
Club Only Club Only Private Only Private Only
Expects Good 1.990⇤⇤⇤ 1.350⇤ 0.961⇤ 0.039
(0.447) (0.664) (0.459) (0.668)
% Reporting Patronage (by cluster)  2.455  1.241
(2.139) (2.392)
Expects Good * % Patronage 3.686 6.666†
(2.892) (3.877)
Club Example (Water) 0.420 0.400
(0.478) (0.481)
Club Example (Drains/Toilets)  0.125  0.090
(0.507) (0.514)
Private Example (Training) 0.286 0.138
(0.507) (0.522)
Private Example (Expenses) 0.544 0.405
(0.529) (0.538)
Question Order  0.003 0.020  0.224  0.161
(0.403) (0.408) (0.424) (0.432)
Covariates Y Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y
N 201 201 207 207
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The outcome is ethnic voting in 2012.
Subset to respondents who received the co-ethnic party treatment (T = 1). Columns 1 and 2
look at questions about club goods. Columns 3 and 4 are for private goods. The third, omitted
baseline club goods example indicator is for school construction; the omitted baseline private
goods example indicator is for loans. All other covariates as before are included, as well as
constituency fixed effects, but coefficients are not shown.
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A.4.12 Club Goods Expectations by Surrounding Ethnic Group
I find that the NDC treatment effect for club goods varies with the proportion of Akans and Northerners
around non-Ga respondents in a similar pattern to Figure 5.3 in the main text. The estimates in the text are
simulated from the models in Table A.21 below.
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Table A.21: Club Goods Expectations by Surrounding Ethnic Groups
Club Club Club Club
Rich Neighs. Rich Neighs. Rich Neighs. Rich Neighs.
NDC Treatment 3.182†  1.656†  0.846  0.362
(1.784) (0.950) (1.201) (0.778)
Akan % (500m) 0.427
(4.498)
NDC Treatment * Akan %  6.046†
(3.476)
Northern % (500m)  39.967⇤
(15.569)
NDC Treatment * Northern % 32.869†
(17.005)
Ewe + Northern % (500m)  9.764⇤
(4.403)
NDC Treatment * Ewe + Northern % 4.120
(4.715)
Ga % (500m) 3.771
(3.250)
NDC Treatment * Ga % 2.658
(3.525)
Club Example (Water)  0.009  0.086 0.063 0.037
(0.463) (0.475) (0.472) (0.466)
Club Example (Drains/Toilets) 0.539 0.489 0.559 0.527
(0.481) (0.490) (0.481) (0.480)
Question Order 0.258 0.296 0.363 0.300
(0.381) (0.389) (0.385) (0.382)
Covariates Y Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y
N 183 201 207 207
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The outcome is expecting to benefit from the cued
club good, for non-Ga respondents only (for comparison to Figure 5.3). Restricted to neighborhoods
with above average wealth. Covariates as before are included. Coefficients not shown.
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Table A.22: Table for Figure 4
Outcome: Club Goods Expectation Private Goods Expectation
Co-Ethnic Party Treatment 3.289⇤ 2.996⇤⇤⇤
(1.309) (0.841)
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m) 1.544
(1.969)
Co-Ethnic Treatment * Ethnic Fract.  3.579†
(1.888)
% Groups Affiliated with Co-Ethnic Party (500m) 2.430
(1.640)
Co-Ethnic Treatment * Groups Affiliated (500m)  4.996⇤⇤
(1.920)
Club Example (Water)  0.093
(0.244)
Club Example (Drains/Toilets) 0.359
(0.241)
Private Example (Training) 0.091
(0.334)
Private Example (Expenses) ( 0.126)
(0.325)
Covariates Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y
N 510 345
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. In column 1, the outcome is expecting to receive
the club good in the prompt. In column 2, the outcome is expecting to receive the private good in
the prompt. All other covariates as before are included, as well as constituency fixed effects, but
coefficients are not shown for brevity.
A.4.13 Table for Figure 5.4
This is the corresponding table for Figure 5.4 in the main text. The first column corresponds to Panel (a)
and shows that the co-ethnic party treatment effect for club goods declines in all neighborhoods as ethnic
diversity rises, consistent with the theory in Figure 5.1 of the main text. The second column corresponds to
Panel (b) and shows that respondents have the largest expectations of favoritism in private goods from the
co-ethnic party when living in a neighborhood surrounded by fewer other co-ethnics of that party. The latter
column is subset to non-Ga respondents only, as discussed in the main text.
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A.4.14 Favoritism Expectations of Ga Respondents
Ga respondents expect significantly more private goods from the NDC than the NPP where there are more
Gas in the surrounding neighborhood and Gas occupy most party and local government positions (column 1
of Table A.23). The size of the NDC treatment effect for club goods for Gas is also greatest where there are
more Gas (columns 2 and 3 of Table A.23). But this does not vary with the Akan or Northern proportion in
the neighborhood, consistent with whether Ga voters receive club goods being less tied to the presence of
other groups around them (columns 4 and 5 of Table A.23),
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Table A.23: Club and Private Goods Expectations, Ga Respondents Only
Private Club Club Club Club
NDC Treatment  2.359⇤ 1.672⇤⇤  0.538 3.086⇤ 2.157⇤⇤
(1.072) (0.524) (0.989) (1.268) (0.713)
Ga % (500m)  1.000  1.976  5.722
(2.714) (3.272) (3.585)
NDC Treatment * Ga % 4.306† 5.842⇤
(2.263) (2.340)
Akan % (500m)  1.192
(6.216)
NDC Treatment * Akan %  4.364
(3.494)
Northern % (500m) 15.999†
(8.885)
NDC Treatment * Northern %  6.478
(5.700)
Private Example (Training) 1.033†
(0.578)
Private Example (Expenses) 0.762
(0.600)
Club Example (Water)  0.989  0.851  0.928  0.951
(0.628) (0.644) (0.622) (0.636)
Club Example (Drains/Toilets) 0.332 0.344 0.333 0.254
(0.590) (0.599) (0.590) (0.599)
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y Y
N 132 132 132 132 132
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The outcome is expecting to benefit from the
cued club good, for Ga respondents only. The NDC is the co-ethnic party. All other covariates as
before are included, as well as constituency fixed effects, but coefficients are not shown. Because
of the small sample size with Ga respondents alone, it is not possible to split the sample by the
mean value of the neighborhood wealth index (model will not fit). The omitted baseline club
goods example indicator is for school construction; the omitted baseline private goods example
indicator is for loans.
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A.4.15 Difference between Located Polling Stations and Full Results
Results for many polling stations are dropped, as described in the text, because (a) they have not been geo-
located or (b) census GIS data is not available for that constituency. The remaining polling stations used
in the analysis still have very similar distributions of election results compared to the full set of available
polling station results for each election year. This can be seen in Table A.24 below.
Table A.24: Polling Station Results, Included v. Full Set
2008, Full 2008, Included 2012, Full 2012, Included
Mean NDC Vote Share at ps 51.4% 52.0% 51.2% 51.8%
Median NDC Vote Share at ps 49.6% 49.7% 51.4% 52.0%
25th percentile NDC Vote Share at ps 40.0% 41.6% 40.6% 43.1%
75th percentile NDC Vote Share at ps 60.6% 61.2% 60.8% 59.4%
Mean Turnout at ps 66.6% 65.9% 76.4% 76.5%
Median Turnout at ps 67.0% 66.6% 77.4% 77.5%
N 2158 587 2823 650
244
A.4.16 Regression Table for Polling Station Results
The main OLS regressions for the analysis of polling station results are included here. In each model I
control for the share of the population at the polling station from un-affiliated ethnic groups, but omit the
groups affiliated with the other party, such that the coefficients on the share of Akans at the polling station
in columns 1 or 2, for example, represent the predicted change in NDC vote share from replacing an NDC-
affiliated voter with an Akan (NPP-affiliated).
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Table A.25: NDC Presidential Vote Share, 2008 and 2012 Polling Station Results
1 2 3 4 5 6
Akan % in 500m  0.450⇤⇤⇤  1.343⇤⇤⇤
(0.042) (0.291)
Akan % (500m)*Eth. Fract. (2km) 1.352⇤⇤
(0.434)
Ga % in 500m 0.436⇤⇤⇤ 0.755⇤⇤ 0.426⇤⇤⇤ 0.438⇤⇤⇤
(0.043) (0.236) (0.045) (0.044)
Ewe % in 500m 0.512⇤⇤⇤ 0.494⇤⇤⇤ 0.270 0.503⇤⇤⇤
(0.056) (0.059) (0.377) (0.059)
Northern % in 500m 0.269⇤⇤⇤ 0.210⇤⇤ 0.245⇤⇤⇤ 1.838⇤⇤
(0.068) (0.076) (0.073) (0.640)
Ga % (500m)*Eth. Fract. (2km)  0.506
(0.362)
Ewe % (500m)*Eth. Fract. (2km) 0.339
(0.552)
Northern % (500m)*Eth. Fract. (2km)  2.104⇤
(0.839)
Ethnic Fractionalization (2km)  0.498⇤⇤ 0.237† 0.025 0.238⇤
(0.186) (0.139) (0.150) (0.111)
Other Groups % in 500m  0.060  0.023 0.414⇤⇤⇤ 0.353⇤⇤⇤ 0.384⇤⇤⇤ 0.369⇤⇤⇤
(0.073) (0.080) (0.080) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
Neigh. Wealth (500m)  0.007  0.009  0.010†  0.012†  0.011†  0.012†
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Neigh. Wealth (2km) 0.003 0.000  0.002  0.000
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Population Density at PS 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Registered Voters at PS  0.002⇤⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤  0.002⇤⇤
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constituency-Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y
N 834 834 834 834 834 834
R2 0.442 0.449 0.451 0.453 0.452 0.456
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. OLS regressions with parliamentary constituency-year fixed
effects (not shown). The outcome is NDC presidential vote share in the 2008 or 2012 election at the polling station
level for Greater Accra, with missing data as described in the text. Polling stations that share the same location
are collapsed into a single observation. For readability, population density is scaled as 1000s per sq. km and total
registered voters per polling station scaled to 100s per station.
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Table A.26: Results for Vote Choice, Dropping Respondent Sorting on Demand for Club Goods
Outcome: Ethnic Voting NDC Vote NDC Vote
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)  3.152⇤
(1.576)
Neigh. Wealth (500m) 1.750 1.892⇤  0.412
(1.190) (0.827) (0.311)
Ethnic Fract. * Neigh. Wealth  2.859
(1.788)
Akan % (500m)  2.520
(2.216)
Neigh. Wealth * Akan %  3.968⇤
(1.956)
Northern % (500m) 11.558⇤⇤
(3.785)
Neigh. Wealth * Northern % 9.415⇤⇤
(3.214)
Covariates Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y
N 757 525 525
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The first column repli-
cates column 2 of Table 5.1 in the main text, with outcome as support for a
co-ethnic party. The second and third columns replicate columns 1-2 of the
table for Figure 5.3 (see above), with the outcome as NDC vote (for non-Ga
respondents only). Both are for dropping all respondents who report choosing
their neighborhood because of demand for club goods. Covariates included,
but not shown.
A.4.17 Respondents Who Move for Public Services
10.8% of respondents noted that the reason they had moved to their current location was because of the club
goods in that area – for better schools, roads, water, etc. – or because of the security from crime in that area,
which can also be seen as a club good (police effort and capacity vary by location). Adding an indicator
controlling for having moved to a neighborhood because of demands for club goods does not affect any of
the results (not shown). In addition, the results are robust to dropping this subset of respondents who sorted
on demands for club goods. Table A.26 below replicates the key results after dropping these respondents.
Note that the p-value on the interaction term between ethnic diversity and neighborhood wealth is p = .11
in the first column of Table A.26. Results for the survey experiment when dropping these respondents are
also similar (not shown).
A.4.18 Having Moved
Having moved – and thus having explicitly chosen a neighborhood – is not predictive of ethnic voting. I re-
peat the model from column 1 of Table 5.1, including an indicator for having moved and find no correlation.
The negative correlation between ethnic voting and local diversity remains unaffected. While this does not
rule out confounding from other types of sorting (as discussed in the text), it does suggest that most of the
reasons people move between neighborhoods are not correlated with whether they support co-ethnic parties.
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Table A.27: Ethnic Voting on Having Moved
1
Has Moved (0,1) 0.156
(0.349)
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)  2.513†
(1.428)





***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,
†p < 0.1. Repeats column 1 from
Table 5.1 in the main text, controlling
for whether respondents moved at some
point in their lives (and thus selected into
a neighborhood). All other covariates and
modeling approach remain as in Table
5.1, but coefficient not shown for space.
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A.4.19 Controlling for Searching Multiple Neighborhoods
The main results for vote choice from Tables 5.1 and Figure 5.3 in the main text also hold when controlling
for an indicator for whether respondents searched for housing in multiple neighborhoods. Moreover, these
respondents who had the widest range of choices of neighborhoods – and thus could have sorted on parti-
sanship or other non-price factors – are also not more or less likely to vote for co-ethnic parties. Table A.28
repeats column 2 of Table 5.1 and columns 1-3 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above) controlling for this.
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Table A.28: Results for Vote Choice, Controlling for Choosing Among Multiple Neighs.
Outcome: Ethnic Voting NDC Vote NDC Vote NDC Vote
Search Multiple Neighs. 0.100 0.146 0.161 0.198
(0.248) (0.276) (0.279) (0.280)
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)  3.538⇤
(1.530)
Neigh. Wealth (500m) 2.066† 1.879⇤  0.437  0.546
(1.167) (0.751) (0.294) (0.512)
Ethnic Fract. * Neigh. Wealth  3.349†
(1.743)
Akan % (500m)  2.255
(2.077)
Neigh. Wealth * Akan %  3.824⇤
(1.822)
Northern % (500m) 12.023⇤⇤⇤
(3.451)
Neigh. Wealth * Northern % 10.252⇤⇤⇤
(2.977)
Ewe + Northern % (500m) 3.668⇤
(1.605)
Neigh. Wealth * Ewe + Northern % 2.331
(1.651)
Covariates Y Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y
N 797 592 592 592
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The first column replicates column
2 of Table 5.1 in the main text, with outcome as support for a co-ethnic party. The
remaining columns replicate columns 1-3 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above), with
the outcome as NDC vote (for non-Ga respondents only). All covariates included, but
not shown.
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A.4.20 Dropping Wealthiest Respondents
Because wealthier respondents are the most likely to have been able to sort explicitly among neighborhoods,
I re-estimate the main results for vote choice dropping the top 25% of the sample on either the assets
index or education/employment index. The results remain substantively robust, although with the smaller
sample sizes some of the interaction effects are no longer statistically significant (but still signed in the same
directions with the same magnitudes). Table A.29 replicates column 2 from Table 5.1 and columns 1-2 from





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.4.21 Ethnic Sorting and Diversity
Respondents who found their home through their ethnic group ties are not actually more likely to live in
neighborhoods that are less diverse, as would need to be the case for this type of sorting to explain Table 5.1.
I estimate this by regressing ethnic fractionalization around each respondent (using OLS) on the indicator
variable for whether a respondent is living in a place because of family or ethnic group ties, controlling for
the same set of covariates as in all other models. Living in at a place because of family or group ties does
not predict each respondent’s neighborhood’s diversity (coef=  0.004, p = 0.33) suggesting that this type
of sorting cannot account for the results in Table 5.1 in the main text.
A.4.22 Living with Other Groups
24.5% of respondents live with people from a group aligned with the opposite, non-co-ethnic party. Re-
estimating the models for column 2 of Table 5.1 and columns 1-3 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above) in
Table A.30 while controlling for this returns substantively identical results, however, and this type of contact
with other ethnic groups does not predict vote choice.
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Table A.30: Results for Vote Choice, Controlling for Living with Opposite Ethnic Group
Outcome: Ethnic Voting NDC Vote NDC Vote NDC Vote
Live w/ Other Party Group 0.180 0.076  0.012 0.036
(0.213) (0.256) (0.257) (0.256)
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)  3.557⇤
(1.530)
Neigh. Wealth (500m) 2.131† 1.875⇤  0.442  0.505
(1.165) (0.749) (0.296) (0.510)
Ethnic Fract. * Neigh. Wealth  3.445⇤
(1.739)
Akan % (500m)  2.283
(2.076)
Neigh. Wealth * Akan %  3.813⇤
(1.820)
Northern % (500m) 12.041⇤⇤⇤
(3.450)
Neigh. Wealth * Northern % 10.174⇤⇤⇤
(2.975)
Ewe + Northern % (500m) 3.691⇤
(1.605)
Neigh. Wealth * Ewe + Northern % 2.151
(1.631)
Covariates Y Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y
N 797 592 592 592
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The first column replicates column
2 of Table 5.1 in the main text, with outcome as support for a co-ethnic party. The
remaining columns replicate columns 1-3 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above), with




As discussed in Chapter 5, I interact each of the main neighborhood explanatory variables in Table 5.1
and Figure 5.3 with an indicator for whether respondents commute to work somewhere else outside the
neighborhood. Table A.31 shows selected results of this analysis, indicating that there are no significant
differences in the effects of the neighborhood variables between those who do and do not commute to work
somewhere else.
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Table A.31: Results for Vote Choice, Interacting Neigh. Variables and Commuting
Outcome: Ethnic Voting NDC Vote NDC Vote NDC Vote
Commutes 1.786  1.113†  0.470  0.043
(1.230) (0.593) (0.315) (0.524)
Ethnic Fractionalization (500m)  1.576
(1.546)
Neigh. Wealth (500m)  0.155 0.392 0.238 0.125
(0.171) (0.249) (0.225) (0.230)
Commutes * Ethnic Fract.  2.627
(1.747)
Akan % (500m)  3.358
(2.093)
Commutes * Akan % 1.558
(1.435)
Northern % (500m) 3.299
(2.364)
Commutes * Northern %  0.269
(1.597)
Ewe + Northern % (500m) 4.455⇤⇤
(1.688)
Commutes * Ewe + Northern %  1.529
(1.528)
Covariates Y Y Y Y
Constituency FEs Y Y Y Y
N 797 592 592 592
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The first column replicates column 1
of Table 5.1 in the main text, with outcome as support for a co-ethnic party, interacting
the ethnic fractionalization measure with the indicator for commuting. The remaining
columns replicate columns 1-3 of the table for Figure 5.3 (see above), with the out-
come as NDC vote (for non-Ga respondents only), now interacting the share of each




A.5.1 Coding Rules for Determining Ethnicity from Names
Names in Ghana are often clearly associated with different ethnic groups. The names of candidates in
the district assembly elections were coded by a group of 5 Ghanaian research assistants. These RAs were
university students in Accra and came from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. Each name was given to 3
of the 5 RAs to code. Each RA was asked to code a first, second, and third guess for each name. They were
instructed to fill out only the first guess in cases where they were confident of the exact ethnicity and fill out
the second and third guesses in cases where they were less confident. These guesses were aggregated using
the following rules to successfully identify the major ethnic category (Akan, Ga, Ewe, Northern) of 91% of
the candidates’ names: (1) if two of three, or three of three, agreed on a single ethnicity coding, the name
was assigned that ethnicity; (2) if all three put different ethnicities for the first guess, but two RAs put the
same ethnicity for their second guess that the third RA put for his first guess, the name was assigned to that
ethnicity. In all other cases, the name was coded as missing.
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Table A.32: Nationwide District-Level Turnout in 2010 Assembly Election
1 2 3




Middle Class %  0.691⇤  0.703⇤
(0.157) (0.158)
NPP 2008 Pres. Vote Share 0.026
(0.039)
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.091⇤  0.134⇤  0.137⇤
(0.034) (0.036) (0.036)
(Intercept) 0.440⇤ 0.540⇤ 0.530⇤
(0.018) (0.022) (0.027)
R2 0.643 0.580 0.581
N 177 177 177
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The out-
come is turnout as percentage of registered voters per district.
Weighted Least Squares regressions, with weights by number of
registered voters per district. There are 177 observations for the
170 districts because the district-level data was decomposed into
sub-metropolitan assemblies – sub-district level – for the Accra
Metropolitan Assembly. One district did not hold assembly elec-
tions in 2010 because of pending legal action. Results for 2008 NDC
vote share are similar (not shown).
A.5.2 Regressions of Nationwide District-level Turnout in Local Elections
I use district-level turnout figures for the entire country in the 2010 district assembly election to examine
how aggregate turnout rates vary with district-level demographic characteristics. As discussed in the text, I
find significantly less turnout in urban districts and in district with larger middle class populations. These
weighted least square regression (with districts weighted by the number of registered voters) are shown in
the following table. Weights are used because Ghanaian districts can vary dramatically in size.
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Table A.33: Probability of Ga Victory
1
Turnout in ELA % 6.129†
(3.516)
Middle Class (Index) %  3.565
(2.606)
Ga % in ELA 6.604⇤⇤
(2.459)








***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The outcome
is a binary indicator for whether a Ga candidate won the as-
sembly election in each ELA. These are logistic regressions
with the same predictors as column 5 of Table 6.1 in the main
text.
A.5.3 Relationship Between Ga Victory and Turnout by ELA
I estimate the probability that a Ga candidate won each assembly election in 2010 using logistic regressions
with an indicator for a Ga victory as the outcome and the same predictors as column 5 of Table 6.1, as well
as percentage turnout in each ELA (the outcome in Table 6.1). Controlling for the Ga population percentage
in each ELA, which understandably predicts whether a Ga candidate wins, Gas are also most likely to win
where turnout in the elections was lowest.
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A.5.4 Full Version of Table 6.2
Coefficients for several control variables in the version of Table 6.2 in the main text are not included so the
table fits on a single page. The full table, with all coefficients, is reproduced here. It shows that NDC vote
share in each respondent’s ELA also does not predict helpfulness of the assembly members, as noted in the
text.
260
Table A.34: Reported Helpfulness of Assembly Members – Full Version
1 2 3 4 5 6
Turnout in 2010 (by ELA) 18.570⇤
(8.982)
Ga Assemblyman (by ELA)  0.808†  1.927⇤ 1.779
(0.439) (0.954) (1.358)
Ga % in ELA  7.814⇤  7.164⇤⇤  4.828
(3.814) (2.659) (3.479)
Ga Assemblyman * Ga % 5.127
(3.476)
Ga Segregation in ELA  2.393
(1.774)
Ga Assemblyman * Ga Seg.  9.708†
(5.203)
Party Member 0.720⇤⇤ 0.621⇤ 0.629⇤ 0.549⇤ 0.698⇤





NDC 2008 Pres. Vote Share (by ELA)  1.917  1.396  4.076  3.327  0.822  5.288
(2.273) (2.413) (2.718) ( 3.327) (3.173) (3.937)
Development Index (500m)  0.071  0.061  0.361  0.696⇤  0.845⇤  0.233
(0.267) (0.282) (0.317) (0.355) (0.350) (0.553)
Population Density (by cluster) 0.025⇤ 0.024⇤ 0.025⇤ 0.016 0.012 0.019
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Years in Neighborhood 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.015† 0.015
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Age  0.002  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.007  0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Muslim 0.848⇤ 0.899⇤ 0.795⇤ 0.780⇤ 0.730† 0.857⇤
(0.357) (0.393) (0.376) (0.376) (0.378) (0.405)
Male 0.654⇤⇤⇤ 0.688⇤⇤ 0.723⇤⇤⇤ 0.716⇤⇤⇤ 0.706⇤⇤⇤ 0.817⇤⇤⇤
(0.190) (0.213) (0.205) (0.206) (0.208) (0.234)
Ewe  0.636⇤  0.452  0.565†  0.605†  0.525  0.642†
(0.307) (0.333) (0.326) (0.326) (0.329) (0.381)
Northerner  0.259  0.307  0.285  0.327  0.233  0.231
(0.384) (0.428) (0.404) (0.406) (0.413) (0.433)
Ga 0.551⇤ 0.617⇤ 0.547⇤ 0.580⇤ 0.598⇤ 0.734⇤
(0.250) (0.282) (0.275) (0.275) (0.283) (0.322)
Assets Index 0.024  0.009 0.070 0.090 0.100 0.024
(0.116) (0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.130) (0.148)
Education/Employ. Index 0.099 0.109 0.093 0.100 0.090 0.116
(0.109) (0.124) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.135)
Move for Club Goods 0.574† 0.588† 0.804⇤ 0.852⇤⇤ 0.948⇤⇤ 1.075⇤⇤
(0.310) (0.356) (0.329) (0.331) (0.334) (0.410)
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 995 804 793 793 752 584
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The outcome is a binary indicator for whether respondents
report that their assembly member is at least “sometimes" helpful. All models are multi-level logistic
regressions with intercepts partially pooled by sampling cluster, following Gelman and Hill (2007) and
include district-level fixed effects (including for the sub-metropolitan assemblies within the AMA). All
models include the full set of individual and neighborhood-level controls described in the text (not shown
for space). Missingness in column 2 is for respondents who did not identify the party they belong to.
Missingness in columns 3-5 is because the RAs could not agree on ethnicity codings for all assembly
members. Respondents from Ga South and Ledzokuku-Krowor districts are dropped in column 6 because
turnout data was not available.
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A.5.5 Reports of Club Good Construction by Ethnic Group and Partisanship
There could be concern that response bias is driving the patterns of favoritism in goods distribution that I find
in Chapter 6. This would be an issue if respondents who live in the same exact place give different answers
to the factual questions about whether specific club goods are distributed based on their own partisanship
or ethnicity. I test for this by taking the questions about club goods from the main voter survey (where I
have a full set of individual-level covariates) and estimating if respondents who live in the exact same place
gave different responses by including survey location-level fixed effects for each of the 48 locations in the
sample. Controlling for differences across locations, I find that Ewe respondents were slightly more likely
to report road construction. This does not line up with the aggregate results I report in the paper, in which I
find that Ga areas are favored in the road construction. This result indicating Ga favoritism is thus unlikely
to be affected by this response bias.
However, I find that NDC supporters are significantly more likely to report school construction, even
when including survey location-level fixed effects. This could indicate that the favoritism to NDC areas I
see in school construction is an artifact of NDC voters being more likely to claim that the NDC constructed a
school. But for this type of partisan response bias to be a serious concern, one would expect NDC supporters
to also be more likely to claim that the NDC delivered the other types of goods as well. But this is not the
case, as shown in the table below. Ultimately, this result that NDC supporters are more likely to claim that
schools were constructed conditioning on survey location-level differences may simply be noise from the
small samples within each survey location. Only 7 respondents in each location were asked these questions
about club goods, as described in the main text.
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Table A.35: Individual-Level Characteristics and Reports of Club Good Construction
Roads Streetlights Schools
Voted NDC in 2012  0.792 0.057 1.604⇤
(0.500) (0.448) (0.675)
Male  0.126 0.266  0.289
(0.389) (0.372) (0.505)
Muslim  0.051 0.745 2.221
(0.941) (0.937) (1.661)
Ewe  1.505†  0.016  1.008
(0.807) (0.648) (1.058)
Ga 0.923 0.225  1.030
(0.676) (0.644) (1.074)
Northerner 0.290  0.718  0.218
(1.056) (1.029) (1.737)
Survey Location FEs Y Y Y
N 256 256 256
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. The outcome is
a binary indicator for whether a respondent reported that each good
was delivered in her community in the last five years. These are lo-
gistic regressions that include survey location fixed effects for each
of the 48 neighborhoods in the main voter survey. This estimates
within-location differences in the probability of reporting a specific
good is distributed, even though the factually correct answer should
be the same for each location. Akan is the omitted ethnicity cate-
gory.
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